

CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STRATEGIC STUDIES

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Contents

<i>Editor's Note</i>	VII
1. Strengthening India's Nuclear Deterrent <i>Lt Gen Dr V K Saxena (Retd)</i>	11
2. Siachen – The Historical Perspective and The Challenges Ahead <i>Lt Gen Sanjay Kulkarni (Retd)</i>	29
3. Massive Ordnance Air Blast, MOAB :- A Perspective <i>Rear Adm Dr S Kulshrestha (Retd)</i>	47
4. Contextualising India's Position as a Leading Power <i>Brig Rumel Dahiya (Retd)</i>	60
5. Haksar and the Making of Indira <i>Shri Jairam Ramesh, MP, Rajya Sabha</i>	73
6. India's Nuclear Capability Policies and Diplomacy <i>Dr Vijay Khare, Shri Gaurav Kokil, Shri Victor Leray</i>	95
7. Dynamics of Security in Central Asia and its Implications for the Regional Integration <i>Maj Gen BK Sharma (Retd)1</i>	103
8. Tournaments in the Shadows: OBOR/CPEC and India's Strategy <i>Air Commodore SN Bal (Retd)</i>	119
9. Book Review of "50 Years of the Outer Space Treaty: Tracing the Journey" <i>Shri Anand V</i>	143
10. Contextualizing Research Methodology for Indian Think Tanks <i>Prof Gautam Sen</i>	149





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EDITOR'S NOTE

The last quarter witnessed two major events which are likely to have significant effect on India's security.

The first was the Summit on the One Belt One Road (OBOR) Forum held in Beijing from 14 – 16 May 2017 at China's initiative which made global headlines. Significant powers attended this scintillating event. Junior diplomats and some academics represented India. China sneered that an isolated India "having missed the bus" would have no "future voice" on the initiative: but hinted that it could board it in the future. India can do so at a time and place of its choosing: when the destination and seat offered further its strategic interests. The 'Summit' and the current stand off at India China border at Doka La in Sikkim is an indicator of the major trust deficit between the two countries.

The second major event was the Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to the U.S. and his establishment of a personal equation with U.S. President Donald Trump. The joint statement by Mr Trump and Mr Modi went beyond the earlier American position while pulling up Pakistan. Stressing that terrorism was a "global scourge that must be fought and terrorist safe havens rooted out in every part of the world," the two leaders gave out a call to root out "terrorist safe havens" in "every part of the world". Both leaders said that they were "committed to strengthening cooperation against terrorist threats from groups including Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, D-Company, and their affiliates. United States designated Hizb-ul-Mujahideen leader Syed Salahuddin as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist as evidence of it's commitment to end terror in all its forms.

VIII *CASS Journal*

This issue of our journal opens with the Article 'Strengthening India's Nuclear Deterrent' by Lt Gen Saxena which looks at India's nuclear deterrent as it exists today and recommends ways to strengthen the same by identifying current gaps and suggesting remedies to address them. The Article covers the genesis of Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) and examines their impact on India's response/deterrence. Measures to restore the credibility of our deterrence in a responsible and credible manner, through a wide spectrum of counter measures have been analysed in this paper. The author concludes that India should develop low yield weapons to address the gaps in its nuclear arsenal and to further strengthen our nuclear deterrent in the face of the ongoing nuclear brinkmanship by Pakistan.

To some Siachen confrontation is the world's most insane, cruel, strategically absurd high altitude warfare fought between 5000 m and 6000m over a dispute which reads 'point NJ 9842 thence north to the glaciers', statement of the 1949 Karachi Agreement. Had it not come to the notice of Col N Kumar through the maps his German mountaineering friend carried in which he saw the American Maps depicting point NJ 9842 joining Karakoram Pass, we would have inadvertently given up our possession of that wedge between POK and China. Lt Gen Kulkarni who was Commander of the first Platoon which landed on the Glacier in 1984 narrates his first hand account of OPERATION MEGHDOOT in the article 'Siachen-The historical Perspective and the Challenges ahead'. The author feels that sooner or later, Pakistan has to give up its obsession of India and accept to be a good neighbour and give up its Myopic vision of a 'Thousand Cuts' only then can a solution not just to Siachen but host of other issues can be found bilaterally.

On 13th April 2017 U.S. Forces Afghanistan conducted a strike using a GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast bomb, MOAB dropped from an U.S. aircraft on an ISIS (Khorasan) tunnel complex in Achin district, Nangarhar province, Afghanistan. In the article on 'Massive Ordnance Air Blast bomb, MOAB-A Perspective', Rear Admiral Kulshreshtha analyses that this advancement could displace Tactical nukes from the battlefield.

India's Prime Minister, has envisioned India as a 'leading power' in the coming decades. Some foreign leaders and commentators have also fuelled this aspiration by calling upon India to be a net security provider in the region. The term itself is not precisely defined. Various terms like 'super power', 'global power', 'leading power' and 'major power' are used to describe the nation(s) that exercise greater degree of influence and leadership in global affairs than the

other countries do. In this Article ‘Contextualising India’s Position as a Leading Power’ Brig Rumel Dahiya analyses the Attributes of a Leading Power and challenges for india emerging as a leading power. He concludes that Critical analysis suggests that India either possesses or has the potential to acquire all the attributes of a leading power. However, it is not there yet.

This is the birth centenary year of Indira Gandhi who was compelling and charismatic on the one hand, and complex and controversial on the other. She continues to draw encomiums for her many enduring achievements, just as she continues to evoke criticism for her errors of judgment and action. Shri Jairam Ramesh, MP delivered this year’s Kogekar Memorial Lecture at Pune on ‘Haksar and making of Indira’. We have published the Lecture Script in this issue. The speaker brought out that Indira Gandhi and Haksar functioned as a jugalbandhi for almost five and a half years. They had perfect understanding of each other—except, of course, on the matter of Maruti.

India’s military tactics and nuclear agenda could find their origins in the will to put an end to its perennial image of a small regional actor attached to the “moral diplomacy” or “moralpolitik” principles inherited from the Gandhi then Nehru years. The Article on ‘India’s Nuclear Capability Policies and Diplomacy’ aims to provide an input on India’s nuclear ambitions, needs and strategies. Considering present power politics and the emerging threat of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and other rogue states, we need to develop long-term strategic nuclear policies.

In the present context, wealth of hydrocarbon resources and Central Asia’s geostrategic location brought the region at the center-stage of geo-political competition. The imperial soldiers and spies of the bygone era have given way to engineers and deal makers as the States jockey for the lucrative business of building pipelines to tap the vast resources of the landlocked region”. This article on ‘Dynamics Of Security In Central Asia And Its Implications For The Regional Integration’ provides a perspective on the ecology of terror, appraisal of security scenario in the region, its internal dynamics and external linkages, and the geopolitics of combating terrorism in the region.

The OBOR involves some 55 percent of world GNP, 70 percent global population, and 75 percent of known energy reserves: grandiose infrastructural links from China to the rest of the world . The German ambassador to India, Martin Ney describes the OBOR as a “...top down exercise...very different from the ancient Silk Road. It’s not about free trade; it’s a trade – enhancing measure by China... In the piece on the subject’ OBOR/CPEC And India’s

X *CASS Journal*

Strategy' Air Cmde Bal argues that OBOR/CPEC jeopardizes our sovereignty and territorial integrity; severely impeding an equitable resolution of the vexed Kashmir "issue". India could bend where required: without crawling at China's bidding. A strong nation – state that endures short – term adversity while relentlessly working for strategic gains with single – minded conviction, dedication and fortitude commands global respect. Our predecessors successfully challenged the world's greatest imperial power: their successors can tread the geopolitical labyrinth with dignity and honour.

The Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, commonly known as the Outer Space Treaty (OST) completed 50 years of existence in 2017. In this issue , Mr Anand V has reviewed the book '50 Years of the Outer Space Treaty: Tracing the Journey' by Ajey Lele. This edited volume provides a detailed and comprehensive assessment about the conception of OST and its motivations, its foundational principles and provisions.

The last article by Prof Gautam Sen on 'Contextualizing Research Methodology For Indian Think Tanks' brings out the role of Think Tanks whose primary concern should be to supplement the conceptualization of National Interest, National Security and the making of National Security strategy.

Read on....



(BN Gokhale)
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Date: 30th June 2017

Strengthening India's Nuclear Deterrent

Lt Gen Dr VK Saxena (Retd)

INDIA'S NUCLEAR DETERRENT GAPS AND REMEDIES

Salient Points of India's Nuclear Doctrine

In essence, the salient points of India's nuclear doctrine as per the CCS notification of 04 Jan 2003 are, that India will build and maintain a *credible minimum deterrent*. It will follow a *no-first use-posture* and will use nuclear weapons only in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere. The nuclear retaliation to the first strike will be *massive* and designed to inflict unacceptable damage. Retaliatory attacks will be authorised only by the civilian political leadership through the Nuclear Command Authority. Nuclear weapons will not be used against the non-nuclear weapon States and India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons in the event of a major attack against it with biological or chemical weapons.

Against the backdrop of the above main points, various issues are examined in context.

THE DILEMMA OF NOTHING OR ULTIMATE RESPONSE

In its formulation of massive retaliation causing unacceptable damage, the Indian deterrence is a *one-leap response* which we want our potential adversaries

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to believe it happening for one and every situation. In that, as per the architects of our doctrine, lies the *punch of deterrence*, which essentially is a mind game. Another cardinal feature of our doctrine is related to its ultimate command and control. In that it is stated unambiguously, that the retaliatory attacks will be authorised *only by the civilian political leadership* through the Nuclear Command Authority.

In contrast, Pakistan follows a *first use nuclear Policy* which guarantees an *immediate "massive retaliation"* to an aggressive attacks against the State¹. Pakistan Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) in late 2001 defined their nuclear redlines in the form of four potential thresholds. These were later published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)². It is relevant to note that these formulations are mere pronouncements by the Nuclear Command Authority of Pakistan. *There is no formal official Nuclear Doctrine or Nuclear Strategy promulgated by the State of Pakistan, per se*. Also relevant is the fact that these thresholds are merely stated positions at a point in time. These are subject to change at any time based on the ever-changing dynamics in the India-Pakistan relations. As of date, the said thresholds stand stated as under:-

- **Spatial Threshold.** The armed and military penetration of Indian armed forces into Pakistan on a large scale which the Pakistan army is unable to stop. The limit of this penetration has been left to imagination of the analysts. The general belief was that it could be the line of Indus - the lifeline of Pakistan. Thus penetration of forces up to Indus valley with the capture of key objectives in the crucial north east-southwest axis was considered to be a situation, bad enough to trigger a nuclear retaliation from Pakistan.
- **Military Threshold.** The complete knockout or comprehensive destruction of a large part of Pakistan Armed Forces or armour particularly Pakistan Air Force (PAF), could lead to a quick nuclear response. Alongside this, an attack on the nuclear installations, as also, a chemical or biological weapon attack against Pakistan, could also trigger nuclear response.

1 Lodhi, Lieutenant-General (retired) FS (April 1999). "*Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine*". Lieutenant-General Sardar FS Lodi, former operational commander of Pakistan's joint special forces command. Islamabad, Pakistan: Defence Journal of Pakistan.

2 IISS; International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). "*IISS: Nuclear policy*". International Institute for Strategic Studies. International Institute for Strategic Studies.

- Economic Threshold. This threshold referred to a possible Indian naval blockade of Sindh province or the coastal cities of Baluchistan province or the stoppage or significant reduction of Pakistan's share of water in the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab rivers or the capture of vital arteries such as the Indus.
- Political Threshold. Political de-stabilisation or large scale internal destabilisation of Pakistan leading to a stage where the integrity of the country is threatened.

A read through of the above thresholds suggests *that these have been kept deliberately vague and sweeping in purport* to the extent, that the same may not even get linked (read triggered) to the conventional military thrust alone (economic blockade... political de-stabilisation).

On the conventional front, India followed what was popularly called the *Sunderji Doctrine*. As per this doctrine, while the seven holding Corps of the Indian Army that were deployed along the Indo Pak border had only limited offensive power, adequate enough to check a possible Pakistani thrust, the main punch of offensive resided in the three strike Corps, based well away from the border in the hinterland. While the holding Corps contained the Pakistani offensive, the Strike Corps were to mobilise from their peacetime locations and launch punitive counter offensives. Anticipating first use of nuclear weapons by Pakistan, the Indian Army prepared to conduct '*conventional operations under a nuclear overhang*'

The limitations of the above doctrine became evident during Operation Parakram, post the attack on the Indian Parliament on 13 Dec 2001 wherein, it took nearly three weeks for the Strike forces to mobilise giving not only, more than adequate time to Pakistan to mobilise and be prepared operationally, but also, for the international community to intervene, urging India to exercise the restraint.

Three main weaknesses of the doctrine came out in open. Firstly it was realised that the *Strike Corps were far too big* and were located far away, making it impossible for them to get ready for strike in a quick time frame. Secondly, the *long time frame required for mobilisation* gave out the strategic surprise as movement of such large forces across the length and breadth of the country just could not be hidden, given the levels of battlefield transparency that existed even during Op Parakram, what to talk of now. And lastly, the *lack of offensive power of the holding corps* prevented them from taking any significant offensive operations, thus seizing fleeting opportunities.

In order to address the above weaknesses, a new doctrinal development took place over time indicating a deviation from the existing defence posture during the Sunderji Doctrine. This deviation, referred to as the *Cold Start Doctrine*, pointedly addressed the three weaknesses stated above. It aimed to establish a proactive stance with a capability to launch retaliatory conventional strikes against Pakistan involving rapid armour thrusts with infantry and necessary air support in the form of multiple thrusts along a wide front in Punjab and Rajasthan sectors. Such a doctrine addressed the lacunas experienced by us during Operation Parakram.

Pakistan having realised that its nuclear bluff (defined as ultimate nuclear thresholds) has been sort of made redundant by the strategy of shallow multiple responses along a wide front, it recalibrated its response strategy. Starting with a series of joint military exercises (Azm-e-Nau III) it focussed on an *offensive defence type of response* against the Cold Start Doctrine. One significant fall out of the above was the testing of Nasr (Hatf IX), a Short Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) with a range of 60 km. Nasr is a multiple launch rocket system capable of carrying four ready-to-fire nuclear capable missiles with a weapon yield in the region of 0.5 to 5 KT. Starting from its first flight test on 19 Apr 2011, the missile was quickly claimed to be operational on 05 Oct 2013.

The aftermath of Nasr are interesting:-

- Lt Gen Khalid Ahmed Kidwai, the then DG Strategic Plans Division (SPD) stated that Pakistan in Nasr, has consolidated its strategic deterrence capability at *all levels of threat spectrum* (implying strategic, operational and tactical).
- It is relevant to note here that in the Hatf series of Surface-to-Surface Missiles (SSMs) Pakistan, besides other missiles possesses the nuclear capable Shaheen I (Hatf IV - 750km), Shaheen IA (1100KM) Shaheen II (Hatf VI - 2000 Km), Shaheen III (2750 Km) Babur (Hatf VII Cruise - 700 Km) and Nasr (Hatf IX - SRBM - 60 Km). This roughly spans the complete range bracket from strategic through operational to tactical (implying Battlefield range).
- Since Nasr arrived post Azm-e-Nau III and as a consequence of it, Pakistan has stated that it is in response to the Indian Cold Start Doctrine. By implication and though covert and overt statements and posturing, Pakistan has tried to convey the following:-
 - *Its nuclear redlines, aimed to blunt and stop the Indian offensive have come down.* This has become possible since Pakistan now possesses the newly

operationalised arsenal of low yield weapons or tactical nuclear weapons (TNW), which are useable on shallower objectives (basically counterforce targets) in the battlefield space with limited/localised effect.

- Making statements that Pakistan will use *every weapon in its inventory* to protect its territorial integrity and to stop a possible Indian onslaught, Pakistan has endeavoured to convey the following:-
 - The erstwhile nuclear thresholds have come down substantially.
 - The space for conventional operations has further shrunk.
 - TNWs are *war-fighting weapons*. That said, it has been clarified that even after the induction of TNWs the sole body that can authorise the use of such weapons will remain to be the Political Council of the Nuclear Command Authority. This allays the concern that the authorisation to use TNWs might pass to theatre Commanders.
- With the above posturing in place (call it nuclear brinkmanship), *Pakistan continues to engage in acts of cross border terrorism* (Mumbai, Pathankot, Uri, Nagrota....). In doing that, it draws assurance from its conviction, that the Indians actually believe that Pakistani nuclear thresholds have indeed come down and in any case, the Indian resolve of massive retaliation with unacceptable damage is unlikely to pass the decision dilemma in response to its pin-prick like acts in sub conventional domain. Pakistani nuclear brinkmanship is thus succeeding and under its garb, are succeeding the continuous acts of cross border terrorism.
- On our part, every time a nasty incident takes place, there is a *decision dilemma of putting boots across the border*. One of the factors of hesitation is the chance of inviting Pakistani response using what the Pakistanis call a battlefield nuclear weapon (more correctly, a low yield weapon), thus starting a nuclear exchange, that may fast snowball into an uncontrollable nuclear war. Something that is neither desirable nor is in our national interest. By repeated inactions, are 'we' (emphasis intended) not therefore getting duly deterred granting success to Pakistani nuclear brinkmanship which has led our decision makers into believing that the space for conventional warfare has indeed shrunk?
- Another significant asymmetry has cropped up post Nasr, wherein, one side has battlefield nuclear weapons (which are claimed as usable) while the other side presumably does not have the same.
- The human angle to the above nuclear asymmetry is the unwelcome feeling in the minds of field force commanders and the troops they command. The

men feel that even when the adversary uses a nuclear weapon, even though it may be of low yield, they have to fight through only with conventional weapons. While it is understood that the effect of these weapons will be localised, the feeling of inequality does not remain localised.

A possible response option is for India to have its own low yield nuclear weapons. Opponents of this option contend that:-

- By succumbing to the Pakistani game, and fielding a low yield nuclear weapon in tit-for-tat mode, we will actually *make a departure from our mind game of deterrence*, anchored on massive retaliation with unacceptable damage to any use of nuclear weapon (of any yield) by the adversary.
- We will signal to Pakistan that we are now ready for a *proportional or graduated response* which will lure him into using his battlefield nuclear weapons (to halt Indian shallow thrusts) in a hope that it will only invite a similar (or little higher) low yield weapon, thus making nuclear game-play possible and feasible with contained effects.
- Our threat of massive retaliation should be a genuine deterrent to stop him from using his TNWs in the battlefield.
- India therefore does not require a low yield weapon.

In the face of the above status-quoists thoughts, following arguments are put forward:-

- The hard reality is, that in spite of our resolve for massive retaliation with unacceptable damage, the adversary is comfortable in his belief that in the (unlikely) contingency of his using a low yield weapon in the battlefield with local effect, the likely Indian 'one-leap response' for 'total annihilation' is unlikely to get pass the political decision dilemma. This feeling of comfort emboldens him to indulge in other misadventures like cross border terrorism activities, remaining sure in his belief of an unlikely Indian response due to the apprehension of a nuclear backlash. *This is the centre pillar of his nuclear brinkmanship.*
- Even on our side of the fence, it is hard to believe that in response to a low yield nuclear weapon, whose effects are restricted to only a portion of the battlefield (combat group/combat team etc), we will nuke out a few cities of Pakistan and thereby start a response/counter response chain which will be damaging for us also, even though, Pakistan may take far more punishment.

It is this incredibility of the one-leap response (right or wrong) that emboldens the adversary in doing what he is, in playing the game of nuclear brinkmanship. To this end, the question, as to 'who is actually getting deterred?,' demands an answer.

- The bottom line is, that while it is a universally accepted fact, that nuclear weapons of whatever yield, are political weapons of deterrence, Pakistanis have brought themselves to believe that their battlefield nuclear weapons are the extension of the country's conventional deterrent capability (Pakistan's Gen Kidwai's statement on record). This 'make-believe stance' however does not change the reality, (and each side ironically knows it too well) that nuclear weapons, irrespective of the yield, very much remain political weapons of deterrence. A nuclear exchange once started just cannot be controlled. It has eminent danger of spiralling out of control in no time, into an all out nuclear war. This spiral emerges clearly and quickly if we were to just play one cycle of nuclear exchange by Pak TNW (or TNW with operational or strategic weapon)...own TNW/massive retaliation..... mutual annihilation. Every country surely wants to exist, and also, does not want to go back in progress by decades!
- As to Pakistani TNWs, there are basically *three schools of thought*. According to the first school, the TNWs merely serve to extend Pakistan's deterrence posture further down the conflict-intensity spectrum. The second school believes that it indicates a shift in strategy from deterrence to war-fighting while the third school has questioned the utility of TNWs in stopping Indian armoured attacks (Ashley Tellis has stated in one of his analysis, that hundreds of TNWs might be required to put a complete stop to multiple armour strikes from India, launched across a wide front).
- Taking the above thoughts one by one. If the TNWs only serve to strengthen the deterrence posture, why give the adversary the advantage of gaps in our deterrence arsenal, wherein, while he fills up the rungs from strategic to operational to tactical, our *one-leap response actually leads him into believing the sheer incredibility of the same*.
- By holding low yield weapons we don't have to let go of the option of the 'retaliation' in the manner decided in our doctrine for it is us and not the adversary, who will decide what massive retaliation will include. Whether it will include certain low yield weapons combined with high yield or the latter alone; it is our call, not the adversary's.

- If the shift is from deterrence to war-fighting (which actually is not, as suggested by the arguments presented above) then *why go in the battle with a posture of nuclear asymmetry?* The requirement is to have ‘multiple options’ what we do with them is our choice. The world must know that we do not have any gaps in our nuclear arsenal. In what permutation and combination we use them, without anyway tinkering with our NFU is our choice. It is for the adversary to draw deductions from the multiple options we have, both nuclear and non nuclear (as covered later) with no gaps in our response options (read combinations). By the way, if the reality of the sheer futility of TNWs in stopping the Indian onslaught dawns on the adversary, it will only render the use of TNWs by him, a non-viable option.
- It is for no small reason therefore, that hundreds of low yield weapons deployed by NATO forces at the height of cold war in Germany to stop the massive Russian armour onslaught into the planes of Europe never got to be used. Both superpowers having had them in large numbers, at best derived a deterrent value from the same and having found them non-usable, gave up the idea of TNWs even though, these are continued to be maintained in some small numbers.
- If that be so, then why have them (low yield nuclear weapons) at all? *THE NEED TO HAVE THEM IS NOT FOR USING THEM, BUT TO DETER THEIR USE BY THE ADVERSARY.* This statement might sound paradoxical to the counter argument of signalling a proportional/graduated response intention, the fact is, who has said that the response to Pak use of TNW will only be a TNW? Since our doctrine of massive retaliation is very much in place, it is for us to decide what is massive, and to that effect, what is punitive?
- If the likely response to Pakistani TNW is going to be massive retaliation only, then why TNW? This is to project to the whole world that we have no gaps in our nuclear arsenal and hence no gaps in our choices. We no longer suffer from the disadvantage of a unitary one-leap response (which the adversary thinks, is unlikely to happen). We have all the options open. What we will do at a point in time is our choice. This projection of adequacy, completeness and multiple options for response will somehow help removing the current belief in the adversary’s mind regarding unlikely feasibility of a massive annihilation strike by us in response to his use of battlefield nuclear weapons.
- By developing low yield weapons we signal to the adversary that for his TNW we also have low yield weapons though our doctrine holds the deterrent of

low yield weapons +++++ as one time massive response. In other words, he will realise that for his 'stone', we have a 'stone', as well as, the 'mountain'. What we use is our wish. Our overtly declared policy is, that for his stone, our stone will come with a mountain in tow. Such a posture will cut out the comfort of incredibility (of single-leap) in the mind of the adversary; something which is emboldening it to play the nasty games he is playing in the sub conventional domain.

- Another significant development would be that it will remove any lurking doubts in the minds of our Commanders and troops of us being half-prepared. With low yield weapons in our arsenal too, *the feeling of a perceived inequality will be obliterated*, as deterrent equation on both sides will become even. This will have disproportionate effect as the whole game of deterrence, and to that effect, the war-fighting itself, plays out a great deal of itself in the 'minds of the war-fighters and their commanders'. Men win wars not gizmos—goes an old cliché.
- Restated, the goal is to have the complete rungs of the nuclear arsenal. The range and depth of its use is our decision. By having the one-on-one arsenal and holding out the threat of massive retaliation in place, is a better bet to deter the adversary from trying out a misadventure, than having just one-leap response whose happening for a lesser effect provocation is doubted, not only, by the adversary, but also, by own side, given the realities that exist (not elaborated).
- It is also relevant to note that in the 1998, out of the five nuclear weapons tests the first group consisted of the thermonuclear device (Shakti I), the second was the fission device (Shakti II) while the third was a sub-kiloton device (Shakti III). With that having happened some 18 years back and with Prithvi series of SSMs years into their operationalisation (other vectors not mentioned) how close are we actually from a low yield weapon is a question to ponder. *May be hardly at all!*
- With that rests the case and the *rationale of having a low yield weapon, without disturbing the stance of massive retaliation* but getting the advantage of deterring the adversary's use of a TNW in the manner explained.
- By implication and as a precipitate, holding of low yield weapons and thus having a 'a complete arsenal range' will also expand the perceived space for conventional operations currently being claimed as dwarfed by the adversary who is basking in the sunlight of a nuclear arsenal asymmetry and holding out a threat of the use of TNW in the battlefield and progressing sub conventional warfare in its dark shadow of ambiguity.

- It is a thought that the ‘completed arsenal range’ (with more options than a single-leap) as stated above, will provide a greater comfort (read options) to the ‘decision maker’ in taking an ‘appropriate decision’ at a point in time. This point is intentionally left at this thought, and not dilated further.

ON DETERRENCE OTHER THAN NUCLEAR

As is well known, the *nuclear deterrent*, as a subset of *Comprehensive National Power (CNP)* rests on three pillars. In that, while the warhead (of tactical, operational and strategic yields) is the first pillar, the triad of delivery capability on land sea and air and the associated command and control structure of authorisations and commands and their execution in the hands of civilian political leadership as defined in our doctrine, are the other two pillars. Very basically, the strengthening of the nuclear deterrent will demand strengthening all the above three pillars, since the credibility of the deterrence is essentially derived from the combined strength of all the three and how the adversary perceives them to be.

While that is true of the nuclear deterrent, there is another very strong and expanding domain of developing nuclear *deterrence capability in the non-nuclear domain*. This domain of deterrence has lately assumed tremendous significance given the net-centricity of the future battle field and its near total dependence on the electromagnetic spectrum.

The tools of such a deterrence arsenal make use of the enablers like the *Electronic Warfare, Cyber Warfare and other Soft Kill means*. The aim is to interfere/hack/debilitate adversary’s surveillance networks, target acquisition capability, missile guidance capability and more, as also, to strike at its command and control networks controlling nuclear launch. The soft kill arsenal is actually huge in range and depth and is only limited by the imagination of the attacker and the technologies at hand.

The above arsenal is cumulatively referred to as ‘*Electronic Combat Capability*’. Such a capability spans both the offensive, as well as, the defensive domains. Hierarchically, it covers the continuum starting from the National level, where it manifests as the policy and decision making functions, and comes down to the armed forces level, where the execution of the said policies and the decisions is to take place in a manner and sequence to be stated in our national war fighting doctrine. Needless to mention, that the above capability as ‘teeth’ needs to be meshed with the ‘flesh’ consisting of requisite organizations, infrastructure and the ‘skinware’ with required skills and training.

In specifics, the Electronic Combat Capability stated above, would comprise Electronic Warfare including non-nuclear e-bombs; Cyber Warfare, Electro-Magnetic (EM) space management, EM Spectrum warfare, Electronic Deception, Optical warfare, counter space operations and appropriate platforms for operations on land, sea, air and space. Exercising of this capability would seriously degrade adversary's C4ISTAR systems, weapon systems, navigation and guidance, logistics, provide real-time intelligence, assist in counter intelligence and impede his overall battle field transparency.

In fact, so exponentially galloping is the pace of technology and information flow in the current era that these two verticals are going to be the new normals in the future battlefield. With that as the stark reality, whose time has come, it is imperative that we must develop the capability of their unimpeded use and negate the same for our adversary. This requirement, in the context of this paper relates to the vertical of generating such electronic combat capability that adds strength to our nuclear deterrent by denying the use of such technologies and information flow to the adversary that may be employed in delivery of his nuclear punch (read first strike). The areas to be targeted by our electronic combat capability must encompass soft-crippling those battle function areas end-to-end, that unfold in the delivery of the nuclear strike. These may include surveillance of battle space, target acquisition, command and control structures to include hierarchical chain of authorisations and successive levels of control, and finally, to cripple/dissuade/waylay the electronics and electromagnetic systems involved in the guidance and control of the delivery vehicle means in flight (a very tall order indeed).

To address the above requirement in the manner stated above, is such a huge vertical and has so many complex requirements that the same will call for *a corresponding organisational transformation* at successive levels of command. Such a transformation will aim to develop capabilities of electronic interference and soft kill means in our arsenal that will aim to cripple adversary's nuclear punch as a whole (surveillance, target acquisition, command and control et al) thereby providing strength to our nuclear deterrent by means other than nuclear. Such a capability if 'disseminated well' will add considerable credibility to our deterrence. *That such a capability needs to be developed as a part of strengthening our nuclear deterrent is a strategic imperative.*

REVISITING NFU AND THE STRATEGY OF MASSIVE RETALIATION

The *No first Use and the resolve of massive retaliation is the central pillar of our nuclear response policy*. The paper will examine if there is a need to change/modify the same.

There is no doubt that one of the primary reasons for choosing the NFU was to quell the adverse reaction the world over, post our nuclear weapon tests in 1998. It is another thing that the same falls in consonance with our culture of 'Ahimsa' and aligns itself with our world standing and stature.

Also there is no doubt, that besides giving us a position of a *moral high ground* and the desirable tag of a '*responsible nuclear power*', NFU stance has yielded several positives at various international fora (a non-NPT signatory getting exemption to NSG rules in 2008, Indo-US civil nuclear deal...). NFU also gels with several initiatives taken by India internationally (part of the UN call in 2006 for a UN Convention on prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons, spearheading the 2012 UN Treaty for banning nuclear weapons, et al.

Some other implied advantages of the NFU stand are well known. A brief snapshot:-

- Puts us out of the nuclear arms race of trying to catch up warhead to warhead.
- No need for matching numbers. Response is based on credible minimum deterrence as decided by us and perceived by the adversary.
- Massive retaliation based deterrence has held out for the last 18 years.

Also there is no requirement to either replace the word massive with punitive or add the same to it. It will be recalled, we went back from punitive to massive for good reasons. A U turn again would show a vacillating stance that gives us no added advantage. Massive is crystal clear in its purport, especially so, when it is qualified by the intended end- -effect of causing unacceptable damage. In fact, replacing 'massive', by the word 'punitive' will give some air of proportional/ graduated response (since punitive for a lesser sin might be less than massive). This we must guard against. If kept alongside massive, it is superfluous, since the combination of massive and unacceptable damage make a completed stance.

Retaining NFU on reciprocity will actually mean a complete reversal and relinquishing of our NFU along with all the positive gains that have accrued

from it over a period of time. A shift from deterrence to war-fighting against Pakistan, will give us no additional advantage. We will get into warhead-matching, equalling the number game, getting into readiness states for pre-emption etc. In fact, it may amount to a total reversal from the country's known position which does not go with the grain of the country.

True, the doctrines are not gospels and need a periodic review and change, if necessary, but the said change must be for a very good reason. Our deterrence has held (in so far as it relates to the nuclear exchange). What is required, is to strengthen our deterrence by filling the rungs in the arsenal and addressing the lacunas of one-leap response. Basically, not to get stymied by the ongoing nuclear brinkmanship by Pakistan.

Our current formulation of the doctrine aims to establish a tangible deterrence by way of our unambiguous resolve to cause 'unacceptable damage' through 'massive retaliation' in response to any nuclear misadventure with any yield of weapon being used. This tangibility will get a fillip if we had no gaps in our nuclear arsenal.

Continuing from the above thought, one stark reality of the NFU which cannot be wished away, is the *reality of taking the first strike* (which itself might be debilitating). This obviously calls for ensuring the survivability and residual capability of our nuclear arsenal for the second strike. However, in this context, it should be very clear to us that *India will retain the right to defend itself in whatever manner it deems fit*. In any case, the right to defend itself is the unenviable, universally accepted and a sovereign right of any State.

AN ASSESSMENT OF CHINESE NUCLEAR STRATEGY

Firstly a word about the Chinese nuclear doctrine. The Chinese Govt published its nuclear strategy in 2006 and took out a White Paper in 2013. Interestingly, in this White Paper the Chinese State Council Information Office omitted a reference to the No First Use policy leading to speculation, on whether China was moving away from its NFU commitment, made earlier. However in the White Paper issued on 26 May 2015 on "China's Military Strategy", the Chinese Government reiterated that, "*China has always pursued the Policy of No First Use of nuclear weapons* and has adhered to a self-defensive nuclear strategy that is defensive in nature". Some other salient points stated in this White Paper are:-

- The nuclear force is a strategic cornerstone for safeguarding national sovereignty and security.

- China will unconditionally not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states, or in nuclear-weapon free zones. and will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country.
- China has always kept its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required to maintain national security.
- China will optimise its nuclear force structure, improve strategic warning, command and control, missile penetration, rapid reaction and survivability and protection and deter other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China.
- Notwithstanding all that has been said above, the paper also states, that China upholds the principal of counter attack in self defence and limited development of nuclear weapons. It endeavours to ensure the security and reliability of its nuclear weapons and maintains a *credible nuclear deterrent force*. Its self defence nuclear doctrine does not however consider nuclear weapons as offensive weapons of first use.

While the doctrines, stated or implied have their place, what will decide our response is the Chinese perception of our nuclear policy and capability. In this context, the views of some Chinese and US experts are presented below.

In essence, China does not subscribe to the common perception that India developed nuclear weapons in response to the Chinese nuclear programme. It ascribes the reason for the same to India's own sense of insecurities and its aspiration to become a great power in the Asia Pacific region. According to Chinese experts, the mention of China during the 1998 tests was made to eliminate domestic opposition and to help legitimise the tests to the international community.

China's nuclear deterrence posture is basically focussed on US. In that, the Indian nuclear programme or capability has little impact on China's view on nuclear deterrence, strategic stability or security threats. India factor does not change or materially affect the US-focussed nuclear thinking of China. Resultantly, China does not consider Indian capability as a security threat to itself. It is well aware of the military and technological gap between itself and India because of which, it does not believe that India has the capability to threaten it.

Besides capability, even on the intention front, experts believe that China does not think that *India seriously intends to go to war with China either on nuclear or on conventional front*. This assessment is based on India's strategic culture. China feels that India will be more cautious and would not take any provocative

action that might lead to a war with China.

While the above perceptions of the nuclear experts stand stated at one end of the thought continuum, it will be a grave mistake to stand firm in the belief that *China does not consider India as a security threat* and therefore, by reciprocity, it poses no threat to India. In fact, not history alone, but also, the Chinese behaviour and dynamics over decades of co-existence has taught us, *never ever to dilute (or worse, not even acknowledge) the China threat factor*; be it nuclear or conventional.

Going by the currently prevailing geo-political and geo-strategic situation in the world at large and South Asia/ SE Asia/ South China/ Tibet/ Asia Pacific in particular, it is absolutely clear that while China may not pose an imminent threat to India, IT ALWAYS REMAINS A THREAT IN BEING and we must always be prepared for the same. It therefore becomes a strategic imperative for India to keep a close watch on political, military, scientific and technological developments in China and to ensure, that all necessary measures are taken to adequately and effectively protect our national interests.

While the above threat perception vis-a-vis China, must stand apart as an unambiguous truth, some relevance might be drawn from the views of Toby Dalton and George Perkovich, especially as it relates to China's likely role in the Indo-Pak equation. According to these experts, while the escalation of tensions between India and China triggered by the border disputes is plausible, in an *Indo-Pak confrontation scenario, China is unlikely to intervene with its own nuclear forces*, especially if India does not initiate the use of nuclear weapons in the conflict³

In fact, China considers India (with its non signatory status to NPT, CTBT and FMCT) as an illegal nuclear power. China is very concerned and critical of 2008 India-US Civil Nuclear Deal and is committed to blocking India's entry into the NSG. While China is not concerned about India's civil and peaceful use of nuclear energy, it is very serious about the grey area between civil and military nuclear use, especially fissile material production, which on date, is not regulated by the IAEA safeguards or the NSG technical control procedures.

In the above context, China sees two main security challenges created by the evolution of India's nuclear programme. Firstly, India's enhanced civil nuclear capabilities may facilitate her nuclear weapons modernisation due to difficulties in verifying dual use goods, which in the Chinese mind, may come through the

³ Xiaoping Yang, "China's Perception of India as a Nuclear Weapon Power" Carnegie Endowment For international Peace

US route. Secondly, it perceives that if India slackens its NFU stand, it might damage the basis for deterrence and violate the nuclear taboo by signalling to the other non-NPT nuclear weapon states that nuclear weapons might be an option during a war.

In consonance with our threat perception stated above. *China also does perceive that India poses a threat to it in the medium term.* This perception is based on three factors, namely, the foreign support for India's great power aspirations, enhancement of India's conventional military capability and the character of China's interaction with India with regard to border disputes and Tibet. It sees with great concern, the growing strategic co-operation between US and India and the emerging US driven bilateral/trilateral arrangements in the Asia Pacific with India as a player (US-India-Japan/US-India-Australia and the like). It perceives them as US efforts to forge a sense of balance

China not ascribing India as an 'immediate threat,' might to an extent, be driven by her awareness of the significant gap in military technology between itself and India; and because of this gap, it may not believe that India has a capability to threaten it. Experts also feel that China's assessment of India's thresholds for fighting a war suggests that *India also has no intentions to threaten China.* Therefore, for reasons of both reciprocity and own security, China may not think, it needs to respond to India's nuclear programme, either militarily or diplomatically. It is reiterated, that such expert views might be valid for THE IMMEDIATE, however for the medium term, CHINA DOES SEE US AS A POTENT THREAT. Be that as it may, on China's end, but on our own end, we must not lose the sight of the fact that China always remains a THREAT IN BEING.

Keeping in mind the views of subject matter experts on the realities of Sino-India matrix as enumerated above and relating them to the issue at hand, it is opined that the *current NFU status of India* need not be tinkered with. That said, we should continue our efforts of seeking co-operation/facilitation in furtherance of our capabilities from the international fora (US, Australia, Japan, Russia...) and forge alliances/arrangements that serve our national interests, *without ever committing the error of diluting or negating the Chinese threat or failing to recognise it as a threat in being.*

RECOMMENDATIONS

Following recommendations are made:-

- India should develop low yield weapons to address the gaps in its nuclear arsenal and to further strengthen our nuclear deterrent in the face of the ongoing nuclear brinkmanship by Pakistan.
- Efforts should be made to strengthen our deterrence in fields other than nuclear by building the requisite Electronic Combat Capability and putting in place the necessary organisational transformation required to sustain the said capability.
- No change is recommended in our existing nuclear doctrine based on NFU with massive retaliation

LT GEN DR V K SAXENA, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (RETD)



Lieutenant General Dr V K Saxena is the former Director General of the Corp of Army Air Defence in the Indian Army. The General has been decorated three times by the President of India for his selfless and distinguished Service to the Nation.

General Saxena is a United Nations scholar with an MPhil and a PhD and a Law scholar pursuing qualifications in Human Rights, Child Rights and Medical Law and Ethics from the prestigious National Law School of India University. The General is also a prolific writer. He has authored 5 books and has to his credit, more than 100 articles in various defence magazines and counting.

The General in his long and distinguished career in the Army, spanning over four decades has served in various command and staff appointments including active Service in Counter Insurgency environment in Jammu and Kashmir.

Besides his busy writing assignments the officer's abiding passion and continued dedication to serve the cause of uniformed brave hearts, years even after his active Service also draws him to lead a Project that is dedicated to the families of our Forces Casualties and Disabled soldiers.

Siachen – The Historical Perspective and The Challenges Ahead

Lt Gen Sanjay Kulkarni (Retd)

“ India had quietly occupied the Siachen area in 1984 in violation of the Simla Agreement which stated that:

In Jammu and Kashmir the 'Line of Control' (LoC) resulting from the ceasefire of 17 December 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or use of force in violation of this line.

The Siachen Glacier is situated near the north-eastern tip of Baltistan and at the time formed part of Gilgit Agency (now Gilgit-Baltistan). It is the northern-most terminus of the LoC (Point NJ 9842), which was also the terminus of the Ceasefire line of 1949. Although this area had been controlled and administered by Pakistan, it remained un-demarcated and unoccupied because of inaccessibility, until India moved its troops in April 1984”.

Neither A Hawk Nor A Dove

by Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, Ex Foreign Minister (2002 -07)

“From 1983 to the middle of 1984 I was posted to the Military Operations Directorate as Deputy Director Military Operations (DDMO). I was also approved for promotion to the rank of Brigadier General, but had to settle temporarily for full Colonel because there were no vacancies at the Brigadier level.

My short time at the Military Operations Directorate was not as rewarding as it should have been, mainly because my boss lacked the ability to inspire and teach. However, I did witness operational planning at the highest level of the Pakistan Army. When the Siachen Glacier conflict between India and Pakistan erupted, I was part of all that happened. The conflict persists to this day.

After the Cease Fire of 1971, the entire SSG was withdrawn to recoup. My company was moved to Kamri in the mountainous Northern Areas, deep in the Himalayas, to check on reported incursions of Indian troops. It took me over a month to complete the move through rugged terrain, and the experience offers a hint of how difficult it can be to guard borders among the highest mountains in the world. We first drove 250 miles to Gilgit in Jeeps on the famous Karakoram Highway – our mountain link with China. This was the time it was under construction and was called the “Eighth Wonder of the World”. We took ten days to get there after navigating through innumerable roadblocks and landslides along the way. From Gilgit onward we went some distance in Jeeps. Then we proceeded on Mules, trekking across the Burzil Pass at 14500 feet, descending into the Minimarg Valley, at 9000 feet and making the final ascent on foot to reach Kamri, high up at 13000 feet. This was a beautifully green pine forested area. It was an experience of a lifetime.

Siachen is a long glacier almost at the junction of India, Pakistan and China, in the Karakoram Range. From the Pakistan side the approach to it, is blocked by the Saltoro Range, with passes from 17000 to 21000 feet high. In 1983 we had learned that India quiet frequently intruded into the Siachen Glacier, which belonged to us. We dispatched a team from the Special Services Group (SSG) to confirm the reports. They confirmed the intrusions, because they came across telltale evidence of a hurriedly abandoned camp on the Glacier, left by some Indian personnel.

At General Headquarters (GHQ) we began planning to occupy the passes on the watershed of the Saltoro Range that dominated the Siachen Glacier. Winter had set in, and we had no experience of operating at such heights, over 16000 feet, or at temperatures that could fall to fifty degrees below Zero Celsius with wind chill. The key decision was when to occupy the passes. Time was critical

because we assumed that the Indians would try to occupy the same passes, now that they already knew that our SSG team had crossed into the Glacier from the Salto Range. We suggested early March, to ensure that our forces got to the passes first, just as the worst of winter had passed. We were opposed by the General Officer Commanding the Northern Areas, who had jurisdiction over the Area. He felt that the harshness of the terrain, and the low temperatures, would not allow our troops to reach there in March. He proposed May 1 instead. His opinion prevailed, because he was the commander on the spot. This proved to be a mistake: when we went there we found the Indians already in occupation of most of the dominating features on the Salto Range, beyond the Siachen Glacier. Still, our troops moved up and performed the challenging task of occupying heights and features around the Indian positions. The result was a series of positions by both sides, at great Heights, within shooting range of each other.

Many precious lives have been lost to enemy fire and to hazardous weather and terrain. The Indians suffer far more than we do. It takes them three to seven days of trekking over the Siachen Glacier with all its crevices to occupy the passes. On the Pakistan side a gravel road reaches close to the Salto range. Troops can climb to any of the passes in one day after travelling by jeep. Innumerable small skirmishes have taken place at various locations along the entire front whenever either side has attempted to readjust or occupy new heights.”

In The Line of Fire- A Memoir

Pervez Musharraf

“ In 1984, India sent troops to occupy the mountains overlooking the Siachen glacier beyond Kashmir. Pakistan, in turn, pushed its own men up to try to kick the Indians out and nearly twenty years (now 33 years) later they were still there. Siachen had become the World’s coldest, highest battlefield, and the war fought there the longest-running conflict between two nation states. Neither side could actually win the war—the terrain was too hostile to achieve a decisive victory. But nor could they give up, even after their Generals had long realized the war was futile, and had accepted that the uninhabited lands around Siachen were of no strategic value whatsoever.

This was a war that crystallized all the myths and prejudices, the heroism and patriotism, the competing religious fervor and twisted sense of history into a single battlefield. It was the only battlefield in the world surrounded by three nuclear-armed nations—India, Pakistan and China- yet the war fought in the brutal conditions of The First World War.

From the autumn of 2003 to the summer of 2004, I travelled through India and Pakistan unraveling the tale of the Siachen war, filling dozens of notebooks with journalistic rigour while writing what I really felt and thought in the diary I had begun the previous summer. In some ways I was seduced by this war, both by its hostility and the stark beauty of the lands around it. But I was also overwhelmed by it, infuriated by its remoteness, its secrecy. Fought within a military- controlled zone in desolate mountains far from the civilian population, it was one of the world's most obscure wars—less was known about it than a single day in many other conflicts.

Though inflamed by the passions that divided India and Pakistan over Kashmir—the Muslim- majority region that both countries claimed—Siachen was a separate war to the North, with its own origins and distinctive battlefield. The soldiers were strung out in isolated posts along a 110 kilometre-long jagged frontline, many of them of them above 18000 feet, a height so unsuited to sustaining human life that the body has to feed on itself in order to survive.

The men half starved to death surrounded by food because the altitude made them incapable of eating. They saw their friends swept away by avalanches, disappearing into crevasses, choking to death from altitude sickness, or carted off to hospital for the amputation of hands and feet swollen and blackened by frostbite. The air was so thin that even walking was an effort. And even then, they had still gone out to fight, backed by artillery and mortars, anti – tank and anti - aircraft guns that had been dragged up into the mountains in an absurd concentration of firepower.

I wanted to know why, what it was that drove them on “.

Heights Of Madness

Myra MacDonald

Extracts from the three books above would give the reader a brief insight into the Pakistani perspective and to the Importance of Siachen Glacier and why it should be held, besides the three books I have also referred to Nitin Gokhale's- BEYOND NJ 9842. The Siachen Saga. A near factual account, beautifully narrated besides my notes and memory, before it fades away.



PATROLLING THE GLACIER

Historical Perspective

The Siachen Glacier, popularly referred to as the Third Pole, lies in one of the most inhospitable terrain and glaciated regions of the world. Sliding down a valley in the Karakoram Range in Ladakh, it is overlooked by some of the highest peaks on earth. The Karakoram is a large mountain range spanning the borders of India, Pakistan and China with the Northwest extremity of the range extending to Afghanistan and to erstwhile USSR, now Tajikistan. Col N Kumar would tell us how he saw all these countries standing on top of Indira Col. Karakoram Ranges are located in the region of Gilgit-Baltistan (POK), Ladakh and Southern Xiajiang (China), and reach the Wakhan Corridor (Afghanistan). A part of the complex of ranges from the Hindu Kush to the Himalayan Ranges it is one of the Greater Ranges of Asia. Karakoram means Black and indeed the ranges are dark in colour and are about 500 Kms in length and is the most heavily glaciated part of the world outside the Polar Region. The Siachen Glacier is 76 Kms long and varies in width from 2 to 8 Km and is the Second largest glacier in the world. The Southern boundary of the Karakoram is formed West to East by the Gilgit, Indus and Shyok Rivers, which separate the Range from the North Western end of the Himalayas Range as these Rivers converge South Westwards towards the plains of Pakistan. Ironically, the name Siachen signifies a 'Rose Garden'

The Siachen Glacier is hemmed in by the Salto Range an offshoot of the Karakoram to the West and the main Karakoram Range to the East. The Salto Range line originates from Sia Kangri, at a height of 24300 ft and has an altitude bracket of 19000 to 24000ft. The major passes on this ridge line are Sia La at 20000 ft and Bilafondla at 18500 ft. It forms a Watershed and is the focal point of the current conflict in the area.

Siachen originates from Indira Col. The Nubra river originates from its Snout and flows South till it meets the Shyok river. To the West of the Salto Ridge line lies Pak Occupied Baltistan sprawling in the Karakoram under whose shadow lie the Gilgit and Skardu areas. To the North East lies the Shaksgam valley, an area of 4500 Sq kms ceded illegally to China by Pakistan in 1963. To the East of Karakoram lies Aksai Chin under Chinese control.

The Shyok Valley is separated from the Indus Valley by the Ladakh range with heights ranging from 17500 ft to 19000 ft. The world's highest road and life line is Khardungla at 18350 ft. The Shyok river flows to the West till it meets the Indus river, East of Skardu, in Pak Occupied Kashmir.

On Teram Sher Glacier lies the Kumar Logistic Base which has a lake and presence of few Mountain Goats called Ibex, hence the area is sometimes called the 'Ibex Hill'. The region has the largest cluster of magnificent peaks in the world which are mountaineers dream world and consequently commercial potential.

J N Dixit, former Foreign Secretary of India and member of the National Security Advisory Board, has maintained till the last day of his breath that Pakistan will continue to foment military tension on the Line of Control and will indulge in intrusions to capture territory in Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan will also engineer violence and terrorism in other parts of India in support of its Proxy War in Kashmir. India should remain politically sensitive to these prospects at the policy level and should maintain continuous military alertness vis a vis Pakistan along the Line of Control as well as the International border. India will have to locate troops and security forces to the Maximum extent possible on the Line of Control around the year. Firmness in dealing with Pakistan at the Operational Level, combined with restraint is the only way forward. Forewarned is forearmed.

One of the Objectives for undertaking Kargil Operations by Pakistan Army was to diminish the confidence of the Indian armed forces, and to signal that Pakistan was capable of tactically and strategically posing an effective threat to Ladakh and Siachen. Gen Musharraf has justified Jihad as a 'tolerant concept' and not a terrorist or a violent phenomenon. In an interview to an American

newspaper he defended Jihad as embodying religious and social commitment to Islam for safeguarding the dignity and safety of Muslims. This is necessary to understand the more critical elements of Pakistan's Kashmir Policy. Sheikh Abdullah's death coincided with Zia reviving Pakistan's subversive activities against India.

The Siachen Glacier came to the notice of Director Military Operations at Army Hqs, New Delhi for the first time as a problem area in 1978 when after my Young Officers Course I was doing Mountain Warfare course at High Altitude Warfare School whose Commandant was Col N Kumar. It is interesting to note how the then Army Commander Lt Gen Chibber was alerted by Col N Kumar, popularly called 'Bull'. Kumar pulled out a tourist map of Northern Kashmir, printed in USA, which he had got from his German Mountaineer friend who had been climbing various peaks in the Karakoram from POK. He requested the Army Commander for permission to climb the awe inspiring peaks as his friend had been granted permission to climb K2 that summer.

Gen Chibber's close look of the map shocked him as the printed line had been extended straight to Karakoram Pass from NJ 9842, instead of 'thence North to the Glaciers'. The 1947 war between India and Pakistan which lasted over a year for Jammu and Kashmir, stopped with Ceasefire being declared on 1 January 1949. Forces of the two sides stayed where they were, and with the assistance of the UN Observers, a Ceasefire line was demarcated on the ground between the two opposing Armies, this line ended at NJ 9842. The glaciated area of the Karakoram to the North of this point was not demarcated being difficult and forbidden and there were no troops from either side. The Karachi Agreement of 1949 which describes the ceasefire line, segment by segment, delineates it upto the terminal point at NJ 9842, and then reads 'thence North to the Glaciers' meant North along the nearest watershed, which in the present case was the Saltoro. Pakistan was mountain poaching through Bilafond la, la means a Pass in Ladakhi.

The cartographic aggression and the publishers aberrations in hindsight look orchestrated by Pakistan. Pakistan encouraged foreign mountaineering expeditions to enter Siachen Glacier mostly through Bilafond la as in 1983 I had brought some Soda Wrappers with Japanese markings on it as part of Polar Bear I, from Bilafond la. The 1981 and 1982 edition of The American Alpine Journal had reported expeditions to Saltoro Kangri and Sia Kangri, Kangri means Peak. The journal in passing also

referred to Climbing of Sia Kangri and Indira Col by Col N Kumar, in the disputed area.

While 'Bull' Kumar's expeditions were on, there was some 'Air Activity' reported from the Pakistani side and a Sabre Jet overflew the expedition at one stage, they too reported wrappers with Japanese markings on the glacier. Northern Command scanned mountaineering Journals and were able to put together the following information;

- **1975 and in 1976.** One Japanese expedition each were permitted into Siachen.
- **1979.** Three Japanese expeditions were permitted into Siachen.
- **1980.** An American expedition was permitted to enter Siachen.
- **1981.** 36 Foreign Expeditions were sponsored by Pakistan but none to Siachen.
- **1982.** Out of 46 Foreign Expeditions sponsored none came to Siachen.
- **1983.** Out of 44 Foreign Expeditions from 14 Countries, none ventured into Siachen.
- **During 1982 and 83** Strong Indian Army Long Range Patrols code named Ibex Hunt and Polar Bear were on Siachen Glacier for more than three months each

Our patrols met no Pakistani troops or members of any sponsored expeditions from Pakistan on the Salto or Siachen. However, Pakistani helicopters did fly over and buzzed our patrols on these occasions. It was for precisely this reason to be able to identify Friend or Foe that our Helicopters were marked with an H under the Belly of the Helicopter in red Colour. It was good enough Identification mark to prevent shooting down of own Helicopters accidentally. Once during the initial deployment of Op Meghdoot we had Pakistan Fixed Wing aircraft fly over us at Bilafond la. What was unusual for us was the protest note sent by the Pakistan's Northern Sector Commander on 21 August 1983, which read as under;

REQUEST INSTRUCT YOUR TROOPS TO WITHDRAW
BEYOND LINE OF CONTROL SOUTH OF LINE JOINING
POINT NJ 9842, KARAKORAM PASS NE 7410 IMMEDIATELY.
I HAVE INSTRUCTED MY TROOPS TO SHOW MAXIMUM
RESTRAINT, BUT ANY DELAY IN VACATING OUR TERRITORY
WILL CREATE A SERIOUS SITUATION. ASSURING YOU
OF MY FULLEST COOPERATION IN MAINTAINING PEACE
AND TRANQUILITY ALONG LINE OF CONTROL.

For the First Time , Pakistan formally projected in Black and White their claim to all the area North west of the line joining the terminal point of the line of control at NJ 9842 with the Karakoram Pass. Having lodged a counter protest note the Pakistanis sent a second protest note on 29 August 83 reiterating the line of control extending to Karakoram Pass from NJ 9842. They were determined to support their unilateral cartographic claim by physical occupation of Siachen. Our Intelligence, reported move of Two Pakistani Columns of trained mountaineers supported by Mortars moving across Bilafond la and Sia la to occupy Siachen. Due to bad weather and inadequate logistic support they were not successful and the troops withdrew to only confirm Pakistans intention to occupy Siachen early next year. This was further reinforced and confirmed by Intelligence Reports that Pakistan Army was procuring large quantities of Special Snow and Ski equipment from Europe to be available to their troops by January 1984. They also launched an intensive training programme for a force named 'Burzil Force' comprising of their elite SSG and Northern Light Infantry (NLI) to occupy Siachen Glacier.

Planning for Operations

The activities of Pakistan gave us no option but to prevent Pakistani forces from giving us a fait accompli which meant occupying Siachen Glacier before them and that entailed occupying the two passes namely Bilafond La and Sia La and all this was to be done in a manner that it does not escalate in an all out war.

There was no precedent or previous experience of fighting on glacier but our experience of patrolling the glacier and Saltoro ridge gave us the confidence to hold the Glacier .

We realized that to occupy the Glacier we had to acclimatize for altitudes up to 20000 feet, we had to master the art off Ice Craft and walking on the Glacier, we had to learn to make self contained logistic loads for each camp as logistics dictated tactics, we had to be frugal as all sustenance would have to be done by Helicopters and porters and this required proper packing and careful planning, the troops were constantly told how to survive and buddy system was strictly enforced even while stepping out for natures call, crevasse crossing drill, avalanche rescue and avalanche avoidance, keeping the weapons battle worthy at all times, how to identify setting in of High Altitude diseases especially HAPO, Chill Blains, Frost Bite, Snow blindness, insomnia, lack of appetite etc etc even though the Army Commander during war game stated that it is easier to fight elements than to fight a determined enemy at such heights.

Based on the above considerations and inputs from us who had previous experience of Siachen Glacier, it was suggested by Brig Channa, Commander 26 Sector that 13 April 84 would be an appropriate date to launch the Operations as we would be able to preempt the PAKISTANIS and that Baisakhi is an auspicious day. To achieve complete surprise it was decided to drop a Platoon each at Bilafond la and Siala and marching columns to establish the various camps on the Siachen Glacier. The number of camps required to establish on the glacier to sustain the troops on the passes besides occupying a defensive positions were more than double the number of camps required to assault Mt Everest. The porters were paid the same rate per day as received by the Sherpas who assisted the Climbers at Mt Everest. Each camp was established on a days turn around from each other. It was a logistic nightmare as the troops and the porters could not carry more than 15 to 20 kgs and as the distance of the turn around increased, the camps had to cater for night stay and food for all. As days passed the inducting troops and deinducting troops added to the administrative load of the various camps. Helicopters with the passage of time were lifting restricted load and sometimes as low as 50 kgs only due to high altitude fatigue factor due to operations of machines at such extreme altitudes. Helicopters were used primarily for evacuation of casualties, recce and logistic sustenance. Snow scooters were later inducted which proved very handy. With the passage of time the sustenance level of the troops has increased and when I was posted as Chief of Staff the troops had mastered the art of living on the glacier and it was a matter of pride for all the troops to serve on the glacier with morale sky high because they had since 1984 foiled all attempts to dislodge our troops by the Pakistani elite SSG troops led by Musharraf himself and having failed to do so he was later the brain behind Kargil war as their Chief of Army Staff.

In the mountains and especially on Saltoro Ridge anyone who is holding reasonably well prepared defensive positions cannot be dislodged unless until the troops get complacent and are sleeping. It was necessary, therefore, to give adequate time to the troops to settle down to prepare defensive positions under the worst weather on earth. Temperatures as low as -50 degrees celcius, wind speed as high as 80 Kms an hour and compounded by very heavy snowfall as high as 8 feet in one night and to top it all an altitude of 20000 feet. No body who is not physically fit and mentally robust and not trained in High Altitude Mountain Warfare can hope to survive and despite the best of training and equipment and experience till date over a thousand troops have been a victim of the most inhospitable terrain. No amount of advice can substitute the way you

feel till you experience the mortuary yourself. The reason why Mr Fernandes as Raksha Mantri always insisted that the Civil Servants dealing with Siachen must experience the Glacier stay once, before taking a decision.

Teeth to tail ratio is often a subject of debate to cut down the revenue expenditure, as the size of tail is considered too long but, not here in Siachen. The Indian Army faces the stiffest challenge in the Mountains, hence to be able to bite and chew the enemy, the teeth have to have a long tail vis a vis plains to sustain and maintain troops at High Altitude. When the adversaries have a good infrastructure opposite us, we have no option. Yes we must optimize but to drastically cut by comparing it with Desert Warfare or Plains would be Catastrophic. In Siachen and more so in Mountain Warfare who ever occupies the passes and certain heights first is the winner as dislodging the ones holding prepared defences on dominating heights, is extremely difficult and prohibitive, we experienced it in Kargil. Pre emptying Pakistan by occupying Saltoro and Siachen on 13 April 1984 was a master stroke as Pakistan despite the road head just a day's turnaround from the passes and equipped with imported snow clothing by January 84 did not want to perish in extreme weather. The credit goes to Gen Chhiber, Gen Hoon and Brig Channa to convince Delhi for the go ahead on 13 April 1984, the go ahead from Delhi came a fortnight before the launch but our 'Imported Clothing' from Europe, arrived at Siachen Base Camp just in time on 12 April. Launch date was not postponed infact we were prepared to launch wearing Indigenously manufactured Ordnance clothing, which was used by us during Polar Bear and Ibex Hunt. Gen Hoon who had scouted for the snow Clothing abroad was hopeful it would reach the Base Camp on Schedule, and sure it reached a day before the launch saving Casualties on account of sub zero temps, as the clothing was of a very superior quality and stuffed with 'Down'. He infact had got annoyed with me for accepting to launch with old Snow Clothing. To us pre emptying Pakistan and securing the Heights and Passes was more important than Clothing, to Gen Hoon a Mountaineer himself both were equally important. He was right.

On 31 March 1984, Army Hqs gave the final go ahead for Op Meghdoot. In May 1984 the Govt accorded clearance for permanent occupation of the Siachen Glacier. On 11 April 84, 19 KUMAON, back up force concentrated at the Base Camp, Ski Troopers linked up with the Task Force and the Six Cheetah Helicopters under Wg Cdr GS Sandhu, VrC were positioned at Thoise. On 12 April 84 Recce of area of operations was conducted by me and Maj Bahuguna, who were tasked to occupy the passes. Gen Hoon accompanied

by Air Marshal Woollen and Maj Gen Sharma, GOC 3 Inf Div, after the Aerial reconnaissance stated that Bilafond la and Sia la platoons would be dropped 3 Kms and 6 Kms, short of the Passes, respectively.

HELICOPTERS - THE LIFELINE OF LOGISTICS Conduct Of Operations

On 13 April 1984, Operation Meghdoot was launched under the able leadership of a very experienced mountaineer Col Pushkar Chand. The Company of 4 KUMAON under Major RS Sandhu VrC was tasked to occupy the three camps on the glacier with a section each from the Platoon under



Captain D Gusain, the Patrol base behind Bilafond la was to be occupied by the Platoon under Captain Paramvir Yadav and the Company Commander along with the Platoon of Captain Sanjay Kulkarni called the 'Zorawar Force' were to be helilifted to Bilafond la. The first pair of Cheetahs were flown by Wg Cdr GS Sandhu, VrC and Sqn Ldr S Bains. Signalman AK Mandal and me were in the first Helicopter, since there was no proven Helipad we were told to jump from the low hovering helicopter, to ensure that we do not sink in the whiteout condition created by the Helicopter, I requested the Pilot that we throw a 30 Kg 'Atta Bag' to check the hardness of the snow, the bag did not sink and the two of us jumped from the hovering helicopter and guided the other

one to land on the improvised helipad and ensuring it was not over a crevasse. The second Helicopter had L Nk Ramesh Singh and L Nk Prakash, these two were part of my earlier Polar Bear missions to Siachen and had accompanied me to Bilafond la numerous times in 1983. The familiarity of the area was a big boon to Psychologically prepare ourselves for the D Day. The intensive training imparted to the troops seemed to have paid off, the imported clothing was a boon to face the blizzardous weather. Maj RS Sandhu, Vrc, the Company Commander came in the third sortie and quickly took charge of the situation, by now Mandal had been affected by HAPO and was quickly evacuated. By 1100 hrs, 4 KUMAON led Zorawar Force comprising of 2 Officers, 1 JCO and now only 26 Other Ranks were camping 3 Kms short of Bilafond la. The rush to la was to commence soon but the weather suddenly deteriorated and blizzardous weather struck the camp location on Lolofond Glacier.

The next three days we had total whiteout and blizzardous conditions and despite having experienced and trained platoon most of the men were showing symptoms of High altitude and all efforts to move to Bilafond la was proving difficult. On 17 April, L Nk Ramesh Singh who was with me in Polar Bear succumbed to HAPO and we lost a very dear buddy who would be full of energy and enthusiasm at all times and always available for advice, his passing away forced us to open the Radio Sets to evacuate him and request for medicines for the rest. We were self contained for 5 days. Opening of the Radio sets and requesting for evacuation raised an alarm at the Hqs in Delhi and 'we told you so', that launching at this time would be like committing hara-kiri. When all this was going on and the radio silence had been broken the Pakistani 'La ma' Helicopter was spotted on top of Bilafond la and seeing us all camping hurriedly left. Pakistanis had been beaten for the race to La, and Musharraf later admitted that the Indians pre-empted them by occupying the two most important and accessible passes to Siachen Glacier. Pakistan hurriedly decided to push troops towards Saltoro Ridge, we spotted some birds fly near La and the Pakistani troops were spotted on Ali Brangsa on 24 April 84, first shot was fired on 25 April 84. War for Siachen had begun.

On 17 April 84 Sia la was occupied, link up force of the foot columns despite bad weather was progressing well and by 18 April, Camp I, II, and III on the Siachen Glacier had been established and link up with the Bilafond la Platoon was established on 24 April and simultaneously Ladakh Scouts was establishing Camp IV, V and VI for link up with the Sia la Heli lifted Platoon. With the

link up of ground troops with post at Bilafond la and Sia la established, the entire Siachen Glacier was secured by own troops and the two main approaches to Siachen secured and sealed. The enemy was taken completely by surprise and area of approximately 9300 Sq Kms, illegally shown as part of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir on the maps published by Pakistan and USA were now under India's control. With Sia la and Bilafond la held by us, Pakistan was making determined efforts to get across the Watershed in area of Gyongla, in the Central Glacier, consequently instructions were issued to Company of 19 KUMAON to occupy the Salto crest line especially in the area of Gyongla. On 29 May 84, a Patrol of 17 Other Ranks led by Lt Pundir, while attempting to reach the crest line was struck by an avalanche triggered by the Enemy which led to all of them buried and dead. Simultaneously Urdolep Glacier, part of Southern Glacier was being secured by a patrol of 4 KUMAON led by Major Satyevir Yadav (later Lt Gen) and Captain ML Chauhan, (later District Commissioner, Solan) it was a strange coincidence that all the three brothers Satyevir, Ranbir and Paramvir were deployed to defend the Glacier, while their father a retired Colonel was Commissioned in 4 KUMAON. The logistic support to Gyong la posed a severe problem as no suitable DZ was available in the near vicinity and Pakistani troops were in close proximity to our troops on the Central Glacier. Patrolling to Indira Col by the Ski troopers was carried out to ensure surveillance of likely approaches to Siachen from the North.

The first Battle for Bilafond la was fought on 23 June 1984 by the platoon of 4 KUMAON and attached troops by beating back the Pakistani attacks at the cost of one dead and two wounded of ours and over a dozen Pakistani soldiers dead/wounded. The situation continued to escalate and the deployment on this highest battlefield in the world became a permanent feature. On 26 June 1987, Naib Subedar Bana Singh of 8 JAK LI passed the ultimate test in endurance and physical danger by clawing his way up the icy slopes to capture the Quaid-e-Azam Post from the Pakistanis at a height of well over 21000 feet. In recognition of his herculean effort he was decorated with PVC and the post was renamed 'BANA TOP'. Where great courage and fortitude is the norm three months later on 23 September 1987, 3/4 Gorkha Rifles beat back yet another determined attack slashing the Pakistani soldiers with Khukris, Gorkhas stubborn resistance forced the enemy to fall back. Nk Prem Bahadur Gurung was decorated with MVC (Posthumously) along with his Company Commander Major Chatterjee. During Kargil Operations 27 RAJPUT under the leadership of Col KH Singh (later Lt Gen) captured Point 5770 and

exhumed bodies of all Pakistani Soldiers killed including Captain Taimur and sent them back with proper military honours unlike the treatment meted out to our captured soldiers by Pakistan during the Kargil War.

From 13 April 1984, when a Platoon of 4 KUMAON was airlifted onto Salto Ridge, the Siachen Glacier till date remains the highest battle field in the world. History and courage in combat is written daily on its icy slopes, and Soldiers with unshakeable determination and unparalleled collective valour, slug it out with the weather, the enemy and a inhospitable and inaccessible terrain.

TERRAIN-THE BIGGEST CHALLENGE Challenges Ahead

To some Siachen confrontation is the world's most insane, cruel, strategically absurd high altitude warfare fought between 5000 m and 6000m over a dispute which reads 'point NJ 9842 thence north to the glaciers', statement of the 1949 Karachi Agreement. Pakistan's cartographic aggression and its attempt to sponsor foreign expeditions and discreet endorsement by some world known Atlas publishers of joining point NJ 9842 with the Karakoram Pass and not aligned in the direction of K2 gave Pakistan the right to sponsor expeditions and lay claim to Siachen Glacier and add over 9500 sq Kms of area to POK. Pakistan had already ceded over 4500 Sq Kms of Shaksgam valley adjoining Siachen to China in 1963 to obtain grazing rights in Hunza. Had it not come to the notice of Col N Kumar through the maps his German mountaineering friend carried in which he saw the American Maps depicting point NJ 9842 joining Karakoram Pass, we would have inadvertently given up our possession of that wedge between POK and China.

We have since 13 April 1984 lost to Pakistan firing and to bad weather nearly Eight hundred and fifty soldiers and over 13000 have been wounded. Thirteen rounds of talks to demilitarize Siachen have failed, primarily because Pakistan wants India to go back to line of 1972 and India insists on authentication of current Pakistani troop positions. It is more important to come to a political agreement first, before a Military solution, but the question is who do you deal with in Pakistan? Can we Imagine the PM of India is being introduced by the PM of Pakistan to his Officials on a State Visit one of whom is their Chief of Army Staff, who refuses to salute the Indian PM, and has the audacity of launching Kargil and immediately thereafter, overthrows the PM and becomes the President of Pakistan.



We have over the years learnt the art of living and take pride in it by sheer hard work, continuous improvement in infrastructure, high standard of training, innovation, medical prowess, time tested successful standard operating procedure and have established ourselves on Saltoro Ridge and Siachen Glacier that it would be foolish to give all that up for an adversary who cannot be trusted. Initially the cost per day was prohibitive but now it is affordable and the operational and Psychological superiority overwhelming. The Indian Air Force and Army Aviation ably support logistics sustenance and casualty evacuation and the morale of the troops go sky high after a tenure on the Glacier. The successful tenure on the glacier is the acid test of a soldier and that of the Battalion..

With China's military presence in POK and especially in Northern Areas for infrastructure development much against the wishes of local population but at the behest of a friend whose friendship runs' higher than the Himalayas and deeper than the oceans, sweeter than honey and stronger than steel, we have to be on guard. Both Pakistan and China continue to have unsettled borders with India. Pakistan played a key role in the initiation of détente between USA and China. The volatile Xinjiang Muslim province of China necessitates China to prevent Pakistan from instigating Insurgency in its backyard, hence China prefers to have presence in Northern Areas to keep a strict vigil on its citizens and instigators, Chinese fighting for ISIS have surprised the Chinese. In 1987,

China and Pakistan signed the protocol to formalize the demarcation of their boundary. Termination at Karakoram Pass and its recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Aksai Chin clearly indicates a tacit understanding between them. Pakistan will do whatever is possible to hold together its most important alliance with China. Forewarned is Forearmed.

The Kargil War is a lesson learnt that it is difficult to recapture lost territory in high altitude and a clear warning, what if the agreement between Pakistan and India on Demilitarisation is flouted by Pakistan, it would be almost impossible to dislodge them from the dominating heights and the cost to recapture very very high. Pakistan has lovely connectivity from Gyari the Pakistani Battalion Headquarter to both Sia la and Bilafond la, 323 Siachen Brigade is Located at Yuching. The approach to Sia la is from the Kondus Glacier and to Bilafond la from Gyari. The helicopters are stationed at Skardu or Gilgit. Musharraf states in his book ' In The Line Of Fire, that on 'Pakistan side a gravel road reaches close to the Saltoro Range. Troops can climb to any of the passes in one day after travelling by jeep.' With that kind of a connectivity Pakistan which has failed so far in its attempt to capture the Siachen Glacier cannot be trusted, since they have been eyeing this territory by launching cartographic aggression since 70's and now with Chinese troops also present in Northern Area and the trust deficit far too low, it is best to hold what we have on the water shed.

Logistic challenges have been undertaken by us over the years by ensuring that the major maintenance is by Air, Porters and by Mechanical means. Troops are being trained hard and are being sensitized to various High Altitude Diseases and how to read the symptoms so that they could be quickly evacuated. It is time and again reiterated that it is no good to be a Gama in the land of Lama. Snow Scooters, High altitude clothing, Satellite communication, high calorie food, buddy system, avalanche warning by SASE, adhering to Standard Operating Procedures, mentally preparing the soldier for the loneliness and ensuring timely turnover of troops has reduced weather related casualties and has enhanced operational readiness on professional front resulting in increasing frustration amongst the Pakistan Military leadership to seek a quick resolution to the Siachen problem. Fortunately the cease fire continues to be in place making life a little less dangerous.

Years of deployment and Climate Change has taken a heavy toll and has resulted in shrinking of the Glacier, since we had operated on the Glacier in 1983 and 1984 and when I went back again as Chief of Staff I was amazed to see a shrunk glacier with lot of waste on the moraine and on the glacier and

temperatures quite high from before resulting in more avalanche and crevasse related casualties.

Operations in the glaciated environment of Siachen have opened a new chapter in Military History. Never before have men battled with nature and fought in such extreme glaciated conditions of terrain and extreme high altitudes. Siachen has turned a new leaf in Mountain Warfare. Sooner or later, Pakistan has to give up its obsession of India and accept to be a good neighbour and give up its Myopic vision of a 'Thousand Cuts' only then can a solution not just to Siachen but host of other issues can be found bilaterally.

LT GEN SANJAY KULKARNI (RETD)



Lt Gen Sanjay Kulkarni, PVSM, AVSM, SC, SM, VSM (Retd) was commissioned into 4 KUMAON in 1977. In his illustrious career of 39 years, he served in various types of terrain and participated in Operation Polar Bear and Operation Meghdoot as a Captain in 1983 and in 1984. For leading his Platoon to unfurl the National Flag on Bilafond la he was decorated with Shaurya Chakra. He commanded a Rashtriya Rifles Battalion in thick of of the Insurgency and later commanded an Infantry Battalion, an Infantry Brigade and a Division along the Line of Actual Control in Arunachal Pradesh where he was decorated with the Governor s Gold Medal. Alumni of National Institute of Defence Studies, Japan and of National Defence College, New Delhi, he retired as Director General Infantry.

Massive Ordnance Air Blast, MOAB :- A Perspective

Rear Adm Dr S Kulbrestha (Retd)

On 13th April 2017 at 7:32 p.m. local time¹, U.S. Forces Afghanistan conducted a strike using a GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast bomb, MOAB dropped from an U.S. aircraft on an ISIS (Khorasan) tunnel complex in Achin district, Nangarhar province, Afghanistan. Some of the immediate reactions were: -


- Mr Ashraf Ghani, the president of Afghanistan, said that the strike was "*designed to support the efforts of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)*" and "*precautions were taken to avoid civilian casualties*"²,
- Mr Hamid Karzai, Afghanistan's former president condemned the attacks in a series of tweets saying "*This is not the war on terror but the inhuman and most brutal misuse of our country as testing ground for new and dangerous weapons*"³

In January 2015, the ISIS had announced the establishment of its Khorasan branch, it was also the first time the ISIS had officially spread its wings outside the Arab world. In December 2015, analyst Harleen Gambhir of Institute for the Study of War, ISW had indicated that ISIS is likely to expand in Afghanistan-Pakistan region⁴ as ISIS associate Wilayat Khorasan, controlling Nangarhar province, had commenced attacking Kabul and Jalalabad. It was estimated that ISIS influence is likely to increase further due to many factors such as, infighting among Taliban, vacuum due withdrawal of international forces and reduction in competition with al-Qaeda due to support of Khorasan.


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Control zones on this map depict villages where indicators of ISIS's control could be precisely geo-located. No village names could be found in open source reporting to clarify the exact location of ISIS's control in Kot district. ISIS likely maintains control of a significant portion of Kot district as of November 2015, however. The circled control zone in Kot district therefore represents an estimate for ISIS's possible control.



Source: Free media repository https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nangarhar_districts.png

Nangarhar Province is located in eastern Afghanistan, on the Afghanistan - Pakistan border. It is bordered by Kunar and Laghman provinces in the north, Pakistan in the east and south, and Kabul and Logar provinces in the west. It provides the easiest passage to Pakistan from Afghanistan. Topographical Features of Nangarhar include Spin Ghar and Safed Mountain Ranges along the southern border; belt of forests along southern mountain ranges and in Dara-I-Nur District in north; Khyber Pass in Mahmud Dara District in east; bare soil, and rocky outcrop throughout centre of the province. Achin, the target of the MOAB on 13 April 2017, is one of the districts in southern Nangarhar, bordering Pakistan.

The ISIS (K) were using a tunnel and cave complex in Tora Bora area which was apparently created by Central Intelligence Agency, CIA for the Mujahideen in 1980 in their fight against the Soviets. Tora Bora has steep heights, mountains, valleys and caves. The Tora Bora CIA complex constitutes of miles of tunnels, bunkers and camps built with the financial support of CIA 35 miles south west of Jalalabad⁵. It is understood that the complex was built by the Saudi Binladen group and the young Osama bin Laden had played a big role in its construction. The complex is said to have its own ventilation and hydroelectric power supply system. Subsequently Osama bin Laden had hidden in the same tunnel complex before escaping to Pakistan during attack on Tora Bora. The MOAB was dropped on the same mountain ridge in the Achin district of Nangarhar.⁶

Conventional/Incendiary/Fuel Air Explosive/Thermobaric Bombs

It is required to differentiate between conventional, incendiary, Fuel Air Explosive and Thermobaric bombs because MOAB is compared with different types of Bombs like the Russian 15, 650-pound Aviation Thermobaric Bomb of Increased Power (ATBIP) also called the FOAB (father of all bombs), as well as the 30,000-pound GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP).

Conventional Bombs. A conventional bomb is a metal casing filled with high explosives (HE). Conventional bombs are generally classified according to the ratio of explosive to total weight. They are mainly of three types namely general purpose or GP, penetration and cluster bombs (The Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) is an international treaty that has prohibited the use, transfer, and stockpiling of cluster bombs, which scatters submunitions ("bomblets") over an area). A GP bomb produces a combination of blast and fragmentation effects with weight of its explosive filling approximately equal to

half of its total weight. In the fragmentation bomb the explosive filling is up to 20% of its total weight, with fragmentation cases making up the remaining weight. The damage is caused due to fragments travelling at high velocities. The penetration bombs have up to 25/30% of explosive filling and remaining is taken up by the body designed for penetration. The kinetic energy of the bomb or the shaped charge or a combination of both achieve the penetration of the target.

Incendiary Explosives. Incendiaries cause damage by fire. They are used to burn supplies, equipment, and structures.

Fuel Air Explosives FAE. These disperse an aerosol cloud of fuel ignited by a detonator to affect an explosion. The wave front expands rapidly due to overpressure and flattens objects in the vicinity of the FAE cloud, and also causes heavy damage in the neighbouring area. A FAE bomb contains fuel and two independent explosive charges. After deployment, the first explosive charge is used to burst open the fuel container at a predetermined height and disperse the fuel. The fuel disperses and mixes with atmospheric oxygen and flows around the target area. The second charge is then made to detonate the cloud, which creates a massive blast wave. The blast wave results in extensive damage to the target especially in enclosed spaces.

Thermobaric weapons. Thermobaric weapons have been designed to overcome the short comings of conventional weapons when used against fortified structures/buildings. The blast wave generated by thermobaric weapons are not designed for penetration and it is effective in causing blast damage in a large radius. Fuels are chosen on the basis of the exothermicity of their oxidation, ranging from powdered metals, such as aluminium or magnesium, to organic materials, possibly with a self-contained partial oxidant. During detonation of a high explosive bomb, rapid formation of a blast wave, thermal radiation, break-up of the munition casing, and acceleration of the fragments takes place. In the case of conventional blast/fragmentation warheads, a large part of the energy is consumed by the breaking-up of the shell and acceleration of the fragments. Thermobaric weapons have thin casings and maximum energy is released in a couple of microseconds as a blast/shock wave. In the initial detonation only a small part of energy gets released, the products of detonation thereafter suck oxygen from the air and burn in what is termed as after-burning⁷. This increases the blast pressure wave as well as the fire envelope.

GUIDANCE OF BOMBS

Air to surface bombs today have either laser guidance kits or Global Positioning System, GPS guidance kits. The laser guided bombs were found to be difficult to deploy in bad weather/visibility conditions or when the targets could not be safely illuminated by the designator, and this led to the preference for GPS guided munitions. Munitions with integrated Inertial Navigation System, INS coupled to a GPS receiver like the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) of Boeing are all weather deployable. The GPS/INS coupled with a tail control system provide the guidance. The Aircraft provides the initializing position and velocity, the target coordinates are also fed/updated by the aircraft through a data link. With GPS, the bomb gives a circular error probable (CEP) of five meters and without the GPS (signal lost/not available/jammed) for flight times up to 100 seconds the CEP is 30 meters. Thus, the GPS/INS kits have enabled the bombs to have the following advantages⁸:

- Deployable in all weather conditions.
- Fire and forget capability, the aircraft can proceed to its next task after launch.
- Enhanced Launch Acceptance Region or LAR because these kits enable the weapon to adjust the flight trajectory at the time of launch to hit the target.
- GPS provides an accurate common time code for all systems.
- Flight trajectory can be programmed to hit the target at desired angle of impact.

As a further improvement Laser JDAM is now operational which has an add on laser kit in addition to the GPS/INS to take care of manoeuvring targets and midcourse alterations. A new wing kit (extended range- ER) can also be added to extend the range of the bomb up to 38 nm.

The MOAB - 'Mother of All Bombs'

The GBU-43/B (MOAB) is a large, powerful and accurately delivered conventional bomb. It has KMU-593/B GPS-guidance with fins and inertial gyro for pitch and roll control. The KMU-593/B kits have been further upgraded with SAASM (Selective Availability/Anti-Spoofing Module) technology in the GPS receivers. In a further improvement, the KMU-xxx/C kits are additionally fitted with Anti-Jam technology. The MOAB is a satellite guided improved version of the 15000-pound BLU-82 Daisy Cutter bomb. It is 30 feet in length with a diameter of 40.5 inches. The warhead is a BLU 120-B aluminium

casing weighing 3000 pounds with an explosive weight of 18,700 pounds. The warhead is designed for blast effect. It was designed to be delivered by a C-130 and originally used the explosive Tritonal, a mixture of 80% Tri nitro toluene, TNT and 20% aluminium powder. It was first tested in March 2003 at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida, when it produced a mushroom cloud that could be seen up to 20 miles away⁹. The current explosive filling is 18,700 pounds of H6. H6 is a type of HBX explosive composition, which is a cast able military explosive mixture composed of 44.0% RDX (Cyclotrimethylene trinitramine), 29.5% TNT and 21.0% powdered aluminium by weight. The MOAB delivers a massive explosive blast (over pressure), with lesser fragmentation effects due to a thin-walled aluminium casing. MOAB is a good choice against caves and earthen tunnels since the pressure waves on entering the complex can severely injure personnel and collapse the structures. The MOAB provides a capability to perform psychological operations, attack large area targets, or hold at-risk threats hidden within tunnels or caves. It is not designed for deep penetration and is an area impact weapon.

The MOAB is cradle launched from C-130 Hercules or MC-130 Talon II aircraft by means of a drogue extraction parachute.¹⁰ Thereafter, the MOAB is guided for approximately 3 nautical miles through a GPS system (with inertial gyros for pitch and roll control), JDAM actuators, and is stabilized by series of fixed wings and grid fins. The MOAB does not use a retarding parachute, thus permitting the aircraft to fly at higher altitudes, and making it safer for US pilots.

Future Trends in Design and Development of Conventional Bombs

It is understood that nanotechnology is spearheading the development of highly potent explosives, however, not much information is available through open sources, much of it has to be gleaned from research papers and patents (for e.g. Patents like US20150210605 - Structure of energetic materials, US6955732 - Advanced thermobaric explosive compositions and WO2013119191A1 - Composition for a fuel and air explosion).

Essentially, Nano energetic materials (nEMs) perform better than conventional materials because of much larger surface area, which increases speed of reaction and larger energy release in much shorter time. Addition of Super thermites¹¹ (nano-aluminium based) have shown instantaneous increase in explosive power of existing compositions¹². Further, use of nano-sized materials in explosives has significantly increased safety and insensitivity by as

much as over 30% without affecting reactivity. It is predicted that nEMs would provide the same explosive power at mass up to two orders of magnitude less than the current explosive systems¹³

While Nanosizing of high explosives leads to increasing their explosive power¹⁴ and decreasing their sensitivity to external forces¹⁵, it also decreases its thermal stability. The shelf life of such explosives could therefore stand reduced; however, some patents reveal that this issue has also been resolved technically (e.g. patent US20120227613 Thermal enhanced blast warhead). In India, the work on explosives and propellants is being undertaken at High Energy Materials Laboratory, HEMRL, a Defence Research and Development Organisation, DRDO laboratory, and it is understood that the research in nEMs is progressing satisfactorily.

It can be envisaged that nEMs would replace the conventional explosives in the next decade. This would provide existing conventional weapons with explosive powers higher in magnitude by a factor of two and enhance the safety to external stimulation by at least 30%. In simple terms, a missile warhead having an explosive content of 200 kg of TNT equivalent would have an explosive power of 20,000 kg of TNT equivalent when substituted with nEMs material of same weight of 200 kg! This advancement could displace Tactical nukes from the battlefield.

Nanotechnology is permeating in all fields of design & manufacturing of weapons and ammunition. It is bringing unprecedented precision in weapon systems, robustness in triggering mechanisms and opening new frontiers in propellant and pyrotechnic functioning. In addition to explosive and propellants, Nanomaterials have ushered in innovative improvements in many characteristics of ammunition such as guidance, penetration capacity, embedded sensors for monitoring condition, embedded antennae for guidance and so on.

Russian Answer to MOAB

An Aviation Thermobaric Bomb of Increased Power (ATBIP) was tested by Russia on 11 September 2007. It was said to be the most powerful conventional bomb in the world, with a 7-Ton explosive mixture resulting in a devastating effect equivalent to 44 tons of TNT¹⁶. It was nicknamed the Father of All Bombs (FOAB). It was hinted that the FOAB contained a liquid fuel, such as ethylene oxide, mixed with energetic nano-aluminium powder, which was dispersed by a high explosive booster. Some reports speculated that the liquid fuel was purified

using nano-filters. What caught the imagination of defense experts was the fact that the Russian FOAB had less fuel than the MOAB, but was four times more powerful. It was also probably the first time that the nonprofessional learned of the lethal uses of nanotechnology.

India's Biggest Conventional Bomb - SPICE

India has acquired the 2000 pound Israeli SPICE (Smart, Precise Impact, Cost-Effective) bomb. It is the biggest bomb in the inventory of the Indian Airforce. Israel's Rafael Advanced Defence System's first precision guidance kit for dumb bombs was called the SPICE. SPICE kits claim a CEP (Circular error probable) of three metres. SPICE's Automatic Target Acquisition capability works by comparing a real-time image received from the dual Charge-Coupled Device (CCD) and infrared seeker to a reference image stored in the weapon's computer. The SPICE can be carried on Mirage 2000 as well as on a variant of SU-30 MK1 aircraft of the Indian Air Force. The SPICE-2000 is stated to have a stand-off range of 32.3nm (60km).

MOAB the New WMD?

'In the more distant future, weapons systems based on new principles (beam, geophysical, wave, genetic, psychophysical and other technology) will be developed. All this will, in addition to nuclear weapons, provide entirely new instruments for achieving political and strategic goals. Such hi-tech weapons systems will be comparable in effect to nuclear weapons but will be more "acceptable" in terms of political and military ideology. In this sense, the strategic balance of nuclear forces will play a gradually diminishing role in deterring aggression and chaos.¹⁷

Vladimir Putin, 2012

There are differing definitions of weapons of mass destruction WMD, therefore it is better to adhere to the one adopted by the United Nations. The definition of WMD was arrived at by the United Nations Convention on Conventional Armament in its first resolution in 1948. The Commission advised the Security Council that "all armaments and armed forces, except atomic weapons and weapons of mass destruction fall within its jurisdiction" and also stated that "*weapons of mass destruction should be defined to include atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in*

destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above".¹⁸ This definition provides the guidelines to distinguish between the conventional weapons and the WMDs.

The determining factors distinguishing the Conventional weapons from the WMD could be the terms Mass Casualties and Mass Destruction. However, mass casualties can also be inflicted by conventional weapons during extended periods of siege or carpet bombings. There is ambiguity in the sense that that event of occurrence of mass casualties could be a single event or a series of consecutive events. The number of casualties could in fact be higher in sustained usage of conventional weapons than in the case of a single use WMD. The other notable point is that there is no quantification of the term 'Mass', i.e. how many dead humans would qualify for an event to be termed as Mass casualty. The term mass destruction also suffers from similar dichotomy. A barrage of conventional weapons can cause a larger scale physical destruction spread across tens of miles as compared to a single WMD in a single event, again, quantification as to what constitutes Mass Destruction has not been defined clearly.

The MOAB has been incorrectly compared to a nuclear bomb. It has less than 1000th¹⁹ of the power of the atomic bomb 'Little Boy' dropped on Hiroshima because the MOAB blast was equivalent to 11 tons of TNT whereas the Hiroshima blast was close to 13000 tons equivalent of TNT. The 'Fat Man' atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki was a 20,000 tons equivalent of TNT. However, the blast radius of MOAB lies in the same one mile radius as the atomic bombs of WWII. Conventional bombs can never achieve the damage potential of the exponential rise of energy that ensues upon a nuclear bombs detonation. The most powerful of nuclear bombs today is the B83 bomb of the United States, it uses a fission process similar to that used in the atomic bombs, the initial energy is then used to ignite a fusion reaction in a secondary core of the hydrogen isotopes deuterium and tritium. The nuclei of the hydrogen atoms fuse together to form helium, and result in a chain reaction leading to a far more powerful explosion. The nuclear fission bomb B83, has a blast equivalent to 1,200,000 tons of TNT compared to 11 tons equivalent of TNT blast by the MOAB. The tactical nuclear weapons range from 10 tons to 100 kilotons. What unambiguously differentiates a conventional weapon from a WMD would be the latent effects of the deployment, which in case of atomic/nuclear weapons last across generations in case of humans and decades in case of remediation of the material. The UN definition of WMD covering atomic, radiological, chemical, biological, or any weapon producing similar effects appears to be sustainable,

from this it can be inferred that MOAB/FOAB type of conventional bombs; which lie on the lowest limits of the destructive power of tactical nukes without the attendant latent effects; would not fall in the category of WMD.

An U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command MC-130 Combat Talon transport aircraft dropped the MOAB out of the cargo ramp on 13th April 2017. The bomb detonated at 7.32 pm local time in the Achin district of the eastern province of Nangarhar²⁰. The Guardian reported that "a local security official said they had requested a large strike because fighter jets and drones had failed to destroy the tunnel complex". Also, Ismail Shinwari, the district governor of Achin, said, "the strike was closely coordinated with Afghan soldiers and special

forces, and tribal elders had been informed to evacuate civilians.²¹ He also told AFP that that at least 92 ISIL fighters were killed in the bombing.²² *It was confirmed later by the Afghan officials that foreign militants, including 13 Indians, were also killed in the bombing.* The Indians had joined ISIS and were fighting for caliphate.

The MOAB had proved itself in Global War on Terror.



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Contextualising India's Position as a Leading Power

Brig Rumel Dahiya (Retd)

India's Prime Minister, Narendra Modi has envisioned India as a 'leading power' in the coming decades. Some foreign leaders and commentators have also fuelled this aspiration by calling upon India to be a net security provider in the region. The term itself is not precisely defined. Various terms like 'super power', 'global power', 'leading power' and 'major power' are used to describe the nation(s) that exercise greater degree of influence and leadership in global affairs than the other countries do. The characteristics of a great power or leading power are also not precisely defined. Yet, a rough hierarchy of states based on their relative power and influence is generally accepted by most. India has often tried to present itself as a 'thought leader' or a 'different power- not in the mould of any of the past or existing powers'. The world at large has not been impressed with these ideas.

Obviously, a country that aspires to exercise leadership successfully in context of global governance has to have some attributes. It must have sizeable population and stable society, both open and pluralistic; possess political will to act in a leadership role; should have significant share of world trade – particularly in high technology products; should have capacity to innovate and respond to world problems; and, possess military reach beyond its immediate neighbourhood. It should have the ability to play a major role in setting the agenda for global governance and to mobilise others to act upon that agenda and arrive at decisions. It should also be able to ensure that the decisions so taken are implemented.

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ATTRIBUTES OF A LEADING POWER

Eminent historians like A. J. P. Taylor gave prominence to a nation's strength for war as a determinant for a great power status. However, other writers have included overall political, economic and military capacity in their definition of power. More such power a country possesses higher becomes its power status. Founder of the neo-realist theory of international relations, Kenneth Waltz, prescribed a broader criteria to determine great power to include: population and territory; resources; economic capability; political stability; and military strength. In the definition of the French historian Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, a great power is one which is capable of preserving its own independence against any other single power. Some others have raised the bar saying that for a country to be counted as a great power it should be able to preserve itself even when others have joined hands against it. That would require a country to possess overwhelming power (Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain The United Nations at Fifty, Ramesh Thakur Ed.).

Most political scientists agree that military power remains a major attribute of a leading or a major power. It is born out to be the fact that despite being way ahead of France and UK in economic strength Japan has never been able to exercise the same influence as the former have had although it is also true that it is not merely the possession of nuclear weapons that characterizes their influence. Possession of an overwhelming military power like that of the Soviet Union is altogether a different proposition though. Besides, it also had the ability to project that power in all the regions of the world and its interests covered much of the globe. This leads one to conclude that for a country to be assessed and accepted as a leading power it must ensure that its interests and influence go beyond its region.

Yet another consideration for being acknowledged as a leading power is the general acceptability of its role, influence and legitimacy in the affairs of their region by many countries in different regions. Merely being powerful is not sufficient, although a necessary condition for being a leading power. This recognition may be formal, like being a permanent member of the UN Security Council, or based on the nature of a state's relations with other leading powers. A state may possess most or all such attributes but it also has to display willingness to shoulder responsibilities of global governance or maintaining order worldwide.

Historically only those states have been recognised as great powers that had enough influence to be included in discussions of major political and diplomatic issues of the day, and have influence on the final outcome and resolution. Major political questions like setting up of multinational institutions, resolving boundary disputes or enforcing ceasefire between warring states or addressing global financial crises etc have required informal and formal discussion among the powerful states to arrive at decisions and implementation has always depended on the continued cooperation of the very same powers. Boundaries of the states in West Asia and post-World War I Europe were set out through discussion amongst the powerful states of that time. Various treaties and agreements such as the Congress of Vienna and the Treaty of Westphalia were decided by the major powers.

There have been relatively few and short periods in world history, such as that immediately following the end of Cold War, where a single power becomes an undisputed dominant power. Such a power soon finds itself overwhelmed by the demands of having to manage global chaos all by itself. A more stable arrangement comprises of a number of major powers sharing the burden of global governance with multinational institutions to maintain a fair and just order.

Obviously, all leading powers pass through the stages of growth and expansion; consolidation and exercise of power, followed by a period of decline. The previous major powers such as the Portuguese, the Dutch, and the British all passed through these stages and now USA is transiting through the third stage of being a major power. It is most powerful in some ways but its leadership is being challenged in other ways, although in sum it still is the leading power despite faster than expected erosion of its global influence. Each of these powers was 'the strongest pole/power' for some time which generally coincided with the period of strong economy.

Historically, the time of decline of a major or leading power and rise of another new power – period of great power transition- has led to wars but it is not inevitable in the present circumstances due to globalised nature of economy and economic interdependence among the leading powers of the day. Possession of nuclear weapons also precludes a major and direct war between declining and aspiring powers although it affords an unfair advantage to those powers that consider possession of nuclear weapons as a hedge to cover their aggressive behaviour. Besides, an all-out war between major powers would be an awfully expensive proposition. This does not, of course, preclude 'war by other means' that can gradually sap the energies of the weaker of the contesting powers. But

for some 'black swan' event, the change in hierarchy of power at or near the top takes place gradually.

There are many positive factors that can facilitate India's rise to a leading power status. Currently India is the fastest growing major economy and with rising incomes, potentially a big market in the world that has started attracting highest external investments in the world; it enjoys political stability; has a benign image amongst most nations; its macro-economic indices are stable; and, it has a professional military that underpins national security. All major countries wish to develop good relations with India and various reports suggest that India will be among the top three economies in the world in next 15 to 20 years, if not earlier.

CHALLENGES FOR INDIA FOR EMERGING AS A LEADING POWER

No state in the world, including those commonly recognised as leading powers are free from challenges and have seldom in history have been so fortunate. Yet those who overcame their challenges rose to become leading power and India could not. India may be courted by major powers but the simple fact is that it is not influential enough presently to be regarded as a leading power. It is not one of the actors automatically consulted on major problems arising in the world. A visit of the Indian Prime Minister to the powerful countries does not attract the same attention that the visit of China's President or the US Secretary of State. It is clear that Prime Minister Modi's statement appears to be a statement of intent, albeit a necessary first step towards achievement of the goal. India is not part of the decision making process on most crucial questions of the day. Despite the overall positive sentiment about it outside, the world recognises that India is facing and likely to continue facing, a number of challenges in the years ahead. Some of these such as, climate change are global in nature, others as state supported terrorism and fundamentalism are endemic to the region, while dissension arising from economic disparities are internal threats facing the country. The root causes of these may vary from targeted proxy war to extremism and poor governance. That many of these challenges are faced by the recognised leading powers of the day is hardly reassuring for India precisely because those countries are still perceived by the world as more secure and prosperous. Their counsel and help to resolve disagreements are sought but not that of India. This perhaps has to do with perceived lack of capacity and slow and ponderous decision making processes in India. Record of implementation of projects decided is also awfully slow. Leading powers make decisive move and act with alacrity. In most cases requiring diplomatic or security intervention

by outside powers India is seldom seen to be taking initiative or displaying willingness to share the burden.

In the overall analysis, India is being courted for its potential and as a market and not for its power and current influence. It shies away from taking lead in any policy issue dealing with global challenges, its contribution in resolving problems beyond its immediate neighbourhood is minuscule, its military is large and professional but remains a blunt instrument as it is denied the sharp and effective response capability due to lack of understanding among the policy makers of matters military, its share in international trade is still below two percent and it stands at a lowly 19th place among top exporting countries.

India can justifiably take pride in frugal innovation and very economical execution of a few projects such as the Mars Mission but the innovation in general so far has been restricted to work around or 'jugaad', the infrastructure in many places continues to be poor and the public service delivery systems largely unresponsive and callous, its cultural heritage remains unexploited fully due to negative cultural practices and, human development indices are lower than all except the countries in perpetual conflict.

The recognition as a leading power status does not come cheap. All powers, large or small, have to pay their community dues through burden sharing or face exclusion from the informal yet powerful group. Unfortunately, the consensus among various institutions of state on the desirability and capability to pursue the aim of achieving a leading power status is absent. The distrust among the institutions and guarding of respective turfs rather than a synergised effort are sorely lacking. Besides, the state must be internally secure and stable.

At this moment, in sum, the country has great potential but does not possess comprehensive national power commensurate with its size. It possesses significant soft power: not because of the government but despite it. No wonder governance in India is rated so poorly. This does not, however, mean that the situation is hopeless. There is now a realisation amongst influential sections of the decision makers that India has to put its act together and convert its potential into actual strength. India is also now becoming confident enough to be objectively self-critical and ready to address the shortcomings. India also acknowledges the challenges to its security and growth and more prepared to meet those. There is a general consensus that effective governance in its many dimensions - development, diplomacy, military and internal security are primary components of strategy to overcome these challenges as well as to build India's

comprehensive national power. Some of the recent initiatives towards structural reformation of economy and infrastructure are positive indicators.

A stable, cohesive and inclusive social environment domestically is a *sine qua non* for achieving a leading power status. The challenges and threats to India's national security and development exist in both external and internal domains. However, these are more tangible in the internal domain. Internal challenges are a product of internal dissatisfaction of the people with the state of governance; denial of equal political and economic opportunities, dignity or social inequality; mismanagement of resources or artificial divisions created by vested interests. Because the state has greater control over internal matters, can clearly identify issues of importance to its people and has sovereign right to formulate its action plan freely as per the need of its people and resources available, the domestic policy also tends to be more tangible than foreign policy. Even the use of military force is more easily justifiable internally than externally. Measuring the outcomes of policy and action plans is also easier in case of domestic policy. In addition, the foreign policy of a state is often seen as an extension of domestic policy. This is more so in case of a federal democratic country like India where interests and political orientation of the people from states often have a bearing on the foreign policy choices of the central government. Internal cohesion and domestic harmony are essential for a country's rise not only because of their impact on perceptions but also because internal security frees up resources for application outside when required and the nation as a whole responds more readily to face the challenges.

India rightly counts the vast size of its youthful population as a demographic dividend that can propel India's economic growth to new highs and help other friendly countries as well. However, unless this population is properly educated and skilled the dividend can easily turn into disaster. A big paradox is that most productive sectors of the Indian economy are facing a shortage of skilled workmen while the unemployment is rampant, leading to various social ills. Additionally, due to social biases the youth are not prepared to undertake low paying jobs. That need is being met by illegal immigrants from the neighbouring countries leading to security and social stability concerns.

Although a theoretical line can be drawn between foreign and domestic policy, both realms constitute a unity that cannot be separated in application. To do so would be to unravel a work that gets its strength in the interconnectedness of their parts. Domestic policy must satisfy own citizens, foreign policy must meet or challenge the conditions created by the international political system.

Despite the obvious link, often indistinguishable, between the domestic and the foreign policy, ordinarily the state has lesser control over the processes and outcomes of foreign policy than the domestic policy. This is so because most often the state is trying to stop or influence the outcomes in a manner favourable to its own objectives, of something already being done by other, mostly the more powerful, states. It is the powerful and nimble footed among the nations that set the international agenda and other countries are merely reacting to protect their interests. It is therefore necessary to be part of norm-setters, decision makers and rule enforcers. That requires comprehensive national power which can only be built by sustained economic growth, prudent use of resources, non-threatening international image, internal cohesion and readiness to share the burden of governing the world.

It is axiomatic to say that the current global situation is full of uncertainties. The international system is chaotic and future trends unclear. The strongest power is ceding geopolitical space for others to expand their influence. No single power can presently replace USA whose political, diplomatic, economic and military investments over last 70 years or so have created a residual power greater than any other challenger can hope to match in next two one decade or more. This has created a space for states that can collectively fill the vacuum as and where it is emerges. It is certain that a power shift is taking place and that policy based on misinterpretation or misperception of the world events can have tragic results. That is a real challenge. Historically such phases are marked by conflicts between the declining and the rising powers. However, due to the economic interdependence brought about by globalisation direct conflict between powerful countries is becoming less and less likely, although not unthinkable. Also, due to the interconnectedness of interests and threats it is impossible to imagine today a country realistically practicing "isolationism". It is also an undeniable fact that policies and rules of global governance are framed to suit the interests of the powerful amongst the nations. India, therefore, has to make deft use of the flux in international relations and leverage its rapidly growing economy to build its power to be part of framers of rules. The controversy and chaos will always take place in an international system but the present chaotic situation also offers opportunities for India that can help it realise its objectives.

The economic growth of a country is a function of its natural resources; size, skill and productivity of its working age population; innovation and technology absorption; manufacturing and processing capacity; level of savings

and investment; domestic market; and, level of foreign trade. The foreign trade was always an important element of a country's reach and influence but has assumed much more importance in the era of globalisation. It is for this reason that in many countries, trade and economic diplomacy are an integral and most important part of their foreign policy. Powerful countries influence international trade policies to suit their requirements. Historically, the wealth has constantly shifted from consuming countries to producing and trading countries. That India's foreign trade is small in comparison to its potential is well known. What is inadequately appreciated is that power follows in the wake of economic growth and not the other way round. The challenge really lies in increasing the share of India's external trade in an environment of overall sluggishness of the world economy and trade. Going forward there is likely to be a tough competition amongst nations to secure export markets. Those who can reduce costs, bring out niche products and are easy to trade with will have an edge in this competition. Initial trends point towards growing protectionism and creation of trading regimes that favour the dominant economies. Under these circumstances continued high growth of Indian economy is not a given.

Yet another factor of national power impacting its power status is its military strength and how prudently it is employed. It is understood that in today's complex and interdependent world, national security can no longer be viewed only from the prism of coercive power but must take into account a multiplicity of factors such as the economy, healthcare, education, etc affecting national well-being. Indeed, the determinant of national security in today's world is a nation's comprehensive national power, which is a composite of many factors cutting across all facets of national life. It would also be right to say that in today's world a security order cannot be based exclusively on defence and diplomacy. It encompasses much more. The cross-domain challenges of security cannot be addressed merely by a kinetic, military response. This is because, in this moment of economic flux, political uncertainty, and rapid technological change, human security has become an intrinsic element of national and regional security. Nations that lost sight of this, such as Pakistan in 1971 in respect of erstwhile East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics after 1979 in Afghanistan had to pay a heavy price. Having said that, one cannot lose sight of the fact that a country's diplomacy will succeed and its prosperity sustained only if it is underpinned by a strong military capability and willingness to use that capability in a prudent manner. Even strategic autonomy can only be exercised when a country can sustain itself against coercion. India, therefore, has to build its military capability in a sustained manner.

The futile debate over disconnect between defence and development needs to be buried. Late K Subrahmanyam had opined there was an inherent linkage between defence and development. He wrote that "It is not realised that uncertainty regarding national security is equally damaging to national efficiency and consequently elimination and avoidance of security threats is conducive to national efficiency." He added, that "with two types of people dealing with defence and development in separate compartments, the demands on resources will appear to be intensely competitive." It is argued here the correlational linkages exist between security and development, both being essential for the progress of a country. Even in the external domain, success in diplomacy can only be achieved when it is underpinned by strong military capability. Conventional wars have become prohibitively expensive in present times and most countries would avoid going to war. However, even war avoidance can be achieved only through proactive deterrence and for creating that a strong military capability is an imperative. Besides, as Clausewitz said in the title to this short part of *On War*, "war is a mere continuation of policy by other means." He maintains that all nations have the option of war to achieve their foreign (and in some cases, domestic) policy goals. Wars, therefore, can take place for political reasons even when the decision to go to war is considered irrational on economic grounds. Despite the costs involved, states could go to war over several issues including sharing of water resources or countering an adversary's influence in the immediate neighbourhood. A country that itself feels threatened can hardly be respected as a leading power. India, therefore, has to be militarily prepared to ensure its own security and also that of other friendly states.

All major powers make it bold to spell out their vision, national objectives, and their security strategy and defence policy. India is yet to articulate its national security strategy or issue a white paper on defence. All the governments in India so far have been hesitating to spell out their goals clearly perhaps to avoid scrutiny and accountability. This approach may suit some people in authority but places a serious limitation on harnessing and husbanding the national resources, including active participation of the citizenry, for productive deployment. Such enunciation of policy and objectives makes their red lines clear to outsiders and lays down clear goals for their own government and the people. The main objective of NSS should be to articulate how the security and wellbeing of citizens is sought to be achieved. Other states need to be convinced about the clarity of India's vision before they accept it as a leading power.

Articulation of NSS is not an end in itself. There has to be a transmission line between policy, strategy and action. To achieve this there is a necessity for strategic communication as a means of pursuing the ends of national strategy, both at home and abroad. Informing public opinion and consensus building on strategies or responses adopted by the state has become central to the idea of legitimacy of action. This has acquired special significance in an era of the all-pervasive media ecology. The Indian state has been often criticised for lacking strategic coherence in communicating the larger message which underpins its strategy, weighed down due to shifting policy goal posts or other compulsions which gives way to ambiguity and confusion. Inordinate attention has been paid to the co-ordination and tools of the message rather than the message itself. The approach adopted often is ad hoc and looks at the exercise in narrow media management and propaganda terms and not in terms of using strategic communication and its mediums as a force multiplier. A country like India which balances aspirations of global recognition of an increasingly young and informed population while battling demons of poverty and social injustice often finds itself in a bind over issues of national security and development priorities. The need for shaping the perceptions of its own people while simultaneously conveying the resolve of and direction that the government plans to take is important. Communication during the time of crisis assumes even greater importance to sustain public morale, rally them to the cause and to provide objective analysis that will go a long way in enhancing government's credibility.

The Indian citizens see a bigger role for the country as brought out clearly by the results of 2016 Pew Poll Survey on Global Attitudes & Trends. It concluded that "more than four-to-one (68% to 15%) Indians believe their country plays a more important rather than a less significant role in the world today than it did a decade ago (...). Indians also favour toughness in dealing with the world. A majority (62%) believes that using overwhelming military force is the best way to defeat terrorism around the world. (...) And 63% back increased defence spending." This data reflects the peoples' understanding of the need for India to be strong and confidence in India's power.

Lack of capacity in governance is one of the principal reasons why India is regarded by many as a soft or a weak state and has led to the country suffering from a variety of challenges globally such as trade restrictions, regionally to include spread of terrorism or internally of insurgency and poor quality of

service delivery to the citizens. In an era of instant communication through email, mobile phones and the internet, business is done at the, “speed of thought” and many governments such as the United States and Japan have moved to the information age paradigm of decision making. An India integrated with the global economy and polity can ill afford delayed responses which will lead to lost opportunities. Joint national decision making structures and inter agency coordination is thus the need of the hour. This would also achieve synergy and thus contribute to comprehensive national power.

The present model of exercising authority in India is based on its inheritance from the British system which comprised of a bureaucratic hierarchy with multiple layers each responding sequentially. This was adequate for an era when the challenges of national governance were limited and size and spread of population along with their aspirations constrained. Today with the vast expanse of administration and widening threats to security which include the traditional or military and nuclear as well as non-traditional these decision making structures are no more adequate.

As India prepares to seek greater influence concurrent with sharing greater burden there will be obvious road blocks. It will have to manage the competition; sometimes open resistance, to its ambitions from the competitors. Confrontation will slow down India’s march. Therefore, cooperation in resolving some common challenges like terrorism and effects of climate change through a cooperative effort is likely to create a more benign environment for India to grow. Avoidance of war for at least next two decades will also have to be strategized.

Use of culture as an instrument of spreading influence will retain its importance. It will however, need to be backed by adequate hard power, nimble footed diplomacy and extensive economic engagement with almost all the countries.

CONCLUSION

All states would like to be consulted while major decisions on managing the world are made. However, major or leading powers have some commonly identifiable attributes associated with them. They have to possess sizable territory and skilled manpower; domestic stability and peace; strong economy including large external trade; investible economic, diplomatic and military surpluses; acceptability by states near and far; and, willingness to share the burdens and responsibility that come with the leading power status.

Critical analysis suggests that India either possesses or has the potential to acquire all the attributes of a leading power. However, it is not there yet. India is now free from competing pressures of Cold War era. Sino-Pakistan axis is pernicious and toxic but is apparent, well defined in geographic, strategic and political spheres and therefore manageable. US is suffering a credibility crisis, Europe is getting fragmented and is stagnating, Russia has enduring challenges of poor demographics and inadequately diversified economy and China is not much liked around the world for its political system, expansionism and mercantilist policies. India is presently in a sweet spot. Its image is benign. It receives highest foreign direct investment and largest bounty of repatriated funds from diaspora. The existing chaos in the international system offers a perfect opportunity for India to steadily gain influence when other states are ceding space. At the same time, there are myriad internal and external challenges India faces that prevent it from realizing its true potential and to reach the status of a leading power. The vision, the strategy and the plan need to be clearly spelt out and timely implementation ensured. Care will have to be taken to maintain a benign image of a responsible nation to reduce the intensity of headwinds that it is bound to encounter as it progresses. An all-of-nation approach in resolving social, economic and security challenges will be a must. Obviously, India's national interests will expand with its rising profile and it will need to be habituated to get involved in global affairs. Mature handling of the growing hard and soft power can definitely help India become a leading power in the next decade or so.

BRIG RUMEL DAHIYA, SM (RETD)



Brigadier Rumel Dahiya is an Indian Army veteran with extensive command and staff experience spanning 32 years, including in counter-insurgency operations. He previously served as Defence Attaché to Turkey, Syria and Lebanon, and with the Indian Military Training Team in Bhutan. He also served with the Military Operations Directorate of the Indian Army and the Net Assessment Directorate at Integrated Defence Staff. He served as Deputy Director General at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi for five years till October 2016. Brig Dahiya is a graduate of the National Defence College and Defence Services Staff College. He was awarded the Sword of Honour and Gold Medal at the Indian Military Academy at his commissioning.

Haksar and the Making of Indira

Shri Jairam Ramesh, MP, Rajya Sabha

I am privileged to be invited to deliver this year's Professor S.V. Kogekar Memorial Lecture. He was a distinguished educationist and amongst the earliest generation of political science scholars and election analysts in the country. He was Principal of a very famous college that has produced a number of eminent personalities, apart from having given the country two Prime Ministers.

This is the birth centenary year of Indira Gandhi who was compelling and charismatic on the one hand, and complex and controversial on the other. She continues to draw encomiums for her many enduring achievements, just as she continues to evoke criticism for her errors of judgment and action.

Deeply embedded in the Indian psyche, she presents a fascinating paradox. Much has been written about her and yet so little is understood of her as a person going beyond her political persona. But today I wish to speak not of her but of a man who was her daily moral and ideological compass from May 1967 to December 1972, a time during which Indira Gandhi reached the peak of her glory.

THIS MAN WAS PARAMESHWAR NARAYAN HAKSAR.

He was in the Prime Minister's Secretariat, first as her Secretary and later as her Principal Secretary. But he was not just a civil servant. Older by four years, he enjoyed an unusually warm personal relationship with her going back decades.

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She looked upon him as more than a bureaucrat, seeing him as a member of her extended family, some sort of an alter ego as it were.

As we celebrate her birth centenary, we should recall Haksar as well because he contributed so decisively to the making of the Indira Gandhi in her magnificent phase. I should also add that after having completed an environmental biography of her called *Indira Gandhi: A Life in Nature* which reveals a relatively little appreciated side of her personality and will be out early next month, I am now writing an intellectual biography of Haksar. What I have to say today forms part of that on-going work.

How did Indira Gandhi become aware of P.N. Haksar in the first place? That, in itself, is quite a story.

It turns out that Haksar and Feroze Gandhi became close friends in the late 1930s in London and it was this friendship that first brought Haksar to Indira Gandhi's attention. The three of them came under the spell of Krishna Menon and became very active in the India League that was espousing the cause of Indian independence.

Thereafter, through the 1940s there appears not to have been much direct contact between Indira Gandhi and Haksar. As a leading lawyer in Allahabad he had, however, come to the attention of Jawaharlal Nehru and it should come as no surprise that, by late 1948, Haksar was inducted into the Ministry of External Affairs and soon thereafter into the Indian Foreign Service. Krishna Menon, who was then India's High Commissioner in the UK, made sure that Haksar joined him. Haksar had a long stint there followed by a spell as a political advisor to the Neutral Nations Commission that had been set up by the United Nations to bring peace back in the Korean peninsula. Incidentally, both Lt. General K.S. Thimayya and Maj. General S.P.P. Thorat were key figures in that endeavour.

Subsequently, Haksar came back to New Delhi to build up the government's external publicity division before being handpicked in 1960 as India's Ambassador to Nigeria, a posting that reflected the importance that Nehru gave to a newly emerging Africa. Thereafter, Haksar was Ambassador to Austria before landing back in London as Deputy High Commissioner in 1965. With both Rajiv Gandhi and Sanjay Gandhi studying in the UK, it was but natural for him now to be back in Indira Gandhi's life in a more meaningful fashion.

Indira Gandhi became India's third Prime Minister on January 24th, 1966. Almost a month later on February 21st, 1966 she wrote to Haksar about her younger son Sanjay who was then an apprentice at the Rolls Royce factory at

Crewe near London. Very soon thereafter, on March 10th, 1966 before she was to leave for her visit to the USA she wrote to him again saying :

I am anxious that you should accompany me to America not only because you will be such a help on various issues of foreign policy, but also because this may give some opportunity to talk about various matters.

It was clear that the Prime Minister had other weighty things in mind for India's Deputy High Commissioner in London. In the midst of her election campaign in very early February 1967 she wrote to him to ask him if he would be willing to come to Delhi. Haksar sent her a three-page reply on February 10th, 1967 which is worth quoting at some length since it reveals much of him:

...Ambitions I now have none unless it be that I be treated with consideration and frankness and, perhaps, with a certain amount of respect to which I feel entitled if only for the reason that I have so far escaped from doing anything dishonourable....

The Secretariat in Delhi is a cruel place. I survived it for six years by playing the game according to the rules. And as all kinds of difficulties arise in making senior appointments...I would beg of you to let me have the first opportunity to make my submission before initiating any action.....

The election results will soon be out....I hope that what you stand for would emerge clearly. Concessions one has to make. One has to show accommodation too for those one may not quite approve of. But if the Congress wishes to produce bread for the people, gradually adopt the tractor as its symbol rather than the Cow or the Bullock and do all this while preserving our national dignity and without sacrificing our liberty there is no other choice except one. Otherwise the Cow and its dung will overwhelm us.

All the controversies about private and public enterprise, of socialism and capitalism are somewhat arid..... But if some of our industrialists feel that we can in this latter half of the 20th century have orderly economic growth with political stability by applying the antiquated Manchester School of Economics, they must surely be warned against having a death wish.

Be that as it may, I would most earnestly beg of you to stand as a custodian of our nation's honour and future and not as a party leader and deal with every one face to face and directly.

This is truly an extraordinary letter and was vintage Haksar—free, frank and fearless, ruthlessly honest with his views and opinions. It demonstrates powerfully the type of relationship that Indira Gandhi and Haksar as they started out in May 1967 when he finally joined as Secretary in the Prime Minister’s Secretariat. He had told her clearly that he would retire from service on September 4, 1971 on reaching the age of 58 and that

If during this short segment of time, I could be of any use I would regard such a possibility as an appropriate end of my ‘working’ life.

The 1967 had broken the Congress’s hegemony. It had returned to power at the Centre with a slim majority but had lost power in six states for the very first time. Politics was in turmoil and within the Congress itself, the position of the Prime Minister was not exactly unassailable. However, the party bosses growing increasingly disenchanted with Indira Gandhi soon found that the Prime Minister was no pushover.

The second half of 1967 and 1968 saw an uneasy truce marked by Indira Gandhi’s belief that her senior party colleagues were out to unseat her as Prime Minister and by the belief of these colleagues themselves that Indira Gandhi was not consulting them enough and giving their views adequate respect. By mid-1969, events reached their climax particularly with the Presidential elections. Much has been written about this period and I do not propose to go over them except to recall something rather unusual that is now forgotten—the Opposition parties that included the Jan Sangh and Swatantra persuaded a *sitting* Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to resign three months before his retirement and be their candidate for President.

Right through 1969 Haksar relentlessly worked on Indira Gandhi to convert what appeared to be a clash of personalities into a choice of competing visions of the future. She, of course, was more than willing to go along and abandon the caution and prudence that had characterized her first two and a half years in office. She sounded the bugle through her historic “*Note on Economic Policy and Programme*” circulated among delegates of the All India Congress Committee at Bangalore on July 9, 1969.

The note started by saying-

The time has come to restate our economic policy and set the direction in which we have to move to achieve our social goal and went to present a ten-point agenda and identify priorities in agriculture. In the backdrop of the Naxalbari uprising of June 1967 and its spread to other states particularly

Bihar and Andhra Pradesh, Indira Gandhi's note laid great stress on land reforms and review of agricultural wages.

It ended by saying-

These are just some stray thoughts rather hurriedly dictated.

Consequently, this has come to be called the "Stray Thoughts" note that changed the direction of the Indian political economy. Quite a few people contributed ideas to this note, prominent among them being C. Subramaniam, Chandra Sekhar and Mohan Dharia. She confabulated with her aides like Pitambar Pant and G. Parthasarathi. Ultimately however, it was Haksar who gave shape, structure and substance to the note. Ten days after it was circulated at Bangalore, banks were nationalised making one of Indira Gandhi's "stray thoughts" an immediate reality. In his memoirs *No Regrets*, D.N. Ghosh a distinguished civil servant who was then in the Ministry of Finance and had been entrusted with the task has written on the role of Haksar in orchestrating the nationalization of banks, of course under the overall supervision of the Prime Minister at all times.

Indira Gandhi was initially willing to go along with social control of banks. She was also initially not entirely persuaded about the abolition of privy purses. In fact, the abolition of privy purses was first demanded in a session of the AICC in Faridabad in 1967 largely because of her Home Minister Y.B. Chavan. She had preferred to put it off then. But by 1969 circumstances had changed dramatically and Haksar was badgering her literally to shed her circumspection and take a bold stance. Between July and November 1969 a number of letters were exchanged between Indira Gandhi and the Congress President S. Nijalingappa. These letters have now become the stuff of India's political history. Indira Gandhi's letters were the handiwork of Haksar. He gave these letters a strong ideological underpinning, making her confrontation with the party bosses out to be an ideological one in which progressive values were at stake, values that took into account India's socio-economic realities and challenges. The Congress finally split in mid-November 1969, *after* Indira Gandhi had been expelled from her own party by Nijalingappa and his group that is referred to as the Syndicate.

Indira Gandhi's finest year was 1971. She got a spectacular mandate in the elections that had been held a year earlier than scheduled. She electrified the country with her "Garibi Hatao" campaign. In the midst of this campaign she wrote to Haksar in a somewhat morbid state of mind. This letter demonstrates

what Haksar meant for her not just as Prime Minister but for her as a mother and head of her family. She wrote on February 2, 1971:

You know that I am neither I am neither morbid nor superstitious but I do think that one should be prepared. The thought of something happening to me has haunted me--not so much now, as during the last tour--and I am genuinely worried about the children. I have nothing to leave them except a very few shares which I am told are hardly worth anything. There is some little jewellery, which I had divided into two parts for the two prospective daughters-in law (this was done before Rajiv's marriage). Then there are some household goods, carpets, pictures, etc. It is for the boys to decide. I personally would like everything to be as evenly divided as possible, except that Rajiv has a job but Sanjay doesn't and is also involved in an expensive venture. He is so much like I was at his age--rough edges and all--that my heart aches for the suffering he may have to bear. The problem is where they will live and how.... I can only hope and trust for the best. But I should like the boys and some to feel that they are not quite alone, that they do have some one to lean on.

Soon after being sworn in as Prime Minister a third time, she faced a crisis of epic proportions on India's eastern border with Pakistan. This was also the time when Haksar showed his mettle. He and R.N. Kao had already got Indira Gandhi to establish India's external intelligence agency, R&AW in 1968. Beginning end-March 1971, the brutal crackdown by the Pakistani army begun in what was then East Pakistan created an enormous humanitarian crisis leading to millions of refugees fleeing to India. It also led to huge pressure on Indira Gandhi to intervene militarily. One of those adopting this 'hawkish' posture was none other than Jayaprakash Narayan himself.

Indira Gandhi's response to the crisis was calibrated in large part because of Haksar's initial reluctance to advise large-scale and immediate military intervention. He met with a number of important Bengali personalities who had fled East Pakistan and who had become the torchbearers of an independent Bangladesh through armed struggle. These meetings are described evocatively in the memoirs of two persons—one Indian and another Bangladeshi. Ashok Mitra was then Chief Economic Adviser in the Ministry of Finance and his book *A Prattlers Tale* tells a wonderful story of how his official residence in New Delhi became the place where the "freedom fighters" from what was to be Bangladesh first established contact Haksar. Rehman Sobhan the distinguished Bangladeshi economist confirms these meetings and more in his book *Untranquil*

Reflections: The Years of Fulfillment.

Haksar was more than convinced that no military operation by India would work in the absence of insurrection from the inside in East Pakistan and it was this that led to him and Kao getting Indira Gandhi to support the training and arming of guerillas in order to create the conditions that could pave the way for Indian military intervention, if at all needed. At no time did Haksar show any inclination or enthusiasm for Indian military operations to deal with the sharply deteriorating situation in East Pakistan.

Henry Kissinger's path-breaking air-dash to China from Pakistan took place on July 9th, 1971. The Indo-Soviet Treaty was signed exactly a month later on August 9, 1971. It is tempting to draw a link between the two and indeed there may well be one. But, in point of fact, the wheels for formalizing the bilateral agreement had been set rolling much earlier. The idea for such a treaty had first been mooted sometime in 1968 by Marshal Andrei Grechko the Soviet Defence Minister and it had actually been all but finalized by end-1970 itself, thanks to the untiring efforts of the-then Indian Ambassador to the USSR D.P. Dhar, another person belonging to Haksar's close circle. Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin had left it to Indira Gandhi to decide on the exact timing for signature by both sides. She, however, was not sure about the reactions such a treaty would evoke both within India and in Western capitals.

On March 23, 1971 Dhar called on Kosygin in Moscow and there is no mention of the treaty in the official record of that meeting. But on June 5, 1971 in his farewell meeting with Marshal Grechko, Dhar raised the issue of the early signing of the bilateral treaty. Even so Dhar, echoing Indira Gandhi's concerns, was himself ambivalent as his letter to T.N. Kaul of the same day reveals. He ended by confessing:

.....Once again I would like to mention here that I am not sure whether the conclusion of a treaty in the form in which it was discussed in 1969 would satisfy the needs of the present situation. Perhaps, an exchange of letters which would set out the same objectives as were contained in the treaty would be an equally good substitute for the treaty at the present juncture. Or, again we could think of a secret document which could emerge as a result of the joint consultations between the General Staffs of the two countries or as a result of consultations which could be held on a purely political basis.

My sense is that this ambivalence ended once and for all with Kissinger's China gambit. A few days before Kissinger and Haksar had met in New Delhi

on July 6th and 7th, 1971 and spent over four hours with each other. The record of the meetings dictated by Haksar has him telling Kissinger at one stage:

I am a little puzzled by your saying that if we get involved in a conflict [with Pakistan] which is not of our choosing and the Chinese intervene in one way or another, United States, instead of assisting us, would feel some sort of discomfiture.

Kissinger's trip to China stunned everybody. Obviously Haksar had no inkling whatsoever what Kissinger was about to do even though he had told Haksar in their meetings that:

As for China, we [the USA] are desirous of improving our relations. We think we can now quickly move forward in this direction.

How was Haksar even to imagine that Kissinger's 'quickly' meant three days flat? There was now a obviously a transformed geo-political situation confronting India. Haksar, Kaul and Dhar convinced a now more-than-willing Indira Gandhi that the time for an Indo-Soviet pact had finally arrived. Dhar, who had become Chairman of the Policy Planning Committee in the Ministry of External Affairs on his return from the USSR, was asked to meet Kosygin to convey Indira Gandhi's readiness to sign the treaty at the earliest. This meeting took place in Moscow on August 5, 1971 and four days later the India-USSR Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation was signed between Sardar Swaran Singh, India's External Affairs Minister and his Soviet counterpart A.A. Gromyko in New Delhi.

Let me take a small detour here. There is a most interesting sequel to the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty. Three days later on August 12, 1971, Indira Gandhi sent a slip to Haksar that read:

Should we not indicate to Misra [Brijesh Misra then India's *Charge d' Affairs* in China] that the Indo-Soviet Treaty does not preclude a similar Treaty with China?

Haksar's response was uncharacteristically delayed by a week but he was stunningly forthright saying:

I would respectfully submit that a Treaty of the kind we have just concluded with the Soviet Union reflects, in time and space, a particular coincidence of interest. In all the Chanceries of the world the Treaty has been interpreted in this light and I believe rightly so. For us now to go round saying to all and sundry that we are prepared to sign a similar

Treaty would appear either unrealistic, or if I may so, something lacking in seriousness.... I think we have to be quite clear in our mind as to which countries might sign such a Treaty and then we should quietly work for it and not publicly state, day in and day out, that the Treaty with the Soviet Union is so routine that we are ready to sign it with everyone....As for signing a Treaty with the Chinese, even a talk about it would not bring about a Treaty with China and it would certainly attenuate greatly the effect of the Treaty which we have signed with the Soviet Union.

Awesome is the only word that comes to mind while reading this put-down of the Prime Minister's suggestion by her top adviser. As it turned out about four months later Indira Gandhi wrote to the Chinese Premier Chou Enlai on December 11, 1971 in the midst of the Indo-Pak War explaining in considerable detail the background to the conflict and suggesting that the Chinese use their leverage with Pakistan to bring about an end to hostilities. But there was to be no reply at all to her letter.

Returning to the main track on which I was, Field Marshall Sam Manekshaw is an authentic Indian hero and he did much to deserve that exalted status. He has bequeathed to us the story that Indira Gandhi and her advisors were keen on an early military operation and that he put his foot down asking for more time. Without in any way wishing any disrespect to him, the documentary evidence suggests otherwise. At no time did Indira Gandhi or Haksar betray any impatience for war even though many influential Opposition leaders were clamouring for it.

The most detailed refutation of Manekshaw's view has come from a very scholarly retired foreign service officer Chandrasekhar Dasgupta. Based on a variety of primary source material in the Haksar archives at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, last year Dasgupta wrote an article entitled "*The Decision to Intervene: First Steps in India's Grand Strategy in the 1971 War*" which was published in the journal *Strategic Analysis* brought out by the New Delhi-based Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA). He starts his seminal contribution thus:

One of the most popular anecdotes of the 1971 war is Field Marshal Manekshaw's tale of how he restrained an impatient Indira Gandhi from ordering an unprepared Indian army to march into East Pakistan in April. The Field Marshal's prowess as a raconteur fully matched his military skills but exceeded his grasp of the political and diplomatic dimensions of the grand strategy shaped by Indira Gandhi and her advisors. The prime

minister had no intention of going to war in April since India's political aims could not have been achieved at that stage simply through a successful military operation.

Dasgupta's meticulous marshaling of archival evidence points unambiguously to just one conclusion: that, more than anyone else Indira Gandhi herself included, it was Haksar who masterminded what he calls "the framework of a grand strategy integrating the military, diplomatic and domestic actions required to speed up the liberation of Bangladesh". And the grand objective was to be the liberation of Bangladesh only. On December 11, 1971 when the war was in full swing Haksar sent a telegram marked "Personal" to India's Ambassador to the USA, L.K. Jha that read thus:

...We have no territorial claims or ambitions as far as Bangladesh is concerned. If we had any, we would not have accorded recognition to that Government. The act of recognition means self-imposed restraint on our part against making any claims whatsoever.

We have no claims against the territory of West Pakistan. However, this does not mean that Pakistanis can continue to savagely attack our forces and occupy our territory that we should, in advance, declare to them that they can do all this and we shall sit with our hands tied and surrender meekly to their attacks.

As far as Azad Kashmir, the [US] State Department ought to know that for a period of 24 years India has consistently maintained that this territory legally belongs to us. Pakistan, on the other hand, has not only seized this territory, but continues to advance claims on our state of Jammu and Kashmir. And yet we have in the past said that we will not alter the status quo by force.....

Two days later, he wrote to the Defence Secretary K.B. Lall:

...All the reports we have received yesterday from Washington, London, Moscow and sources close to China point to the fact that the United States and China have only one dominant interest, namely to preserve the integrity of West Pakistan. Anything that we may do or say which gives the impression that we have serious intentions, expressed through military actions or dispositions and propaganda that we wish to detach parts of West Pakistan as well as that of Azad Kashmir would create a new situation.

Haksar sent a copy of this letter to R.C.Dutt, Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting for his "information and guidance" and added the following instruction:

It appears that PIB [Press Information Bureau] had prepared some material calculated to stimulate Sindhi irredentism in West Pakistan. The PIB Release was picked up by the PTI. Such a publicity within our country has to be stopped forthwith and all PIB releases fanning Sindhi, Baluchi or Pathan irredentism must be withdrawn.

Indira Gandhi was at pains all through December to make clear that India had no ambitions whatsoever to dismember Pakistan. She called a meeting of the Political Affairs Committee of the Cabinet on December 14th, 1971 two days before Pakistan accepted defeat to get the approval of her colleagues to her viewpoint. The note for the Committee was prepared by Haksar. He submitted six principles for its consideration, the sixth of which read:

Recognising the principle that territorial gains made by the application of force shall not be retained by any party to a conflict, Governments of India and Pakistan through their appropriate representatives of the respective armed forces shall immediately commence negotiations in the Western theatre of the war as soon as possible.

Thus, contrary to the canard spread by Kissinger himself and accepted by many, India had never any offensive ambitions on the western front, other than to maintain the territorial status quo.

While going through the Haksar papers, I was quite startled to find something that was *not* widely known even then. Haksar's last day as Secretary to Prime Minister was September 4, 1971. The previous day, he proceeded on two months leave preparatory to retirement. He and his wife went to Geneva, Paris, London, Moscow and Warsaw. While in Moscow, he was informed that without him Indira Gandhi's six-nation visit was in jeopardy and that she wanted him to accompany her even though technically he was in leave. Indira Gandhi's itinerary was Brussels, Vienna, London, Washington, Bonn and Paris. Haksar joined her on this crucial opinion-moulding trip that was to become epochal by their meeting with President Nixon and Henry Kissinger in the White House on November 6, 1971. Indira Gandhi dealt with Nixon in a magnificent manner that made all of India proud.

Pakistan attacked India on the evening of December 3rd, 1971. Indira Gandhi was then in Kolkata, the Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram was in Patna and the Finance Minister Y.B. Chavan was in Bombay. She rushed back to the capital that very night giving instructions for Cabinet meetings to be called on her return and for Haksar to be present as well. Orders appointing him as Principal Secretary to Prime Minister were issued on the morning of December 4th, 1971

when India was at war with Pakistan. Eight days later Indira Gandhi wrote to President Nixon a letter that must be amongst the most unique in world diplomatic history. The letter was quintessential Haksar in his sweep of history and politics. Nixon just didn't know what had hit him from the beginning of the letter which began thus:

....I am setting aside all pride, prejudice and passion and trying, as calmly as I can, to analyse once again the origins of the tragedy that is being enacted.

and ended with this dignified admonition:

Be that as it may, it is my earnest and sincere hope that with all the knowledge and deep understanding of human affairs you, as President of the United States and reflecting the will, the aspirations and idealism of the great American people, will at least let me know where precisely we have gone wrong before your representatives or spokesman deal with us with such harshness of language.

Four days later, India had decisively won the war.

While Haksar's contributions in 1971 are beyond dispute, his role in Simla a few months later has come under criticism. The Indira Gandhi-Zulfikar Ali Bhutto summit started on June 28, 1972 and four days later the Simla Accord was signed under dramatic circumstances. P.N. Dhar who was then Secretary to the Prime Minister and was present has given an account of what happened in those four days in his memoirs "*Indira Gandhi, the 'Emergency' and Indian Democracy*".

The charge against Haksar is that he let Pakistan get away scot-free at Simla. Shankar Bajpai the venerated diplomat recently told me that while he was a great admirer and friend of Haksar, he still believed that Haksar allowed Indira Gandhi and himself to be fooled by Bhutto. The implication of critics of the Simla Accord like Bajpai is that India should have made the conversion of the line-of-control in Jammu and Kashmir into the international border as a non-negotiable at the summit meeting. Dhar also is pretty much of the same opinion. Even Natwar Singh a Haksar-bhakt otherwise said to me that "on Simla PNH was wrong".

The Accord has been both hailed and attacked. Interestingly this is true not just in India but in Pakistan as well. This in itself should impart great value to the agreement. I had only one conversation with Haksar a few years before he passed away in 1998 and when I asked him about how he

responded to his critics on the Simla Accord, his laconic reply was—“*young man, Versailles yaad hai?*” Conceivably, he did not want Pakistan to leave as an embittered foe hell-bent on taking revenge for being humiliated so comprehensively. That it did anyway first in Punjab and later in J&K is a different matter.

There is a lot of retrospective angst on the Simla Accord, especially in view of how the bilateral relationship nosedived in the eighties and thereafter, except for some brief periods of bonhomie. It is this, in my view, that has given that agreement a bad name in India. Of course, the Jan Sangh was critical of it even when it was signed but Indira Gandhi’s bitterest political foe, C. Rajagopalachari had, according to his biographer Rajmohan Gandhi, been “delighted” with it calling it the “Pact of Good Hope”. Rajaji had gone further and asked for an early second summit for resolving the unsettled issues.

The revisionism on the Simla Accord simply does not take into account the full facts. There were definite limits on what India could accomplish after the military victory on the eastern front on December 16, 1971. Haksar was painfully aware of these constraints. We could not keep over 90,000 prisoners of war forever nor could we hold on to West Pakistani territory in perpetuity. And we should not forget the pluses from Simla—the Cease Fire Line being replaced by the Line of Control and the Pakistani commitment to bilateralism. It is this Line of Control that still holds the only hope for a new and enduring solution.

I should also mention here that revisionism on Simla fails to take into account what Bhutto wanted and what he ended up getting. Here is how another participant at Simla T.N. Kaul described it much later:

He [Bhutto] wanted India not only to vacate all West Pakistan territory occupied during the war, but also the immediate return of 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war. He was reluctant to give up the use of force (as at Tashkent) or to accept the actual line of control in Jammu and Kashmir, which gave back to India about 400 sq. miles more of her own territory than the old ceasefire line. He also wanted to bring in the UN machinery under Article 33 of the Charter—of arbitration, mediation, etc. to settle bilateral disputes. And what is more he did not want to mention Kashmir at all. He also wanted immediate restoration of diplomatic relations with India but would not recognize Bangladesh.

By mid-December 1972 Haksar had decided to finally quit. Indira Gandhi made no special effort to hold him back. But she did write to him a most unusual letter on December 25, 1972 which reads thus:

Dear Haksar Saheb:

I have hesitated to write or to speak. Some things are too deep for words or it may be that I am not enough of a writer to find the right words. I have no new or better phrases in which to tell you what so many have been repeating—much to your annoyance—all these days and even months, whenever the question of your leaving us has arisen.

During a period which has spanned so many crises you have stood like a rock. Your wise guidance has been invaluable in helping us negotiate the obstacles and steer clear of the many pitfalls endangering our onward journey, and even our survival.

There is perhaps no dearth of worthy, intelligent, even sincere or conscientious persons. But the need is for something over and above that—as you yourself are well aware. These qualities can be useful only if they are combined with a depth of judgment which is based on long experience of men, especially in government, and affairs of India as well as the world; on an insight into trends and forces. There can be no doubt that your retirement will greatly diminish the efficacy of the PM's Sectt and will be a great loss to me.

Starting with the salutation itself, this letter says it all about the relationship two had shared. But the letter also makes it abundantly clear that Haksar himself had wanted to exit from the Prime Minister's innermost circle for quite some time.

Why did this happen? What caused the rift between the two? Was it a case of familiarity breeding contempt, proximity creating distance? Three persons who worked in the Prime Minister's Secretariat have written about Haksar's departure—P.N. Dhar in the book I have just mentioned, B.N. Tandon his two-volume *PMO Diaries* and H.Y. Sharada Prasad in his obituary of Haksar. Sharada Prasad put it the best of all. He wrote that the reason why Indira Gandhi and Haksar, who were so close to each other for decades, drifted apart was because

There was growing friction between sovereign and chamberlain over the doings of the prince.

I think all of you know the allusions. Nothing more need be said of the matter except that from early 1968 itself Haksar had kept telling Indira Gandhi what he thought of Sanjay Gandhi's Maruti venture.

On January 15, 1973, Haksar finally bid farewell to the Prime Minister. Two days later he wrote to Govind Narain, the Union Home Secretary:

Dear Govind:

You spoke to me over the RAX yesterday morning and asked me, with a rare sense of delicacy, if I would accept the Award of Padma Vibhushan for the Republic Day of 1973. You said that it was P.M.'s desire that I should do so. You were good enough to give me some time to think it over. And this I have done. May I, first of all, say that the very thought that I should be given an Award is by itself a great reward for whatever services I might have rendered as a public servant. I am grateful for this to P.M. However, I have a difficulty in accepting the award: All these years, I have often said to myself that one should work so that one can live with oneself without regret. This gave me a measure of inner tranquility and even courage. Accepting an award for work done somehow causes an inexplicable discomfort to me. I hope I will not be misunderstood. I repeat I am grateful for the thought that my services should be recognized. For me this is enough. I would beg of you not to press me to accept the award itself. I shall be grateful if you kindly convey to P.M. my deep and abiding gratitude for the privilege I had to serve under her.

This letter has everlasting relevance and should guide anybody in public life at any point of time. There have been people who have refused such awards but after they have been announced. I really cannot think of anyone else who has politely declined at the offer stage itself and that too with such high-minded sense of values.

But Indira Gandhi was not done with him. A few days after refusing the Padma Vibhushan, Haksar was in Iran as the Prime Minister's special envoy to help build a new bilateral relationship. His visit was a turning point although the Shah of Iran was himself to be overthrown six years later. In July 1973, Indira Gandhi once again turned to Haksar. India and Pakistan had agreed to open talks to resolve what were referred to as "humanitarian" issues arising out of the 1971 war that were not settled in Simla. These included the repatriation

of detained Pakistani citizens from Bangladesh to Pakistan, the return of Bengalis detained in Pakistan to Bangladesh, the trial of Pakistani prisoners of war held in Bangladesh and the return of prisoners of war held in India. Haksar engaged in shuttle diplomacy going first to Rawalpindi and Islamabad and then to Dacca. Although the talks were between him and Aziz Ahmed, the Pakistani Minister of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs, at every step he had to keep Bangladesh in the picture. Haksar was actually negotiating on behalf of both India and Bangladesh. Thus these were trilateral talks conducted on a bilateral basis on account of the fact that Pakistan had not yet formally recognized Bangladesh.

Finally after over a month of tortuous negotiations, Haksar and Aziz Ahmed signed the agreement on August 28, 1973 which took the Simla Accord forward. The verbatim transcripts of Haksar's discussions in Rawalpindi, Islamabad, Dacca and New Delhi have been reproduced in Volume III of Avtar Singh Bhasin's magisterial *India-Pakistan Relations 1947-2007: A Documentary Study* and reveal Haksar at his supreme best mindful at every step of the national interest but always looking for avenues for mutual accommodation. I cannot help take a diversion here and quote from the conversation that took place on July 27, 1973 between Haksar and Bhutto at the latter's residence in Islamabad:

Haksar: Finally, if you permit me, Mr President, I would like to say something most respectfully. I am not a historian. (Pointing to the picture of a Buddha on the wall). What do you feel about the picture? Is, or is not that a part of Pakistan?

President Bhutto: I respect Buddha.

Haksar: Then, Mr. President, May I humbly ask, why do you talk of confrontation of thousand years? Are you in conflict with your own history? Is Pakistan in conflict with its own personality? To talk of confrontation has impact on the minds and hearts of people in India and Pakistan. It will be picked by the wrong type of people in India. Is that a contribution to durable peace in the sub-continent.....You said Sindhi language is 5000 years old. Is there a confrontation in Sind between the last one thousand years and the previous 4000 years? I beg of you, Mr. President, to thin it over the implications of the pronouncements about confrontation of a thousand years.....

President Bhutto: I will say less of it in future (President looked embarrassed and confused and said “ it was for internal....” but did not complete the sentence”.

Not only did Haksar speak to Indira Gandhi without holding anything back but he also treated Bhutto in the same fashion. His exchanges with others like Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and Henry Kissinger are also marked by their provocative pointedness.

Getting back to the main narrative, a day after the India-Pakistan agreement was signed in New Delhi on August 28th, 1973, Indira Gandhi wrote to Haksar:

Neither of us care for formalities. But I must express my deep appreciation of the manner in which you have handled the whole delicate business of talking with the Pakistani delegation. The going was often tough and exasperating and entailed a great deal of hard work. The result has justified all the effort which you and your colleague have put in. I sincerely hope that the implementation will go smoothly and that the Agreement does in fact lead to peace and better relations in our sub-continent. I should like to thank you on my own behalf and on behalf of the Government.

Four days before she sent this letter of her appreciation to Haksar, she had entrusted him with another onerous responsibility. She wrote:

I have been wanting to speak to you for some time but waited for the Pak delegation to return to their country. However the talks are dragging on. Hence this hurried note.

I am a little worried about the Algiers Conference [4th Non-Aligned Summit]. I foresee all kinds of pressures and currents and I do not know if the delegation that is proposed is really equipped to give any kind of lead.....

The thought struck me that your being in Algiers would make an enormous difference to India's role. I always hesitate to put such thoughts to you....

Will you at least think about it? I do sincerely hope that you can come.

This letter shows that Indira Gandhi may well have been in awe of Haksar. But her postscript to the letter is even more amazing. She added:

It will mean a great deal to me.

Obviously, Indira Gandhi was being pulled in two different directions. On the one hand, she had let Haksar because he had been brutally outspoken on Sanjay Gandhi's Maruti adventure. On the other, she desperately sought opportunities of keeping him close to her. In January 1975, she got him back into the system full-time as Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission where used the "bully pulpit" very effectively.

The foundations of India's extensive science and technology infrastructure were laid in the fifties when Nehru was at the helm. He was passionate about science and obsessed with the cultivation and propagation of a 'scientific temper'. In this regard, Indira Gandhi built and consolidated on what was achieved during the Nehruvian era. Although she had a special relationship with the scientific community in her own right, Haksar was crucial in this endeavour.

His influence was very visible in the nuclear and space programmes and his choice of key people who he knew personally and were his ideological "soul mates". Three choices were inspired and served the country immeasurably. The first was of Satish Dhawan as Chairman of the Space Commission in early 1972 after the untimely demise of Vikram Sarabhai. Haksar and Dhawan shared many common interests, including photography. Dhawan, who was then on a sabbatical at his alma mater Caltech in the USA, took some persuading to agree but I suspect he knew very well he could not refuse Haksar who was acting on the full authority of the Prime Minister. The second was Brahm Prakash an eminent metallurgist who, unfortunately, has not got the full credit he deserves for his yeoman contributions to India's space programme. Haksar shifted him from the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) to the Space Commission and got him appointed as Director of the Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre (VSSC). The third was Raja Ramanna who Haksar placed as Director of the BARC so that he could start work on India's "peaceful nuclear experiment" which was how Indira Gandhi would always refer to Pokharan-I of May 18, 1974. It bears mention here that Haksar continued as Member of the Space Commission even after he left the Prime Minister's Secretariat in January 1973—obviously the Prime Minister knew his intellectual value only too well.

Haksar was a great believer in bringing professionals into administration and giving them full powers so that they did not have to play second fiddle to the ICS/IAS bureaucracy. I.G. Patel and Haksar had different ideological

temperaments. But Patel himself has written in his memoirs *Glimpses of India's Economic Policy* about how Haksar intervened on more than one occasion to 'protect' his interests and address his concerns. Another example is that of M.S. Swaminathan who, in early 1972, was appointed Director General of the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) and also given the status of ex officio Additional Secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture. Haksar called him and told him not to take over till he—that is Haksar—had given the green signal. That signal came some weeks later in April 1972 when Swaminathan found to his pleasant surprise that, in addition to being Director General of the ICAR, he was now designated as Secretary in the Department of Agricultural Research and Education—a practice that has continued ever since. Haksar had got Indira Gandhi's approval for this change to send a signal of the Prime Minister's strongest possible commitment to agricultural research. She had agreed readily.

I must now turn to economic policy without which this lecture will be incomplete.

Indira Gandhi was no doctrinaire ideologue as she is often portrayed. She came to power convinced that something dramatic had to be done to revive the economy which was in the grip of stagnation. She was committed to planning of course largely because it was her father's legacy. Her one great obsession in her initial three-four years was food self-sufficiency. The droughts of 1965 and 1966 made her even more determined in this area.

The initial months of her tenure were consumed by debates and discussions on devaluation of the Indian rupee. Actually, the need for devaluation had been talked about for over a year but a final decision kept getting postponed. Finally, Indira Gandhi bit the bullet on June 6, 1966 and the sharp devaluation was also accompanied by a substantial liberalization of the international trade regime and loosening of industrial controls. In some ways, what was to happen in a much bolder manner in July 1991 happened in June-July 1966—a quarter of a century earlier.

But things came unstuck soon thereafter. The promised \$ 900 million or so of programme assistance from international institutions did not materialize because of India's vocal stance on American bombing of targets in North Vietnam. In addition, the devaluation and opening up of the economy caused deep fissures within the Congress party with most of the party establishment critical of Indira Gandhi's decision.

Haksar was, of course, not in Delhi in 1966 and that year Indira Gandhi was largely guided in economic matters by pragmatists like C. Subramaniam, Ashoka Mehta and L.K. Jha who was then her Secretary, a holdover from the earlier Shastri regime. But mid-1967 onwards there was a definite shift in economic thinking. The Congress debacle in the national elections may have forced a rethink. Certainly, the replacement of Jha by Haksar in May 1967 brought a strong “public sector wallah”, an unabashed leftist, a man who had close and long-standing links to the Communist Party of India into the Prime Minister’s Secretariat in the most pivotal position. Politically too, Indira Gandhi was under threat from within her party and she looked to the left parties and some regional parties like the DMK for support. This was particularly important after the Congress split of November 1969. By this time, a younger group of left-leaning Congressmen had also emerged and had started asserting themselves. These were soon to become famous as the Young Turks to whom I have already drawn a reference. The bugbear of the Young Turks was the then Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Morarji Desai and big business houses, especially the Birlas.

Did Haksar steer Indira Gandhi leftward? Decidedly so. Did he do it against her wishes and better instincts? I don’t quite think so since Indira Gandhi, when push came to shove, was a natural leftist if by being a leftist meant primacy to the public sector, belief in some form of licensing and planning, controls on inflow of foreign investment and growth of large companies. But at the same time she was not dogmatic. After all, P.N. Dhar whose economic instincts were diametrically opposite to that of Haksar had been inducted into the Prime Minister’s Secretariat in November 1970 with the understanding that he would take over from Haksar when the time came. Incidentally, Dhar himself has written in his memoirs I have mentioned earlier that the move had the full backing and support of Haksar.

Haksar placed his ex-Communist friends into positions of authority. They were all nationalists who had been educated in England in the late 1930s and had returned to India thereafter. Some were lawyers, some were academics and some were in the private sector. The best example of coterie was Mohan Kumaramangalam—an active member of the CPI and a noted lawyer—who finally switched over to the Congress Party in 1969. Kumaramangalam whose brother had been Chief of Army Staff a little while earlier contested the 1971 elections and won from Pondicherry. He went on to play the lead role in the nationalization of the coal industry and in the formation of the Steel

Authority of India (SAIL) as a holding company for the public sector steel plants. Unfortunately, Kumaramangalam had a most untimely demise in an air crash in May 1973 at the relatively young age of 57. Indira Gandhi's letter to her American friend Dorothy Norman on his death makes for very poignant reading and shows the regard and respect she had for him.


It is not my intention to suggest that for the period he worked with her, Indira Gandhi was a largely blank slate on which Haksar could write anything. Far from it. She had her own views and opinions on issues and individuals. Although her worldview had been profoundly shaped and moulded by her father over the decades, she was very much her own person. And she differed with Nehru on occasions and got him to change his mind as well—one example of which was the creation of Maharashtra with Bombay as its capital.

My own take is that Indira Gandhi and Haksar functioned as a *jugalbandhi* for almost five and a half years. They had perfect understanding of each other—except, of course, on the matter of Maruti. That understanding came from their personal friendship going back to London in the late thirties, from the fact that Haksar had been a close friend of her husband as well, from Haksar's deepest admiration for Nehru and his belief that the daughter would carry forward the great man's legacy, from her own firm view that Haksar was a man of incorruptible intellectual, moral and financial integrity and her knowledge that whatever happens Haksar would be loyal to her. Ultimately however, the sad reality is that Indira Gandhi chose her son over her closest confidante and that would cause a permanent divide between the two.

Every head of government requires a Haksar—a counsellor who can stand up to power, speak the truth as he sees it and gives advice according to the dictates of his conscience, not a courtier who tailors what he says to what he thinks would want to be heard. That Indira Gandhi had such a truly remarkable man by her side for so long is as much a reflection on him as it is on her. He not only gave her the strength of his convictions but in the process helped her discover hers as well.

Thank you.

SHRI JAIRAM RAMESH, MP, RAJYA SABHA



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India's Nuclear Capability Policies and Diplomacy

Dr Vijay Khare, Shri Gaurav Kokil, Shri Victor Leray

India is considered as a major player in the international scene. Thanks to its strong economic growth, increasing demographics, rich culture, extensive diaspora and democratic institutions, India can rely on its hard and soft power.¹ If the country is still an expanding giant, it strongly intends to voice its presence to the world, and especially to its close neighbors, China and Pakistan. Since 1998, India has been undertaking a gigantic modernization of its army and nuclear capabilities. Being the world's largest arms importer, developing military applications from its ambitious space program and upgrading its nuclear arsenal demonstrates that India is engaging into an arms race.

The independent Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that India already possesses between 90 and 110 nuclear weapons, as compared to Pakistan's estimated stockpile of up to 120² India is currently working on building a nuclear facility in Challakere, in the south-western state of Karnataka. Its home-made Agni-V intercontinental ballistic missile is now operational.³ In 2001, these developments led United States Secretary of

1 Nye, J. (March 16 2004) *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. Public Affairs.

2 SIPRI. "Biological, chemical and nuclear weapons/World nuclear forces". Retrieved March 30 2017.

3 Times, Global. "India successfully tests Agni-V intercontinental missile - Global Times". *www.globaltimes.cn*. Retrieved March 30 2017.

Defense Donald Rumsfeld to declare that India was “a threat to other peoples, including the United States, Western Europe and West Asian countries”.⁴ No Western official today would make this kind of statement. Courted by most of the world powers - with China being the notable exception - India now has the luxury of choosing its allies.

With the strength of its economic expansion, New Delhi wants to use the nuclear option to assert itself as a world military power. But if India aspires to enter the “perpetual feast of the great powers”⁵, what does it want to do with this power? What is the vision behind this quest? These questions generally remain unanswered by Indian officials.

India’s military tactics and nuclear agenda could find their origins in the will to put an end to its perennial image of a small regional actor attached to the “moral diplomacy” or “moralpolitik” principles inherited from the Gandhi then Nehru years. This posture may also result from a real dilemma between India’s attraction for the United States and its desire to be part of a sovereigntist alternative partly inherited from the non-aligned movement embodied by the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). It can therefore be argued that this growing uncertainty had led to a paralysis of the Indian diplomacy, which tends to seek refuge in abstention and sometimes even obstruction. This essay aims to provide an input on India’s nuclear ambitions, needs and strategies.

THE NUCLEAR DOCTRINE OF INDIA

Twenty-four years after the experimentation of its first “peaceful” nuclear explosion on the 18th of May 1974, India undertook underground nuclear testing in 1998. In fact, India did not suddenly become a credible military nuclear power on the 11th of May 1998. Its technical capacity to carry out three simultaneous tests is the result of long experience acquired since the country’s Independence in 1947. In 1948, Prime Minister Nehru ordered the start of the civilian nuclear program with the establishment of the National Atomic Energy Commission. As early as the 1950s, the military option was considered with some restraint. Indeed, a “moral barrier” prevented the authorities from taking such a decision. How could India, which had gained its independence by the massive use of non-violence, acquire such a weapon? The use of nuclear energy for military use nuclear was to remain taboo for many years.

4 Varadarajan, S. (February 18 2001) Stop supply of N-fuel to India, US tells Russia. *The Sunday Times*.

5 Khilnani, S. (1999). *The idea of India*. New York.

However, India's defeat against China in 1962 on its Himalayan border led to the development of its conventional and nuclear military capability in order to protect itself from China's threats of aggression. In response, Pakistan also acquired nuclear weapons. Pressure for nuclear weapons development became stronger in the context of a troubled regional situation that favored the development of nuclear weapons. The third war against Pakistan had demonstrated that China was Islamabad's strong ally. Similarly, the presence of American nuclear weapons aboard aircraft carrier *USS Enterprise* in the Bay of Bengal contributed to New Delhi's feeling of nuclear blackmail. Indira Gandhi's decision to carry out "peaceful trials" in 1974 must be placed in this particular context which excluded any other option. In accordance with its non-alignment policy, New Delhi never considered the possibility of a formal alliance with Moscow or Washington. Access to the nuclear umbrella of one of the big two was impracticable in particular because of the United States policy of non-proliferation. This unfavorable context greatly contributed to the development of a sense of insecurity. In the 1990s, research and developments of the Prithvi and Agni ballistic missiles were another proof of India's ambitious efforts in getting credible nuclear dissuasion arsenal. It was also in the 1990s that Indian military and diplomatic experts conceptualized a nuclear deterrent strategy for India.

The 1998 nuclear tests marked a turning point. India's reluctance to join the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) despite strong pressure from the international community was expected by foreign powers. Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) which promised to extensively develop the use of military nuclear weapons – reviewed India's atomic policy according to two major principles. First of all, the regional environment was a determining factor in the acquisition of nuclear weapons (following the persistent trauma of the 1962 defeat against China, a campaign to modernize the Chinese nuclear arsenal at the end of the 1990s and the rise of Sino-Pakistani technologies). Secondly, India's willingness to become a world power through atomic weapons would have granted the country international recognition. Thirdly, strong pressure from the international community in the 1990s towards the signing of the CTBT certainly influenced India on its nuclear tests' agenda. For India, the signing of such a treaty would had mean the formalization and perpetuation of the power imbalance to the advantage of China.

Following Pakistan's nuclear tests, the Indian government commissioned a document presenting the country's Nuclear Doctrine. The National Security

Advisory Board (NSAB), together with a National Security Advisory Committee (NSAC), wrote the Draft Nuclear Doctrine for parliamentary scrutiny. This ambitious document sets out the reasons for India's accession to nuclear weapons.

THE NUCLEAR TACTICS OF INDIA

While working on developing effective tactics to counter the rising number of terrorist attacks emanating from Pakistan, India needs to ensure that its military tactics and its restrained nuclear doctrine and arsenal mesh well together.⁶ With regards to nuclear weapons, India follows a stringent no first use policy. The nuclear tests of 1998 forced both, India and Pakistan, to formulate and enact policies on nuclear deterrence.⁷ Following the Kargil conflict of 1999, Indian officials and scholars developed and released a report prepared by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) highlighting India's nuclear doctrine. The report emphasized India's doctrinal pronouncements and also reiterated India's stance with regards to the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT), disarmament and nonproliferation. In addition to this, the report also underlined that the development of India's nuclear programme is to "achieve economic, political, social, scientific and technological development within a peaceful and democratic framework".⁸ The report also draws the attention to India's three pillars of nuclear policy: credible minimum deterrence; no first use of nuclear weapons; and "punitive reaction" to inflict "unacceptable" damage in response to a nuclear attack on India.⁹ Post the tension between India and Pakistan in 2001-2002, the Indian government, in January 2003, amended its nuclear doctrine and made it official by releasing a statement. The doctrine predominantly remained similar to the NSAB report, with amendments to two of its pillars. India caveated it's no first use policy to allow it to retaliate to a nuclear attack not only on Indian soil, but also on "Indian forces anywhere".¹⁰ In addition to this, punitive reaction was reworked and changed into "massive retaliation".¹¹

Strategic concerns about perceived threats stemming from certain nuclear

6 Dalton, T.; Perkovich, G.: India's Nuclear options and escalation dominance. Accessed through <http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/05/19/india-s-nuclear-options-and-escalation-dominance-pub-63609>

7 Ibid

8 Ibid

9 Ibid

10 Ibid

11 Ibid

weapon states-like China- and fears emerging from preferential international treaties such as the NPT and the NSG, has lead India to pursue a more robust nuclear doctrine.¹² Through its current nuclear doctrine, it can therefore be argued that India develops its nuclear capabilities to deter China, while stockpiling against Pakistan. India's pace towards further nuclearization has been successfully moderate despite having sanctions imposed on New Delhi in May 1998.¹³ India sustained the economic sanctions imposed on it due to its size and geostrategic weight. This also allows India the requisite autonomy to counter various political pressures that nuclear weapon states might impose on New Delhi to roll back its nuclear programme.¹⁴ While India weathers the storm with the help of its hegemonic status and allies, Pakistan unfortunately cannot afford the similar luxury. To prove its mettle and to counter Indian hegemony in the subcontinent, Pakistan would rather risk internal stagnation and decay than exacerbate its external vulnerability by caving in to international pressures for denuclearization; as long as its archrival, India, refuses to take the first step towards denuclearization.¹⁵ India, in turn, will refuse to contemplate such a step until China, its principal long-range threat, remains a significant nuclear power. China would not consider denuclearization until the United States and Russia, its main strategic rivals, do not consider denuclearization as well. This fosters mistrust and confusion with the arms race in South Asia.

Since 2003, India's nuclear doctrine has remained constant. It can be argued that as long as Indian policymakers strongly believe that the existing nuclear weapons states will not or cannot move to reduce their individual stockpiles, with complete nuclear abolition as a global goal. Therefore, until this complete nuclear abolition is achieved, neither India nor Pakistan will roll back on their respective nuclear programmes.¹⁶ Like other emerging countries, India is unsure of the use of its military nuclear power.

12 Tellis, J. A.: India's emerging nuclear posture Between recessed deterrent and ready arsenal. Accessed through https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2008/MR1127part1.pdf on 30th March, 2017, pg. 21

13 CNN World: US imposes sanctions on India. Accessed through <http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9805/13/india.us/> on 30th March, 2017

14 Tellis, J. A.: India's emerging nuclear posture Between recessed deterrent and ready arsenal. Accessed through https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2008/MR1127part1.pdf on 30th March, 2017 pg. 22

15 Ibid

16 Ibid, pg. 21

YESTERDAY'S *MORALPOLITIK* VERSUS TODAY'S *REALPOLITIK*

From a strategical and military point of view, India demonstrated its power as a global nuclear player, with its quadruple nuclear test in early May 1998.¹⁷ Pakistan emulated India's actions by carrying out its own nuclear test a few days later.¹⁸ Prior to the aforementioned events, New Delhi had struggled to gain global recognition as the seat of power for an emerging power in the sub-continent and had been subjected to sanctions from the West and Japan. While India is still not a part to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), its international recognition as a major nuclear player is now indisputable.

Since the late 1980s, India made the most intense financial efforts to strengthen and modernize its military-industrial complex, with an average expenditure of 2.8% of its GDP over the 1988-2011 period. India also ranks as the world's largest arms importer between 2006 and 2017. India is modestly increasing its defense spending by 11 percent to around \$40 billion for the fiscal year 2015-2016.¹⁹ Although India now possesses the fifth largest nuclear arsenal on the planet, its tactics and strategy cannot be clearly deduced from official speeches or its diplomatic actions. New Delhi seems to be abandoning its *moralpolitik* in favor of a new *realpolitik* and simultaneously pursuing two strategies that are difficult to reconcile: getting closer to the United States while claiming the leadership of the BRICS at the same time. Hence a certain difficulty to be heard in the international scene.

India was renowned for its idealistic vision of the world that defended a philosophy of non-alignment and rejected the confrontation between the Soviet and capitalist dogma in the name of Gandhi's inspirations. It once advocated for a strong solidarity among nations and global non-violence – including the denuclearization of Asia. Prime Minister Nehru's posture was idealist and even utopist during his tenure between 1947 to 1964. During these – almost – seventeen years, Nehru put his Gandhian humanist and nationalist approach into practice by declaring “We are inclined to attach less importance to military solutions than to pacific solutions. [...] Disarmament should be bilateral, or multilateral... Everyone

17 Carey, S. “Nuclear Weapon Archives”. Retrieved March 30, 2017. <http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/IndiaRealYields.html>

18 Levy, A. and Scott-Clark, C. (1977) *Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons*. Walker Publishing Company, page 112.

19 Gady, F-S. (March 3 2015) *Is India's Defense Budget Adequate?* *The Diplomat*. Available from: <http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/is-indias-defense-budget-adequate/>

should disarm”.²⁰ On the other hand, former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh adopted a clear realistic approach when he justified the need of a United States - India nuclear partnership: “We must face reality. International relations are a matter of power and powers are not equal. We cannot escape reality. We need to use the international context in the best interests for ourselves.”²¹

Switching from *moralpolitik* to *realpolitik* is almost inevitable in a situation of nuclear and economic emergence. Nehru almost admitted it: *moralpolitik* was the tool of the weak, the poor, and those who were not listened to; it no longer has its place as India's interests are now deployed much further than in the 1960s. The rise of India as a nuclear power suggests that emerging countries differ little from the old nuclear powers when they are able to compete with them on the same grounds. Furthermore, India is not interested in the production of international public goods but rather see international relations only through the effects they have on its internal problems, hence the absence of a coordinated and oriented external strategy. As a result, one of BRICS' rare common interests is to solve their domestic problems far from the eyes of the outside world. In a sense, we are brought back to the Concert of Nations: logics of alliance and strategic calculation, free trade, no or little international public goods and mutual opacity over domestic political agenda.

While many considerations have been brought up with regards to denuclearisation, it can be argued that the nuclear capable states would like to enjoy their great power status indefinitely. Furthermore, the fear of consequences of cheating, apprehension about possible proliferation involving rogue states and perhaps non-state actors and the age-old considerations about national security measures form a unique nexus rendering India's nuclear disarmament a remote goal, at least for the moment. Considering present power politics and the emerging threat of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and other rogue states, we need to develop long-term strategic nuclear policies. These policies will help India focus on peace, security and sustainability of resources. India has the potential to guide global actors to deal with disarmament of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, if we want to usher in a world without nuclear weapons, we need to develop strategic goals and execute policies to achieve diplomatic solutions through negotiations.

20 Mende, T. (1956) *Conversations with Nehru*, Secker & Warburg, London.

21 Singh, M. (November 4 2004) *The Hindu*.

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Dynamics of Security in Central Asia and its Implications for the Regional Integration

Maj Gen BK Sharma (Retd)¹

“A stable, prosperous Central Asia fully integrated with global trading network will not become a breeding ground of trans- national challenges like terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking and organized crime or be susceptible to the ambitions of its larger neighbors.”

CSIS Report, May 2015

INTRODUCTION

Geo- strategically, Afghanistan-Pakistan (Af-Pak) region and Central Asia form part of the same strategic space. Helford Mackinder, the 19th century British geographer, described Eurasia as the “heartland of history” and he argued that whosoever “controls it controls the world”.² The known US strategist Zbigniew Brzezinski highlights the importance of Eurasia in these words, “ever since the continents started interacting politically, some five hundred years ago, Eurasia has been the center of world power”. In the ancient era, the ‘Old Silk’ Route was a conduit of trade, science, spirituality and cross-fertilization of civilizations between the Indian sub-continent-Central Asia-West Asia and China. On the

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flip side, many invasions stemmed from Eurasia into the Indian sub-continent and shaped regional geopolitics. The region witnessed the Great Game of the 19th century between the Great Britain and Russia leading to the emergence of Afghanistan as a buffer state. The term "Great Game" was introduced into mainstream consciousness by the British novelist Rudyard Kipling in his novel *Kim* (1901).³ Later in the Eighties proxy war between the US- Saudi Arabia - Pakistan axis against the Soviet Union legitimised the use of Islamist Jihad as a state policy. Since then the Af-Pak region has infamously come to be known as epicenter of international terrorism thus posing a grave risk to regional and global security.

In the present context, wealth of hydrocarbon resources and region's geostrategic centrality brought the region at the center-stage of geo-political competition. An editorial in English newspaper of Central Asia aptly highlights, "the New Great Game is all about oil and gas. The imperial soldiers and spies of the bygone era have given way to engineers and deal makers as the States jockey for the lucrative business of building pipelines to tap the vast resources of the landlocked region".⁴

Afghanistan's geographic location forms a strategic bridge between landlocked Central Asia and South Asia, connecting the two regions through a web of trade and energy corridors. The access to this land-locked region through the Northern Distribution Network from the Eurasian landmass in the North or via Bolan and Khyber passes on the Durand line from the South pass through Jihadi strongholds. One Road One Belt (OBOR), Maritime Silk Route (MSR), China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), Chabahar- Zaranj- Delaram - Central Asia Axis, Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI), Iran-Pakistan (IP) and the power grid -Central Asian - South Asia (CASA)-1000 are the dream projects that usher peace and prosperity in the region. Likewise, the trade and transit between Afghanistan - Pakistan and India via Wagha border and between Pakistan - Afghanistan and Tajikistan via Wakhan corridor hold great potential for the economic integration, provided there is peace and stability in the region. However, if we are unable to curb terrorism, the risk of state collapse in Afghanistan, Pakistan and inter/intra-state conflicts in the region will increase.

This article provides a perspective on the ecology of terror, appraisal of security scenario in the region, its internal dynamics and external linkages, and the geopolitics of combating terrorism in the region.

ECOLOGY OF TERROR IN THE AF - PAK REGION

GLOBAL RANKING : 2016			
COUNTRIES	HDI (188)	TERRORISM INDEX (163)	FRAGILE STATE INDEX (178)
Afghanistan	169	2	09
Pakistan	147	4	14
Tajikistan	129	56	57
Uzbekistan	105	117	60
Turkmenistan	111	130	83
Kyrgyzstan	120	84	64
Kazakhstan	56	94	113
China	90	23	86
Russia	49	30	65
Iran	69	47	47
India	131	8	70
Bangladesh	139	22	36
Iraq	121	1- Source of Daesh	11
Syria	149	5- Source of Daesh	06

Poor in Global Terrorism and HDI Ranking. . The countries of Central Asia, South Asia and West Asia rank very low in the Human Resource Development Indices (HDI) and very high in the Terrorism and Fragile State indices⁵ The global ranking on these countries in the said indices is tabulated as under: -

Terrorist Network in the Af-Pak Region. As per General Nicholson's report to the Pentagon, out of 98 US designated groups globally, 20 are located in AF- Pak region. They are adherents of a militant Salafi-Wahabi ideology and seek to establish a Caliphate of Khorasan, the mystical state encompassing the territories of Af-Pak, Indian Sub-continent and Central Asia. Jihadist is following the concept of 'Takfeer', an aggressive form of Jihad that propagates killing of apostate and non-Sunni Muslims. There are a number of Islamist radical groups active in the region with their bases in Afghanistan and Pakistan Details of militant groups are elucidated below:-

- There are nearly eight factions of Afghan Taliban, Haqqani network, and Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP) active in Afghanistan. Tehrik e Taliban of Pakistan (TTP), Jundullah and Jamaat-ul-Ahrar are fighting the Pakistan Government, whereas, groups like Lashkar e Taiba (LeT), Hiz ul

Mujahideen (HuM), Jaish e Mohamed (JeM), Jamat-ud-Dawa (JuD) are protégé of ISI directed against India. Al Qaeda Indian sub-continent (AQIS) operates- against India and other South Asian countries. Sunni militant groups namely Sipah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Janghvi indulge in killing of Shia Muslims and other minorities in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Likewise, groups like Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hizb e Tehrir (HuT) are active in Central Asia. Jaish al Muhajireen- wal- Ansar is active in Caucasus and East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) operates in the Xinjiang province of China. Militant groups namely, Jundullah and Baloch resistance groups target Iran.

- Jihadist profess a strategy of protracted warfare depicted in the belief “Americans have the watches, we have the time”. They are apt in all forms of terrorism like, suicide attacks, cyber terrorism, narco-terrorism, and will not hesitate even in nuclear terrorism. Terror is financed through charity, donations, drug trade, extortions, illegal arms trade, and fake currency.
- Daesh appeared in the region in 2014. As per the former American commander of the international coalition in Afghanistan, Gen. John F. Campbell, the strength of ISIS in Afghanistan is between 1,000 to 3,000 fighters.⁶ It mostly comprises TTP defectors, elements of IMU and other foreign militant groups. According to Gen John W Nicholson, the US NATO military commander in Afghanistan, the ISKP wants to start a Caliphate from Nangarhar and Kunar provinces with the help of migrant fighters from Iraq and Syria. They are despised for brutalities, deadly bombings against non – Sunnis, and burning houses of common people. There are simmering differences between ISKP, Taliban, and Al-Qaeda. In March 2016, President Ashraf Ghani had declared that Afghanistan would be a graveyard for the Islamic state.

COMPLICITY OF PAKISTAN IN CROSS- BORDER TERRORISM

Pakistan is obsessed with foisting a Taliban dominant proxy regime in Afghanistan to accomplish its objectives of gaining strategic depth, mitigate its ‘Durand Line’ dilemma, expand influence in Central Asia and limit India’s growing role in the region. It continues to use Jihadi terrorism as an instrument of state policy and provides safe havens to terrorists on selective basis. Jihadi leaders like Osama bin Laden, Mullah Omar, Mullah Mansoor and many others were killed in Pakistan. Banned leaders like Al Qaeda head, Al Zawahri, Jamaat-ud-Dawah Chief, Hafiz Saeed, Jaesh e Mohammad Chief, Masood Azhar, United Jihad Council Chief, Salahuddin, and Lashkar e Tyaba Chief,

Zaki ur Rehman Lakhvi operate with impunity in Pakistan. Sane voices of civil society activists like Professor Pervez Hoodbhoy of Quaid Azam University Islamabad point out, “militant jihad has become a part of the culture in the academic institutions ...Mullahs are creating a cult and seizing control over the minds of their worshippers.”⁷ Unmindful of these warnings, the bigwigs of Pakistan establishments brazenly eulogize Jihadists. Gen Pervez Musharraf, former President of Pakistan in an interview said, “Osama bin Laden, Ayman – Al Zawahari, Haqqanis are our heroes, we trained the Laskar e Tyaba against India.”⁸ Sartaj Aziz, an advisor on Foreign Affairs to their Prime Minister further reinforced this thinking in an interview to the BBC, “Pakistan should not engage in war with those insurgents or militants whose target is not Pakistan”.⁹ According to noted Pakistani journalist Najam Sethi, “Pakistan’s national security state is embroiled in antagonistic relations and proxy wars with neighbors, India and Afghanistan whose blowback is spawning terrorism inside Pakistan. Pakistan’s relations with India will not improve until the domestic jihadi groups are dismembered so that Mumbai and Pathankot (Indian airbase) never happen again. Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan will not improve until the Afghan Taliban are disrupted and defeated or compelled to sue for peace. And until Pakistan is at peace with its neighbors, it will not be at peace with itself.”¹⁰

President Ashraf Ghani during the NATO Summit in 2016 said, “Peace Initiative taken by Afghanistan with Pakistan is not successful as Pakistan differentiates between good and bad terrorists in practice”.¹¹ The SAARC summit in 2016 to be hosted in Pakistan was boycotted by Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, and India due to Pakistan’s complicity in cross-border terrorism. Sheikh Hasina, the President of Bangladesh, categorically stated, “it is over the situation in Pakistan that we decided to pull out from the SAARC summit. Terror from Pakistan has gone everywhere.”¹² Pakistan based terrorist groups were categorically named for regional instability at the ‘Heart of Asia’ conference held at Amritsar in December 2016.

REGIONAL SECURITY SCENARIO

The Af-Pak Region. Pakistan’s much touted ‘Zarb-e-Azb’ and ‘National Action Plan, notwithstanding, there has been no respite from terrorist strikes within Pakistan, India or Afghanistan. A series of terrorist attacks against high profile security targets in Punjab and J&K provoked India to undertake surgical strikes against terrorist launch pads across the Line of Control (LoC). The scenario

in Afghanistan remains grim. The recent sensational strikes in Lakshargarh, Tarinkot, Kunduz, Kabul, Faraha and many other places reveal the growing magnitude of terrorist threat in Afghanistan. Reports suggest that Taliban control about 9 districts and are contesting another 43 out of 400. Since 2001, this is the largest swath of territory in the occupation of Taliban.¹³ The US DoD report to the Congress 'Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan', December 2016 suggest that as of end September 2016, the Taliban has been assessed to have control or influence over approximately 10 per cent of the population and was contesting the Afghan government for control of at least another 20 per cent. The year 2016 witnessed spurt in civilian (31,000) and ANDSF (30,000) casualties. The ANDSF has shown great grit and determination to resist Taliban offensive. In the words of Gen Nicholson, "they were tested and they prevailed".¹⁴ The capacity building of ANDSF remains a mammoth task that demands unstinted US engagement and international support. The US decision to deploy 9800 troops complemented by 6000 from the NATO allies is another welcome development. The combined US military operations codenamed 'Green Sword' led to killing of 500 IS cadres and reduced their strength by 30 percent by destroying two dozen command and control and training facilities, disrupting financial network and reducing their sanctuaries by 2/3rd, thus reducing their presence from nine districts to three.¹⁵ The ISKP, however, retains capacity to undertake suicide bombing against soft targets. The new ANDSF 'Sustainable Security Strategy' adopted in 'Operation Shafaq' entails conduct of pro-active offensive operations to fight the enemy, hold communication centers and disrupt enemy network. In order to enhance the operational effectiveness of the ANSF, the issues of poor leadership, rampant corruption and combat worthiness of the ANSF are being addressed. Special attention is being paid for modernization of 17,000 strong Afghan Special Forces and building Afghan Air Force. Besides, the existing inventory of MI-17 and MI-35 helicopters, the US is fielding A-29 light attack aircraft, MD-530 helicopters and UAVs to make counter-terrorism operations more lethal and effective.¹⁶

Security Scenario In Central Asia. The security scenario in Central Asia is fragile. Drivers of Security in the region are elaborated as under: -

- Border and Water Disputes. Geo-ethnic fault lines and strategic location of Central Asia has put this region at the center stage of conflicts. During the Soviet era, the National delimitation of Central Asia in 1920 cut across boundaries across geo-ethnic homogeneity what is classically referred as the

Stalin's cartographic overdrive. Fergana Valley, a single and unified politico-economic entity till 1991 was disrupted due to breakup of Soviet Union leading to border disputes, water disputes and ethnic and multitude of other non- traditional conflicts. At the heart of border disputes is the contention over nine main enclaves in the Fergana valley Any Territory Separated From its Mainland by the Land of any Other Country. Access to Uzbekistan's five enclaves (Sokh, Shakhimardan, Qalacha, Dzhangail, Tayan) lies through the territory of Kyrgyzstan . The entry to Tajikistan's two enclaves (Vorukh and Western Qalacha) is through the territory of Kyrgyzstan and one enclave (Sarvak) through Uzbekistan. Likewise, the entry to one enclave of Kyrgyzstan passes (Barak) passes through the land of Uzbekistan. These enclaves are prone to demographic changes, land grabs, ethnic riots and stand offs between the border guards. Control over the water resources of rivers, Amu Darya and Syr Darya between the upper riparian states i.e., Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and remainder three lower riparian states is another bone of contention. Uzbekistan opposes construction of Kambarata -1 dam on Naryn Darya (cost \$ 2-4 billion, 1900 MW) and Rogun Dam on Vakash Darya (cost \$ 2-3 billion, 3600 MW) being constructed by Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan respectively.

- Ethnic Clashes in Fergana Valley. Fergana valley measures just 2200 Sq Km with highest density of population in Central Asia. Out of approximately 68 million people , nearly 15 million live in Fergana valley which means a population density of 100 persons per sq. Km against an average of 49 person per sq. Km in rest of Central Asia . The average birthrate is 3 babies per woman and there has been 32 percent increase in population growth in last one decade. Fergana valley has witnessed ethnic clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks clashes in Osh-Jalalabad in Jun 90 causing death of 600 people, Civil War in Tajikistan (92-97), Tulip revolutions in Kyrgyzstan, Andijan uprising in 2005 in Uzbekistan and ethnic clashes in Southern Kyrgyzstan in Jun 2010 during which 200 persons were killed and 100,000 displaced.
- Caspian Sea Dispute. Bulk of hydrocarbon resources is found in the Caspian Littoral region, which is mired in controversy. There exists divergence among the five littorals (Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Azerbaijan) on the demarcation of the sea. Cold War-era Soviet-Iranian treaties stipulated that the sea's resources to be split equally. The Soviet collapse changed the Caspian Basin's political landscape overnight, resulting in five Caspian states, each seeking its own share of the sea resources. Russia,

Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan favour sectorial split of the sea basin thus giving them a predominant share of the hydrocarbon resources, whereas Iran and Turkmenistan want equal division of the sea which would give them more share than they would have been entitled under a sectorial split.¹⁷ The possibility of conflict and the need to protect the offshore assets has led to the militarization of the Caspian Sea. Russia is the major naval power with Iran being the second largest. The dispute over sharing of resources is unlikely to be resolved in a hurry as Russia and Iran are not keen to permit construction of a Trans Caspian pipeline, which is favoured by the Western countries and Southern Caucasus States like Azerbaijan and Georgia to make Westerly energy grid feasible

- Drug Trafficking. As per of Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) report 2014, there has been 50 percent Increase in poppy cultivation In Afghanistan from 2012-2013 despite the US spending \$7 billion for poppy eradication. AS per SIGAR report – 2016, percent of Afghan drugs are smuggled through Central Asia to Europe, Russia, China. Narco- terrorism has emerged a serious trans- national threat inter alia due to a strong nexus between drug barons, war lords, politician terrorists, border guards and custom officials.
- Risk of Nuclear Terrorism. Proliferation of fissile material heightens the risk of nuclear terrorism. The safety of fissile material remains a cause of concern in Central Asia There is a risk of jihadi access to fissile material. As per reports fissile material is stored in caskets in Kazakhstan. There are reports of orphan or abandoned radioactive material lying properly accounted. Chemical testing and storage facilities in Uzbekistan are reportedly unsafe. US troops had found traces of Nerve and Mustard gas at Kashi – Khanabad Airfield. Likewise, biological weapons tested and Stored in Vozrozdheniye Island in Aral Sea are said to be unsafe. There are number of experts in nuclear, biological and chemical weapons lying unemployed whose expertise can be exploited by Jihadists or rogue elements for using such unsafe materials for sabotage .
- Radicalization of Central Asia. The history of radicalization in Central Asia dates back to Islamist Basmchis movement that was in forefront to assert the Islamic identity of the people and resist communist rule during the Soviet Union. The Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan which fought a bloody civil war, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) that attempted to topple Islam Karimov regime in Uzbekistan , Hizb-e Tehrir – a Pan Islamist

movement that espouses to create Caliphate albeit through peaceful means, East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) that is asserting for sub-nationalism in Xinxiang and Chechen Islamist fighters have been active in the region in one way or the other. In the recent past three disruptions have led to spurt in the Jihadist activities in Central Asia, first, dislocation of regional militant groups after launch of Zarb – e – Azb by Pakistan army in FATA , second, disruption of local ISIS cadres after fall of Mosul in Iraq , third, spurt in Taliban/ Daesh activities in the Northern Afghanistan. The developments in the Northern Afghanistan are fraught with possibilities of violence spreading to Central Asia. The Northern Afghanistan is increasingly becoming unstable as is evident from two attempts by the Jihadists to seize Kunduz in 2015- 2016 and reports of a series of attacks in northern towns Jowzjan , Faryab and Badghis. As per Reports in Badakshan 75000 people out 100000 live under Jihadi controlled Territory. Media has reported trans – border raids by Jihadists in May 2016 in which 17 Turkmenistan conscripts were killed , incidents of rocket firing in Termez and repeated infiltration bids into Rashit valley in Tajikistan . Before 9/11, since 1999 there were large scale incursions by the IMU in Fergana valley which posed a serious threat to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. IMU was reportedly behind the Andijan uprising in 2005. On 16 Jul 2015, four suspected ISIS militants had killed seven people in Bishkek. During last five years Kazakhstan has witnessed a number of Jihadist attacks tabulated as under: -Today , Daesh is emerging as the biggest threat to the region . As per New York-Based Soufan Group there are about 2,000 locals in the ISIS : 500 fighters each are from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and 1000 from Tajikistan. It is said that 1/3 of foreign ISIS cadres hail from Russia and Central Asia. In May 2015, colonel gulmurod khalimow, a senior Tajik police commander, defected to the ISIS. There is heightened sense of relative socio-economic deprivation in the minds of common people. Oppressive and autocratic regimes and social media are the other contributory factors for spread of extremism. Consequently, the regimes have recalled students studying abroad in Islamic countries, banned Salafism and Hijab and are strictly monitoring religious sermons at Madrasas and Mosques.

Date	City	Casualties	Orgnaisation
12 Sep 2012	Almaty (2 Incidents)	12 Killed	Unknown
05 Jun 2016	Aktobe	17 Killed	'Sectarian Religious Group'
31 Oct 2016	Atyrau (2 Incidents)	1 Killed (suicide bomber)	'Soldiers of Caliphate'

GEOPOLITICS OF COMBATING TERRORISM IN THE REGION

It was heartening to note that in July 2016, at the Warsaw Summit, 39 nations pledged \$800 million annually to support ANSF through 2020. The US provides USD 3.5 billion annually which combines close to 4.5 billion dollars for growth and sustenance of ANSF.¹⁸ In October 2016, at Brussels, international donors committed additional \$ 15.2 billion for peace building in Afghanistan.¹⁹ All stakeholders in their recent declarations at the 'Heart of Asia', BRICS and SCO summits had vowed to combat terrorism in its manifestations in the form of Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism under the aegis of the UN, support Afghan led and Afghan owned peace process, facilitate reconciliation efforts under the aegis of Afghan Government, contribute in capacity building of the ANSF, and jointly combat narco terrorism, cyber terrorism, nuclear terrorism, arms trade, and terror financing. There was a general agreement to harmonize the role SCO, BRICS, CSTO, NATO, and the neighboring countries to promote peace in the region. However, in practice, major players are adopting contradictory approaches to deal with Taliban and Pakistan. The level of the US / NATO engagement remains uncertain even though NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg affirmed that the US led alliance will maintain its presence in Afghanistan for a long time. All eyes are set on how Trump administration deals with Afghanistan

China perceives security in the Af-Pak region from the perspective of mitigating ETIM threat to Xinjiang, OBOR, energy corridors, securing investments in mining and oil exploration projects in Aynek and North Amu Darya. The CPEC has become a strategic rallying point to consolidate Pakistan-China nexus and solicit Russian participation in it. The underlining aim appears to countervail NATO / US presence in Eurasia and limit India's influence in Afghanistan. China is pursuing its strategic objectives in Afghanistan through

bilateral strategic partnership and under multilateral mechanisms such as BRICS, SCO, QCG and Afghanistan, Pakistan and Tajikistan and now the Russia-Pakistan-China Trilateral Dialogue.

Russia perceives rise of ISKP and escalation of terrorism in Af- Pak region as a threat to Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Southern security belt. Russia is also concerned about long-term US presence in Afghanistan. Russia's Ambassador to Afghanistan in an interview to Turkey's Andalou Agency said, "US infrastructure in Afghanistan is a threat as they can deploy 100,000 troops in these bases in less than four weeks". Moscow has for years opposed the Taliban, calling them terrorists, and supported the anti-Taliban 'Northern Alliance'. As per Russian Ambassador in Kabul, Alexander Mantitsky, one of the reasons to open channels with the Taliban is for the security of political offices, consulates in Afghanistan.²⁰ Zamir Kubalov, Putin's' special representative for Afghanistan termed ISIS in Afghanistan a bigger threat than the Taliban.²¹ In December 2015, a senior Russian diplomat declared that "the Taliban interest objectively coincides with ours" in the fight against IS and that his country and the Taliban "have channels for exchanging information". Taliban sources also confirmed that the group's representatives met Russians inside Russia and "other" countries several times over the past two years.²² Russia can take revenge with the US by arming Taliban and directing them against the US thus forcing their withdrawal or leverage its influence with Taliban to extract concessions from the US. Militarily, Russia is in a better position to combat terrorism due to deployment of its troops along Tajikistan-Afghanistan border, air bases in Central Asia, Regional Anti-terrorist Centre at Bishkek and with the help of CSTO Rapid Reaction Forces.

Recently, Iran-Taliban relations have come under debate. Iran is concerned with Sunni encirclement from Syria and Iraq in the West and Daesh and Taliban from Afghanistan in the East. Iran perceives US presence in Afghanistan inimical to its national interests. Iranian Ambassador, Mohd Rena Behrami has confirmed that Iran publicly hosted leaders of Taliban at the recently held Islamic Unity Conference.²³ Conspiracy theories in Russia, Iran and China paint the ISIS as an American or Western creation aimed at destabilizing their countries. Like Russia, Iran supported the anti-Taliban groups in the 1990s. Tehran also co-operated with the US-led international coalition to topple the Taliban regime in late 2001. But, at the same time, Taliban sources say Iran sent them a message that it was willing to support them against the US.²⁴

STATE OF RECONCILIATION WITH THE TALIBAN

Reconciliation talks under the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) reached a dead-end after the death of Mullah Mansoor and Qatar Peace Process is now in news. It is learnt that three members of Quetta Shura and 2-3 members from Taliban office Doha were invited by ISI, presumably, inspired by the Hizb-e-Islami deal. Afghanistan government too is engaged in direct secret talks with Taliban senior leaders in Qatar. Mulla Abdul Manan Akhund, brother of Mullah Omar, has reportedly met Mohammed Nasoom Stenkazi, the Afghan Intelligence Chief. These talks have, however, remained inconclusive due to intransigence on part of Taliban leadership on the withdrawal of foreign troops.

In a dramatic shift, China, Russia, and Pakistan held secretary-level trilateral talks in Moscow on Dec 27, 2016 to discuss regional stability and restoration of peace in Afghanistan. It was agreed to adopt a flexible approach to remove some segments of Taliban from the UNSC sanctions list and foster peaceful dialogue between Kabul and Taliban.²⁵ Afghanistan did not approve of this meeting and expressed displeasure over its absence from the meeting.²⁶ However, Taliban has welcomed this initiative, particularly the Qatar office.

Presently, two broad alignments in Afghanistan are emerging; India-US-Afghanistan-Japan and the second; China-Pakistan-Russia-Iran. Russia's policy shift in engaging with Pakistan entails cooperation on the CPEC, supply of military hardware, signing of \$ 2 Billion gas pipeline, and conduct of joint military training. China has embraced Russian position in Syria. Both China and Russia believe that the US position in Afghanistan has weakened and it is therefore imperative for them to play a bigger role in Afghanistan. Russia could aid Taliban in the Northern areas to oust US and assist in infrastructure development to foist a pro-Russia regime. The US, on the other hand, feels that Russia, China, Pakistan, and Iran's engagement with Taliban is inimical to the US and Afghan interests. Strategic experts opine that another phase of the 'New Great Game' is unraveling in Afghanistan. These developments do not augur well to fight terrorism or to foster stability in Afghanistan. The Jihadi forces must be defeated and Pakistan deterred from indulging in cross-border terrorism. The silver lining in the cloud may be a close cooperation between the Trump administration and Putin to smoothen their vexed relations and cooperate on Afghanistan.

IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA

India strongly supports an Afghan owned and Afghan led peace process and encourages the endeavors of the National Unity Government (NUG) for politico-ethnic reconciliation with all stakeholders, election and administrative reforms. India has invested \$ 2 billion in the civil infrastructure projects and pledged another \$ 1 billion besides contributing towards ANSF capacity building. India strongly supports a multilateral collaborative approach in restoring peace and stability in Afghanistan. There is need for close cooperation between the SCO, CSTO, and NATO on Afghanistan. Any attempt to remove Taliban from the UN sanction list is contradictory to the Indian efforts to declare Masood Azhar and many other Jihadi leaders in Pakistan as international terrorists under the aegis on UNSC Resolution 1267. Such initiatives are against the spirit of decisions taken at the Heart of Asia, BRICS, and SCO summits to combat terrorism in a collaborative framework with the NUG of Afghanistan in the lead role and moderate behavior of Pakistan in perpetuating cross border terrorism against India and Afghanistan. India's strategic partnership with Afghanistan, India - Iran - Afghanistan trilateral agreement India-US-Afghanistan dialogue and membership in the SCO bear testimony to India's resolve and commitment.

All stakeholders in the region need to work together with a hope of success to realize the pledge made by the President Ashraf Ghani at the time of assuming office, "history will not be repeated, we have overcome our past. The process of state formation, consolidation and political consensus in Afghanistan is irreversible".

India has a well articulated connect Central Asia policy which encompasses a multi-dimensional engagement with these countries. India's entry in the SCO as a full member will afford more opportunities for India to play an important role in the regional geopolitics and security arena. India has signed bilateral strategic partnership and MOUs to combat terrorism with most of the member countries. India should assiduously work in building a collaborative framework to combat terrorism and peace building in Afghanistan. The fundamental to India's strategic sustenance rests in early operationalization of Chahbahar-Zarang-Delaram transit corridor and INSTC via Iran. Likewise TAPI, IPI and CASA-1000 (power-grid between Central Asia and South Asia) can only succeed, if the terrorist threat is contained. The rise of Islamic State of Khorasan is a common threat to all the regional countries and cannot be dealt with a selective approach to terrorism. India should leverage its rich experience in combating terrorism by exchanging data with the SCO run Regional Anti Terrorist Centre (RATS) at Tashkent and active participation in the 'Peace

Mission 'series of anti terror exercises. However, India will definitely face some opposition from Pakistan, the main perpetrator of cross- border terror, and its mentor- China. India will have to show deft diplomacy to garner support of other SCO countries, Iran and Afghanistan (both observers) to balance Pakistan –China strategic nexus and garner support for peace and stability in Central Asia and Afghanistan.

END NOTES

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International Conferences.

Tournaments in the Shadows: OBOR/CPEC and India's Strategy

Air Commodore SN Bal (Retd)

“The East Wind prevails over the West Wind”

Chairman Mao

(17 November 1957)

“...The gift horse we are reluctant to look in the mouth...
...should not turn out to be a Trojan horse...”

Ehsan Ali Malik, CEO

(Pakistan Business Council)

“...please remember that there is no last word in diplomacy...”

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto

OVERVIEW

The Summit on the One Belt One Road (OBOR) Forum held in Beijing on 14 – 16 May 2017 at China's initiative made global headlines. Significant

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powers attended this scintillating event: a 21st Century Chinese “*ashwamedha yagna*”. Junior diplomats and some academics represented India. China sneered that an isolated India “*having missed the bus*” would have no “*future voice*” on the initiative: but hinted that it could board it in the future¹. India can do so at a *time and place of its choosing*: when the destination and seat offered further its strategic interests. Unless Indians write their history, others will dictate it: condemning India to the status of a vassal: relegating it to the backwaters of history – if not total irrelevance to the emerging world order. The CPEC is *the shape of things to come* – unless we act in time.

ARGUMENT

The OBOR/CPEC jeopardizes our sovereignty and territorial integrity; severely impeding an equitable resolution of the vexed Kashmir “*issue*”. India could bend where required: without crawling at China’s bidding. A strong nation – state that endures short – term adversity while relentlessly working for strategic gains with single – minded conviction, dedication and fortitude commands global respect. Our predecessors successfully challenged the world’s greatest imperial power: their successors can tread the geopolitical labyrinth with dignity and honour.

THE CHALLENGE

The OBOR/CPEC and associated Kashmir “*issue*” are top – priority challenges. Strategic options remain and some can even be created - but “*windows of opportunity*” are not perpetually open. Some are shut by outsiders: others by misguided entities inside the country. The present impasse to the north has a long incubatory history; acts of commission and omission from 1947 onwards. In the mid 19th Century, the boundaries of J&K extended to Shahidulla Post on the Leh – Yarkand road: more than 32 miles north of the Karakorum Pass. This was abandoned in the 1950’s and the Indians withdrew to the Karakoram Pass. This geopolitical myopia and disinterest in Xinjiang and Tibet were noted by the Chinese – and India continues to pay the price.² The guilt accrues to all those in or out of power; cannot be ascribed an individual. The decision – making core has to create and sustain a national strategic culture. Regressing

1 Saibal Dasgupta, *India Can Join Project Later, Hints China*, The Times of India, Pune, Sunday, 14 May 2017, p 13.

2 Ram Rahul, *Politics of Central Asia*, Curzon Press Ltd, London and Dublin, 1974, p 72.

to the *blame game* leads nowhere: focuses on past acts, and inhibits a futuristic orientation. India must exploit the remaining windows of opportunity and open new ones: aptly stated by Dr Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan in The Principal Upanisads "...the highest achievements of the human mind and spirit are not limited to the past....the gates of the future are wide open..." It is tempting to follow the Dragon without a whimper: so many, including the European Union, Britain in "*Brexit*", Germany, Russia, the USA and Japan, and especially our potential friend to the west (Pakistan) enthusiastically attended the show. The stakes being very high, objective and serious analysis is overdue. Unless India treads carefully, the fallout could be cataclysmic.


Is India the envious spoilt sport (or naughty boy) on the block to stay away from the Chinese festival? Which bus has India missed? Cannot India recognize a good thing offered on a plate: or is it high – handed obduracy? What advantages could possibly accrue and, more importantly, at what price? Some see the OBOR as a panacea for all ills – simply join and the world (and India) would move into the sunny uplands of peace, prosperity and tranquility. By "*missing the bus*" the Chinese and some Indians too, say India will pay a heavy, long – term price for its principled obduracy. Others suggest caution. More buses are sure to follow: India could even drive one!

THE OBOR/CPEC

The OBOR involves some 55 percent of world GNP, 70 percent global population, and 75 percent of known energy reserves: grandiose infrastructural links from China to the rest of the world (Map 1). Beginning in Xi'an in northwest China it stretches north of J&K westwards through Urumqi to Central Asia, above northern Iran and onward through Iraq and Syria, to Turkey. The Chinese ostensibly aim to facilitate enhanced free trade and connectivity between China and Africa, Eurasia, Europe, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia: though on Chinese terms.³ The German ambassador to India, Martin Ney describes the OBOR as a "...*top down exercise...very different from the ancient Silk Road. It's not about free trade; it's a trade – enhancing measure by China...*"⁴

3 Stephen Aris, *One Belt, One Road: China's Vision of Connectivity*, CSS Analyses ISSN: 2296-0244, N0. 195, September 2016. The Center for Security Studies (CSS) is a center of competence for Swiss and international security policy. Dr Stephen Aris is a Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zürich.

4 Indrani Bagchi, *Germany Backs India's OBOR Stand Ahead of Modi's Visit*, The Times of India, Pune, Wednesday, 24 May 2017, p 4.




Map 1: The OBOR, Source: Economist.com

Introducing the concept, President Xi Jinping said at Nazarbayev University in 2013 “...China will...seek to strengthen mutual support and to be good friends, with sincerity and mutual trust, on the issues concerning the major core interests, including the state sovereignty, territorial integrity, security and stability...”⁵ This pious declaration is blatantly discarded when applied to India. The façade is indeed paper - thin. Whether the OBOR will lead to friendly relations with the ASEAN, generate a perception of Chinese overbearing influence or create new flashpoints *en route* is difficult to predict to any degree of certainty.⁶ The OBOR actually translates economic instruments into geopolitical objectives.⁷

5 Shreyas Deshmukh, *Strategic Framework for Understanding OBOR and CPEC*, Issue Brief No 87, October 2016, The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), RPSO Complex, Parade Road, Delhi Cantt, New Delhi 110010, Tel.: +91-11-25691308, Fax: +91-11-25692347, Email: landwarfare@gmail.com,

6 *How Mega-regional Trade and Investment Initiatives in Asia will shape Business Strategy in ASEAN and Beyond*, A management brief sponsored by Baker & McKenzie, The Economist corporate Network, 2016.

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Map 2. Proposed TAPI. Source: the US Energy Information Administration

It is only pure economics, ignoring the geopolitical aspects that would suggest that economic interdependence automatically contributes to peace.

Naively misguided views about the bounteous benefits of the Turkmenistan – Afghanistan – Pakistan – India (TAPI) oil and gas pipeline are periodically aired solely on economic grounds (Map 2). If India were to import oil and gas,

a strategic resource, through Pakistan, it would be naïve indeed – or perhaps geopolitical suicide. If TAPI is ever built, it would cut across the CPEC *entangling India in a web*.

The economic viability of the OBOR has been questioned. Jia Qingguo points to the long distances to markets through Central Asia and Russia to Europe, or via Pakistan to the Middle East, which traverse sparsely populated regions. Even in highly populated countries, low economic development and limited markets, corruption and administrative inefficiency are constraints which could adversely affect implementation of the OBOR⁸. Land routes are not quite competitive: sea - based ones being cheaper for goods, and air travel faster for passengers. The highest train – load under exceptional circumstances is some 2300 TEU: a large ship carries almost ten times as much, even though takes thrice as long. The twenty-foot equivalent unit (or TEU) describes the capacity of container ships and terminals; based on the volume of a 20-foot-long (6.1 m) intermodal container which can be easily transferred between

⁸ Jia Qingguo, a member of the Standing Committee of the CPPCC and dean of the University of international relations at Beijing University, as quoted in *China One Belt One Road: China's Great Leap Outward* by Francois Godement, European Council on Foreign Relations / Asia Centre June 2015, Contact: london@ecfr.eu, contact@centreasia.eu.

different modes of transportation, such as ships, trains and trucks.⁹

Another scholar, Hu Zhiyong contends that the threat of terrorism is a significant political risk that cannot be ignored. According to Pang Zhongying, India will challenge the OBOR as well.¹⁰ Professor Huang Yiping from Peking University warned "*China has become the third-largest direct investing country, but more than half of its deals do not provide financial returns.*"¹¹ The record of Chinese projects abroad is not entirely flattering. The water pipe construction project in Libya was burnt down in 2003; in 2014, over 200 container trucks were abandoned in Kyrgyzstan because of local opposition. China has to handle these politically unstable countries and broken contracts: its foreign policy has to address these issues.¹² The experience of Sri Lanka over the strategically located Hambantota Port is noteworthy. Saddled with a \$ 8 billion, Sri Lanka wants to (or perhaps has to) sell the port to a Chinese company.¹³

THE CPEC

The focus shifts to the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC); which some Pakistanis dismiss as the China Punjab Economic Corridor.¹⁴ The risks for Pakistan are examined briefly: implications for India being accorded detailed

9 Prabhat Shukla, *Occasional Paper – August 2015, Understanding the Chinese One-Belt-One-Road* Prabhat Prakash Shukla, (former Ambassador of India to Moscow) and Distinguished Fellow in the Vivekananda International Foundation, 3 San Martin Marg, Chanakyapuri, New Delhi – 110021, Tel: 011-24121764, Fax: 011-24106698, Email: info@vifindia.org, Website: <http://www.vifindia.org>, pp 8, 17. See also *Wikipedia*.


10 *ibid*. Hu Zhiyong is a research fellow at the Institute for International Relations at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. Pang Zhongying is professor of International Relations at the School of International Studies, Renmin University of China, Beijing.

11 "*One Belt One Road Initiative The New Development for China's International Economic Cooperation and its impact on China EU Relations*", BRICs International Seminar, Fudan University, Shanghai, April 20-21, 2016

12 "*China One Belt One Road: China's Great Leap Outward*" by Francois Godement, European Council on Foreign Relations / Asia Centre June 2015, Contact: london@ecfr.eu, contact@centreasia.eu. . Ge Jianxiong is professor of History and Historical Geography at Fudan University and a CPPCC member.

13 "*CPEC IS A SEA CHANGE*", by Swagato Ganguly, The Times of India, Pune, Thursday, 25 May 2017, p 12.

14 "*CPEC: How Pakistan is losing out to China*" 10 April 2017 by Jayadeva Ranade (former Additional Secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India, and presently President of the Centre for China Analysis and Strategy).



Map 3. The OBOR and CPEC. Source: Google



Map 4 The CPEC. Source: Google

analysis. A crucial link of the OBOR, the CPEC provides China *strategic depth* in Pakistan, a land bridge to the Middle East and access to the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean: effectively making it a two - ocean power with facilities for its Navy at Gwadar as well (Maps 3 and 4)¹⁵.

More than half of the world's proven oil reserves are in the Middle East. Currently oil tankers traverse over 10,000 nautical miles to Chinese terminals along the east and southeast coast. The Corridor will also open business opportunities for the Chinese in Pakistan and the Western world.¹⁶ China aspires to extend the Corridor through Afghanistan and Iran at some point in time.¹⁷

Baluchistan is the largest province of Pakistan: long ignored by the feudal tribal aristocracy, it is affected by corruption, lack of education and neglect by the Central Government. Its untapped mineral wealth includes the world's fifth

¹⁵"*Strategic Framework for Understanding OBOR and CPEC*" by Shreyas Deshmukh, Issue Brief No 87, October 2016 The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi.

¹⁶"*One Belt and One Road: Dose China-Pakistan Economic Corridor benefit for Pakistan's Economy?*" by Muhammad Saqib Irshad, Qi Xin and Hamza Arshad, Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development www.iiste.org, ISSN 2222-1700 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2855 (Online), Vol.6, No.24, 2015c

¹⁷"*Forget India*", The Times of India, Pune, Wednesday, 10 May 2017, p 14.

largest reserves of gold and copper¹⁸. Muhammad Ishaq, a leading industrialist and a director of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Board of Investment & Trade, told Asia Times that the CPEC does not benefit local trade and industry; even the labour comes from China. He cautions that the CPEC will be a big disaster for Pakistan in the long run.¹⁹

IMPLICATIONS ON INDIA'S SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY

Implications of the CPEC on India's sovereignty, territorial integrity and strategic threats would reveal India's strategic options. Speaking at the Asian Development Bank in Japan, Shri Arun Jaitley emphasized that in traversing Gilgit – Baltistan, the CPEC impinges on India's sovereignty. It also intensifies Pakistan's hold over POK by default: with military implications as it links with Xinjiang²⁰. However, China engages in blatant double speak. The Beijing – based paper Global Times, with links to the Communist Party, piously asserts “...China has always adhered to the principle of non – interference in the internal affairs of other countries...” adding ominously “...but that doesn't mean Beijing can turn a deaf ear to the demands of Chinese enterprises in protecting their overseas investments...” It further adds that China is (unilaterally) entitled to mediate [in the Kashmir issue] because of business investments in POK.²¹ However, it is not all smooth sailing for China. Organizations like the Karakoram Students Organization, Balawaristan National Students Organization, Gilgit Baltistan United Movement and Balawaristan National Front have protested against the CPEC in Gilgit, Hunza, Skardu and Ghilzer. It is seen as an illegal Chinese attempt to grab Gilgit: a “Road of Gulami or Slavery for Gilgit – Baltistan”. Further, the region is considered as disputed territory since 1948 – 49. According to Wajahat Khan, founder of the Gilgit – Baltistan Thinkers Forum, China is establishing a military presence in the region.²²

18“China-Pakistan Economic Corridor route map and its implication on India”, by Hazrat Hassan, Asia, Business Opinion, 09 May 2016.

19“Tax concessions for Chinese firms, mounting security costs, crippling debt... The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is beginning to look like a disaster for its host nation” by FM Shakil 28 April 2017, 2:12 PM (UTC+8)

20 “Jaitley's OBOR Remark Reflects Unease In Ties”, The Times of India, Pune, Monday, 08 May 2017, p 8

21 “Beijing Wants to Mediate between India, Pak on Kashmir: Report”, by Saibal Dasgupta, The Times of India, Pune, Wednesday, 03 May 2017.

22 “CPEC Protest Erupts in Gilgit – Baltistan”, The Times of India, Pune, Monday, 15 May 2017, p 7.

Protecting its economic interests in Indian territory (without India's consent) seems quite in order for China: a *neo land – based colonialism* – with Pakistan the first colony. This *double speak* does not apply to China's hyper - sensitivity on sovereignty issues over Tibet, Taiwan and Arunachal Pradesh. The Dalai Lam's visit is considered a hostile act by India; Chinese officials asserting "... *even after the bite, the pain remains...the blood...we are hurt...*" Commenting on the strategic 9.2 kilometer Dhola – Sadiya Bridge connecting Assam and Arunachal Pradesh, the Chinese Foreign Ministry asks India to be "*cautious... and exercise restraint...before final settlement of the border issue...*"²³ Such "*restraint*" does not inhibit China in constructing the CPEC through POK. According to David Kelly, director of geopolitics in a Beijing – based firm China Policy, "... *China needs India's participation more than it needs the United States...does not serve China's image and strategic interests...being unable to mend fences in its neighbourhood...* [adding]...*India would not lose much by skipping the event...*" Both Germany and the United States representatives at the Forum reminded China to maintain transparency and give equal opportunities to all stakeholders in the allocation of finance and purchase of machinery: but China provides business to its own companies, while sidelining competitors.²⁴By encouraging Pakistan to declare Gilgit – Baltistan its fifth province, China seeks to legalize the CPEC – in utter disregard to India's position.²⁵ Chinese control of the region could also counter a future resurgent Russia in this *new Great Game*. With the tacit support (or cynical indifference) of many global players, the Kashmir issue has been internationalized through the back door; a *fait accompli* to India. If POK were ever to revert to India, a CPEC through Indian territory to supply Pakistan, which has demonstrated 70 years hostility to India, would make no sense to China (or India). China will protect its strategic interests in Gilgit – Baltistan, and by military means if necessary: rendering any merger of POK with India impossible. Pakistan may not have any short – term objections but, as argued later, this could be counterproductive in the long - term. This situation may not entirely be to India's disadvantage either: favourable outcomes

23 "*Skipping Meet Will isolate India: Beijing*", by Indrani Bagchi, The Times of India, Pune, Saturday, 06 May 2017, pp 9 – 11. See also "*Longest Bridge in Assam Rattles China*", The Times of India, Pune, Tuesday, 30 May 2017, p 9.

24 "*Don't Politicise It: Sharif Dig at India*", The Times of India, Pune, Monday, 15 May 2017, p 7.

25 "*China takes A Hand*", by Raghavan Jagannathan, The Times of India, Pune, Friday, 21 April 2017, p16.

are possible.

The Indian media laments over lost opportunities citing the immense economic benefits that could accrue to India – without examining the strategic price. Eminent “*thinkers*” opine that “...*India has backed itself into a foreign policy corner...difficult to see how it will come out...*” However, better to be in a corner than in a cul-de-sac. Sovereignty issues in Kashmir are questioned since Chinese occupation of parts of Kashmir and Aksai Chin has not deterred India from doing business with it. The author adds that “...*relations with Pakistan have hit the lowest ebb since the 1990’s...*”²⁶ Such positions suggest that self – flagellation is indeed a virtue. The Sino – Indian dispute is a bilateral one, whereas with the CPEC passing through Gilgit – Baltistan makes China a third party to the bilateral Kashmir issue, and so any comparison is untenable.

India joining a Chinese - sponsored CPEC through Gilgit – Baltistan is at best a hilarious suggestion and one of unilateral appeasement (or shameful capitulation) at worst. Moreover, if Indo – Pak relations have reached such a low, is India solely responsible? The aggrieved now becomes the villain of the story! The author opines that since the world is lining up to do business with China, India must follow suit; while ignoring the sovereignty issue.²⁷ The focus is on business at any cost – so long as the price has to be paid by India: akin to installing an in - house super computer - when the roof is caving in. However, India is not entirely isolated. While acknowledging India’s concerns over CPEC, Nepal’s envoy to India has opined about the reality of China being an economic giant that Nepal cannot ignore. Sri Lanka’s minister Sarath Amanugama has stated that India would find it difficult to reconcile with the CPEC. Germany has also shared India’s stand on the OBOR.²⁸

The chorus criticizing India is voiced in the international arena as well. The European Union’s stance that “...*Indian democracy is strong and stable enough not to be destabilized by territorial and political concessions on J&K...*” is indeed preposterous; indicative of the pressures that India has to address since most

26 “*Backed In A Corner*”, by Kanti Bajpai, The Times of India, Pune, 20 May 2017, p 14.

27 *ibid*

28 “*China an Economic Giant, Can’t Ignore Silk Road: Nepal*”, by Sachin Parashar, The Times of India, Pune, Sunday, 14 May 2017, p 13. See also Indian Express, Pune, Wednesday, 17 May 2017, p 2 and The Times of India, Pune, Wednesday, 24 May 2017, p 8.

significant countries endorse the OBOR. The late Air Commodore Jasjit Singh VrC (former Director of the IDSA) has opined that of the solutions by eminent strategic – diplomatic “*experts*”, all have required India to make all the concessions, and that no sacrifice by India is too much.²⁹ The West (like Pakistan) has never reconciled to Kashmir’s legal accession to India. According to Lord Phillip Noel – Baker, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (1947 – 1948), Kashmir’s accession was an “...*awkward fact*... [adding]...it would have been natural for Kashmir to eventually have acceded to Pakistan...”³⁰ The pressure on India will only mount over time: a severe test for its resilience.

THE NEW MAGINOT LINE

A fair part of the CPEC runs close to the Indo – Pak border, making it vulnerable (Map 4). This would ensure that “POK” will remain firmly in Pakistan’s orbit: notwithstanding the charade of its “independence”. The Pakistan Army will be heavily concentrated along the Corridor – and thinly to the West. The Chinese would take no chances and also “*beef – up*” security along the CPEC (with or without Pakistan’s permission) with “*volunteers*”. Any “*Cold Strike*” by India would be stiffly resisted. However, it would also inhibit Pakistan from using tactical nukes should India choose to strike along/ across/ up to the CPEC nevertheless: Pakistan’s own forces would be vulnerable. The CPEC is the heavily fortified *new Maginot Line* – along with its strengths and weaknesses.

During WWII the Germans bypassed the Maginot Line from the north through the Ardennes or simply flew over it to strike deep into France. India could bypass the CPEC from the south and, over the Arabian Sea, strike behind it or fly over it to targets. India could also avoid Gwadar and not upset the Chinese. Tunnels and bridges on the CPEC in Gilgit – Baltistan, being static targets, could be struck with the Prithvi missile system using conventional warheads. Similarly, the CPEC need not inhibit India from targeting dams, bridges, canals and railway networks and other economic targets in southern

29 “*Central Asia A Strategy For India's Look – North Policy*”, by Air Commodore SN Bal AVSM (Retd), Lancer Publishers & Distributors, K – 36A Green Park Main, New Delhi – 110016, ISBN 81 7062 273 5, p 21.

30 “*War And Diplomacy In Kashmir 1947 – 48*”, by C Dasgupta, Sage Publications, New Delhi, pp 13, 52, 54, 56, 59, 60.

Pakistan across it – always operating below the “*nuclear threshold*”. An all – out war with Pakistan is rather unlikely - notwithstanding mutual chest – thumping rhetoric. However the contingency has to be examined. A two – front war with Pakistan and China can be contemplated *only after three overriding conditions are met*: economic development to ensure defence in breadth and depth, creation of a favourable international geo – political environment conducive to the exercise and, most important, the national will to suffer severe hardships to secure a better future for succeeding generations. These conditions encompass an extended time frame and can be seen as *strategic foci*.

THE KASHMIR CONUNDRUM: INDIA’S AGNI PAREEKSHA

India has to face a bitter reality (substantially of its own making): living in an unreal world of fantasy is not a viable solution. Since the Kashmir War of 1947 – 48, and right through 1965 and 1971, India has not recovered POK. The world is getting tired of listening to India’s protests - and increasingly turning a deaf ear. India has not attempted to cross the LOC into what it *de jure* considers to be Indian territory. With the passage of time, and missed opportunities, the prospect of recovering POK, or even Aksai – Chin, is diminishing and rapidly entering the realms of unromantic fantasy. With the OBOR/CPEC, China has *de facto* imposed a solution to the Kashmir “*issue*”: notwithstanding Pakistan’s *de facto* or India’s *de jure position*. The blame game must cease: there is much promise in the future. India’s writ never ran in POK: it will continue to be governed (or misgoverned) by Pakistan with or without China’s assistance.

By supporting the OBOR and the CPEC, the major world powers have tacitly endorsed this position. Pakistan was advised to face the reality of Bangladesh: the world community would soon tell India to accept the reality of POK – something which India has uncomfortably lived with since 1947. This may not be quite as traumatic. A study carried out by the RAND Corporation in 2001 concluded that the only concession acceptable to India would be to convert the LOC, with some modifications, into a *de jure international border*: admitted in private at the highest levels of government. India would renounce claims to POK and the Northern Territories.³¹ The study adds that the Indian polity may accept this reality so long as it leads to permanent peace in south

31 “Limited Conflicts Under the Nuclear Umbrella Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the Kargil Crisis”, by Ashley J Tellis, C Christine Fair, Jamison Jo Medby, National security Research Division RAND, 1700 main Street, PO Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90497 – 2138, 2002, P 69

Asia: but Pakistan's position is not so clear, unless China can influence it. The study concludes that India "...seeks to secure geopolitical goals much larger than simply humiliating Islamabad..."³² A military solution by India to both POK and Aksai – Chin can only be contemplated if (and when) the overriding conditions indicated in the preceding paragraphs are met.

With moves to incorporate Gilgit – Baltistan (with Chinese support), Pakistan has shot itself in the foot: rendering the United Nations Security Council Resolution 47 of 21 April 1948 on Kashmir irrelevant. This non – binding Resolution requires that (a) Pakistan to use its "best endeavours" to secure the withdrawal of all tribesmen and Pakistani nationals (b) India to "progressively reduce" its forces to the minimum level required for keeping law and order and (c) India to appoint a Plebiscite Administrator nominated by the United Nations. Since Pakistan has not used its "best endeavours" to withdraw its forces, and India cannot "progressively reduce" its forces to the minimum level till law and order are restored, India has no obligation whatsoever to consider a plebiscite. The resolution was passed under the Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter (which is devoted to "peaceful settlement of disputes"): did not consist of directives to the parties, but rather "recommendations". Former UN diplomat Josef Korbel states that this is only "morally" but not "juridicially" binding. The final resolution lies with India and Pakistan depending on goodwill.³³ Any evidence of such "goodwill" on the part of Pakistan has not been demonstrated over 70 years. The Kashmir "issue" is now entirely an internal matter for India: Pakistan has to face this bitter truth as well.

Since the world has endorsed the OBOR/CPEC, India is justified in asking it endorse its position on J&K. Any separatism in Gilgit – Baltistan now becomes an internal matter of Pakistan – though India is *fully justified in providing moral or other support* to the residents where requested – something Pakistan and China are already doing in J&K and the North - East. In the final analysis, the GOI has to talk to Kashmiri separatists and get them back to the fold: or effectively marginalize them. This would require an incredible degree of patience, a combination of the velvet glove and the mailed fist and, last but not the least, rapid socio – economic development to hasten the integration of J&K into the mainstream. A more daunting, though not impossible, task would

³² *ibid*, pp 70, 75.

³³ "War and Peace in Modern India", 2010, by Raghavan, "Danger in Kashmir", 1966 by Joseph pp. 113-114.

require both the ruling party and the Opposition to rise beyond parochial interests and work for the Nation.

Through The Crystal Ball

The rapid economic development the CPEC promises could have both favourable and unfavourable outcomes for India. A stable Pakistan may abandon its neurotic obsession with Kashmir. More likely, it would whet the appetite of the Generals to more aggressive adventures. It is unlikely that China wants an all-out war with India, and could even convince the Pakistani junta not to cross *the red lines – but operate below that threshold*. However, India cannot take this for granted and must prepare for the worst case scenario; a two-front war that not only has to be fought, but won as well. Leon Trotsky's comment "... *you may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you...*" can be ignored at great peril. The overriding conditions for coping with this contingency have already been



Map 5. Chabahar Port. Source: Google

enunciated. China will aggressively establish the CPEC and suppress the internal dissent in Gilgit – Baltistan and Baluchistan: its interests overriding those of Pakistan. A confident China could force a unilateral military solution on Arunachal Pradesh: and the world would encourage India to accept the reality for *“peace in our times”* (world peace)


– a 21st Century Munich sellout.

Gates To The Future: Through The Geopolitical Labyrinth

By thinking *“out of the box”* India can look through many *“windows of opportunity”* It can live with the OBOR/CPEC with a little pain, and eventually join it under favourable conditions - at Tehran. It could also join it across the Karakoram Pass to Xinjiang; bypassing Pakistan completely - the Indian part built entirely by Indian contractors and finance. India could tap oil from the Atyrau – Xinjiang pipeline through J&K, to the refinery at Mathura bypassing the disputed Aksai – Chin area and POK. This would ensure the economic

development of J&K and hasten its integration.³⁴ China would thus have a stake in J&K being part of India: though India would have to renounce claims over

34 “Central Asia A Strategy For India's Look – North Policy”, by Air Commodore SN Bal AVSM (Retd), Lancer Publishers & Distributors, K – 36A Green Park Main, New Delhi – 110016, ISBN 81 7062 273 5, pp 47, 48




Map 6. Iranian Railways. Source: Google

POK It is pertinent to reiterate that POK has been occupied (and sometimes governed) by Pakistan since 1947.

India already trades with the world through its extended littoral: though must develop better transit infrastructure. The key lies in rapidly developing the Chabahar Port (Map 5). This regional trade, investment and transportation hub links the Indian Ocean to Central Asia and provides India access to the region through friendly nations. The existing Iranian road network can link up to Zaranj in Afghanistan, about 883 km away. The Zaranj - Delaram road constructed by India in 2009 can give access through Afghanistan's Garland highway to major Afghan cities – Herat, Kandahar, Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif. This corridor also gives an alternative access for Afghanistan to India via the sea: entirely bypassing an unstable Pakistan. India does not have to depend on the OBOR/CPEC.



Map 7. Russian Railway Network. Source: Google



Map 8. The International North – South Transport Corridor. Source: Google

Chabahar will enhance the economic engagement with a politically stable Iran whose geographical location and proximity to India make it an ideal transit hub for reaching Russia, the CIS countries and Europe.³⁵ India can gain access right up to Moscow, Kyiv, Ankara and Helsinki to the west, and the Central Asian Republics, Beijing and Vladivostok to the east. The 320 kilometer railway linking Mashad in Iran to Serakhs and Tedzhen in Turkmenistan was completed on 02 May 1996.³⁶ Iranian lines already link up with the Russian railway network from Bandar Abbas up to Mashad and Ashkhabad (Maps 6, 7 & 8). The dotted lines on Map 8 indicate possible links for a shorter route to Mashad – Serakhs – Tedzen – Ashkhabad (Turkmenistan). A railway from Chabahar linking the Iranian network would provide another route.

The International North – South Transport Corridor (INSTC)

The Corridor can provide a shorter route to Moscow (Map 8). Formalized in 2002, it is a 7200-km-long multi-modal (ship, rail and road) transportation system that connects the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea via Iran and thence to Russia and North Europe. Apart from the original members India, Russia and Iran, 11 countries including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria (observer status), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Oman, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkey and Ukraine are INSTC members. Presently, Indian goods to Russia and Central Asia move by sea via Rotterdam to St Petersburg, or via the Chinese port of Qingdao, and takes over 50 days. When operational the INSTC will reduce the time and cost of container delivery by 30 – 40 percent, and transship 30 – 50 million tons of cargo annually. India and Russia are committed “*to build effective infrastructure for the International North South Transport Corridor...*”³⁷ The concept of this corridor could date back to 1469 when Afanasy Nikitin, a merchant from Tver in Russia, undertook a 6-week voyage across the Arabian Sea to Gujarat to purchase indigo. Continuing his journey by sea from Cambay he arrived in Chaul, a village in Maharashtra's Raigad district. Perhaps, after 648 years, the INSTC could be named the Afanasy Nikitin Marg (ANM).

The Volga River

India could also use the Trans – Caspian route from northern Iran to the Volga River port of Astrakhan. The Volga is Europe's longest river and a major trade artery (Map 9). Astrakhan can connect ports on India's west coast to


35 “*Why Chabahar Port is so important for India?*”, The Resurgent India, Sunday, 11 June 2017.

36 “*The Handbook of Central Asia*”, Giampalo R Capisani, IB Tauris, London, 2000, p 148.

37 “*India Gears Up To Enter The Eurasian Integration Path*”, Ambassador B Stobdan, Senior Fellow at the IDSA, New Delhi, 07 June 2017.



Map 9. Volga River. Source: Google/Microsoft Map Point



Map 10. Volga - Don Canal.
Source: Google



Map 11. Volga – Baltic Waterway. Source: Encyclopedia Britannica Inc.

Russia and Northern Europe as well.³⁸ Widened during the Stalin Era, the Volga can handle large vessels from the Caspian Sea almost to the upstream end. The Volga – Don Canal provides the most direct link between the Caspian Sea and the Sea of Azov to the Black Sea, and the world's oceans. Access to the Baltic Sea is through the Volga – Baltic Waterway (Map 10 & 11). Commerce with Moscow is possible by the Moscow Canal connecting the Volga and the Moskva Rivers. The Trans – Caspian route can also access the Kazakh port of Atyrau (formerly Guryev) on the Ural River.

Any delays in completing the INSTC and/or Chabahar Port would reflect poorly on India's resolve, credibility and capability - yet another "window of opportunity" lost, and to China's gain. All these projects are yet to be realized: but so is the OBOR. However, the Volga transportation artery has been long in existence. Upgrading existing infrastructure could be a cost – effective alternative vis – a – vis creating one de novo. It is a race against time – and there is no prize for the runner – up. These endeavours by India should not be in competition with the OBOR, but complimentary to it.

THERE IS NO LAST WORD IN DIPLOMACY

38 "A New Era: India – Russia Ties in the 21st Century", Times Group Book, Bahadur Shah Zaffar Marg, New Delhi 110002 (for *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, Russia), ISBN 979 – 0 – 9888419. The 368 – kilometer Volga – Baltic Waterway was built in the early 19th Century and rebuilt in the 1960's. The 126.1 – kilometer Moskva Canal links Moscow with the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea. The 101 – kilometer Volga – Don Canal links the Volga River with the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea. Source: Wikipedia.

These words of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto merit attention. China and India have co-existed as civilizations for centuries and there is no deep rooted conflict between them: the border dispute being a legacy of imperialism to be resolved with equity and justice. Along with China, Russia and Iran, India can aspire to build a strong and vibrant Eurasia. Should it abandon its neurotic anti – India obsession, Pakistan could also join: antagonism with India being the very *raison d'être* for Pakistan. If Sino – Indian relations improve, the Pakistan problem will wither away – with China not needing to bolster Pakistan. According to Shri Sharat Sabharwal, China is using Pakistan as a strategic partner, and exploiting its obsession with India to contain it. He adds “...*if the Chinese persist in using Pakistan to contain India, sooner rather than later, they may find it to be more precarious than treading on thin ice...*”³⁹ *This window of opportunity must be exploited: Indian diplomacy must convince China that it is the more reliable partner than Pakistan.*

Sitting on a high horse, China could ignore India’s overtures – till such time India closes the economic and military gap. Regional groupings must also be strengthened since others also look at China with apprehension. India must not only spend more on defence, but further strengthen bilateral relations with Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan. However, if all such approaches fail, India must prepare for the worst – case scenario: a two – front war. While advocating diplomacy, Admiral Yamamoto simultaneously prepared for war against the USA. It must also ensure rapid development in Arunachal Pradesh. If China can brazenly build infrastructure in POK, it has no case in Arunachal Pradesh. India could also upgrade the Tibetan Government – in – Exile and open a consulate in Mysore. Tibet could be accorded the status of a distinct nation within China at present and without prejudice to independence at a later date through internal negotiations with China. Similarly Taiwan could be offered consulates in Kolkata, Mumbai and Chennai. To Chinese protests, India could counter that while it supports a one – China policy, it cannot ignore the reality of Taiwan – just as China ignores India’s position on POK. All these measures can be implemented on a time continuum as *calibrated responses*.

39 “ChiPak: A Precarious Partnership”, by Sharat Sabharwal, India Today, Volume XLII Number 20, 09 - 15 May 2017, Living media India Ltd, India Today Group Mediaplex, FC – 8, Sector 16 – A, Film City, NOIDA – 201301, p57. The author is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan

CONCLUSION

The OBOR, and especially the CPEC, jeopardizes our sovereignty and territorial integrity; severely impeding an equitable resolution of the vexed Kashmir "issue": and is *the shape of things to come* – unless we act in time. By supporting the OBOR and the CPEC, the major world powers have tacitly endorsed the status of POK as being a part of Pakistan. The OBOR is an economic instrument to further China's strategic geopolitical aims: though mainly on Chinese terms. India need not chase the *mirage* of the OBOR in its present form – or the nightmare of the CPEC in any form.

With its principled stance on the OBOR, India has not missed any bus, and can join it at a *time and place of its choosing*: does not have to crawl at China's bidding. Destinations the OBOR, when complete, hopes to reach are already within India's grasp. Rapid development of the Chabahar Port, links to the Russian railway network and access to Astrakhan across the Caspian Sea will facilitate trade with Russia right up to Finland and, through the Black Sea to west Europe. Eastwards it will facilitate trade with the CAR's and China. Most infrastructures are already in place: requiring link – infrastructure to be built. For this India has to negotiate mainly with the Russian Federation and Iran, with whom India has always enjoyed good relations – and not with an arrogant China or a deceitful Pakistan.

India does not have to depend on China for global trade. As argued, extending the olive branch is the preferred option: among a wide spectrum of options. India does not need to compete with China – but cannot be pushed around by it either. For this mere chest – thumping will not suffice: economic and military development along with building up a pluralist society with equity and justice would ensure India's place in the comity of nations with dignity and honour.


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AIR COMMODORE S N BAL, AVSM (RETD)



Commissioned as a transport pilot on 04 June 1967, he has logged over 6200 hours on various aircraft, and also held a Senior Commercial Pilots License. Commanded the Paratroopers Training School and served as Air-II at the Central and Western Air Commands respectively. Retired on 30 September 2002 as the Air Officer Commanding, Air Force Station, Agra.

A graduate of the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, he was the Head of Department, HRD & Strategic Management at the College of Defence Management, Secunderabad. Attended the National Defence College at New Delhi.

Visited the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, and attended a programme on Civil-Military Cooperation at the John F Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Massachusetts, USA. Post-retirement served as the Dean and Director, Symbiosis Institute of Mass Communication, Pune. A PhD in Political Science, and an MPhil in Russian, he has master's degrees in Management and Defence Studies,. Authored a book "Central Asia; India's Look-North Policy". Has contributed articles to the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, as also the Indian Defence Review. Currently teaches Organizational Behaviour at B-Schools in Pune.

BOOK REVIEW OF “50 YEARS OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY:
TRACING THE JOURNEY”
AUTHORED BY SHRI AJEY LELE (ED.)

Shri Anand V


The Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, commonly known as the Outer Space Treaty (OST) completed 50 years of existence in 2017. It is quite significant that this treaty has stood the test of time, despite the highly competitive space race of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the entry of a number of new players in the post Cold War era. It is also noteworthy that the OST was instrumental in setting up an international legal framework in outer space within a decade of the origin of space-faring activities. In comparison, for instance, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was framed centuries after maritime activities were carried across the high seas, and more than a decade after the OST was signed. Hence, the legal system caught up faster with the extra-terrestrial than the terrestrial realm, which speaks volumes about the relevance of law in regulating outer space activities. However, the treaty is not without its challenges – the ones inherent, and those which have accrued over five decades of space activities.

In this context, this edited volume provides a detailed and comprehensive assessment about the conception of OST and its motivations, its foundational principles and provisions, the level of adherence to it by the global community in general and the established space powers in particular, as well as the way ahead for the treaty in the rapidly changing outer space scenario. Accordingly, the edited book consists of 15 chapters, which are classified under three sections – *Debating OST*, *Global Outlook*, and *Governance and Prospects*. In the

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out the viewpoints which assess the treaty contents holistically. This section discusses the origin and evolution, theoretical dimensions, and effectiveness of the treaty as well as the emerging concerns in the space domain which has the potential to test the treaty's relevance. The first chapter by Ram S. Jakhu focuses on the evolution of the OST. He traces a timeline of the events which unfolded, culminating in the signing of the treaty; and analyzes the unique conditions which made it possible. Interestingly, it was the Cold War geopolitics which determined the establishment of outer space as global commons. Any treaty of global scope at that time required the consent of both the poles; and it was a strategic necessity for both to keep the outer space open for competition. This shared interest rooted in superpower rivalry presented the unique condition essential for bringing about the consensus required to sign the OST in 1967. The second chapter brings in the theoretical perspective to assess the establishment

introduction, the editor, Ajey Lele, has established a firm background for discussions in the three sections. The OST has 104 ratified parties and 24 non-ratified signatories, and has three objectives – to ensure the access and utilization of outer space as a global commons, to facilitate and regulate co-operation and interaction among the parties exploring space, and to prevent the type of terrestrial arms race from being reflected in outer space. He emphasises that the 17 articles of the OST are in fact, based on principles reached after consensus and therefore remains vaguely articulated. Moreover, it is observed that the OST lacks review provisions as a result of which there is inadequate debate in updating the treaty.

The first section brings

of the OST and its survival to this day. Reflecting the empirical observation of the first chapter, Joan Johnson Freese infers that even though politics of outer space is generally viewed through strictly realist or liberal prisms, the establishment of OST demonstrates that realist goals are best achieved by liberal means due to an exceptional level of convergence of the collective and vital individual interests of states in space.

The focus within the section shifts from historico-theoretical theme to reflections from a contemporary viewpoint with the third chapter by Gulshan S. Sachdeva on an appraisal to OST. He argues that the challenges to the treaty are firstly due to its inability to visualise future contingencies and secondly due to legal deficiencies which were necessitated by the requirement to achieve consensus. "The New Jurisprudence" – the distinctive features of the OST with respect to the terrestrial laws before it, is hailed by the chapter as the cornerstone of the normative framework in outer space. However, the chapter seems to have overlooked some practical loopholes with regards to the principle of non-appropriation. For instance, certain orbits are de-facto appropriated by states for years by merely placing satellites, especially in the Geostationary Orbit. However, he does bring to light the lacunae within certain principles, including the lack of legal grounds for conceptualizing outer space as a "province of all mankind".

Further, it is argued that the OST was made deliberately vague and weak for application and was inadvertently left without sufficient technological foresight. The issues cited in this context are the absence of important definitions, inadequate provisions on non-weaponisation, and the impracticality, illegitimacy, and redundancy of the principle that astronauts be treated as envoys of mankind in space. The deficiencies in the treaty arising from unanticipated developments include the rapid development of space technology, the rise of the private sector, and the growing menace of space debris. The chapter finally proposes certain solutions to these challenges, which include the need for concluding specialised protocols for making the OST relevant again, as well as national level legislations and global level organization. However, it needs to be seen how practical the suggestion of a World Space Organization under the UN auspices as the regulator, trustee and inspector of outer space affairs could be. Sovereignty constraints, along with the contemporary resurgence of state-centrism present substantial impediments in this respect. The fourth chapter by Ranjana Kaul dwells on a similar theme, but throws more light on the issues related to privatization, space debris, weaponization and militarization in the 21st century. The fifth chapter by Ji Yeon-jung presents the grim picture of an emerging arms race in

space based on cascading regional security dilemmas since 2002 when the US withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. A recommendation is made in this respect regarding opening of dialogue mechanisms among India, China, Japan and South Korea to enable more transparency, reduce trust deficits based on the common interests to secure their satellites. However, such possibilities appear to be grim, given the deteriorating regional security conditions.

The second section explores the viewpoints of the global community on the OST, in which the sixth chapter by Frans G. von der Dunk presents the legal dilemma faced by the European Union (EU) in contextualizing its space activities through the European Space Agency (ESA) within the ambit of space law. The EU is seen to be faced with a unique challenge – it does not see itself as an ‘ordinary’ intergovernmental organisation, which could have opened up possibilities for being a legal entity in space, nor is it a proper state to become directly a party to the OST. The seventh chapter by Philip A. Meek highlights the orientation of the US to the OST, which is grounded in American exceptionalism. On this basis, an argument is made that the US should move ahead with its commercial initiatives through an appropriate interpretation of the relevant provisions in the OST. This is especially in context of the US Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act signed into law in 2016, which gives US individuals and companies the right to conduct a wide range of commercial space activities including resource ownership, extraction and sale. In addition, the chapter also presents the legality of the interim recommendations given by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to preserve the Apollo landing sites and related artefacts on the Moon, in light of the rise in the number of foreign and private lunar missions.

The consistent push at the global level by Soviet Union and its successor, Russia, in working towards a treaty on Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) is explained by Aleksandr Klapovskiy and Vladimir Yermakov in the eighth chapter. The chapter also highlights the lack of support by the US to any of these initiatives by the Soviet Union and Russia. As a result, Russia is teaming up with emerging powers including China to push ahead for a No First Placement (of space weapons) commitment, which would set the ground for a Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT). Li Juqian provides an overview of the space activities of China and its legal dimensions in the ninth chapter. China is in the process of formulating the space law at the domestic level consistent with the OST and is partnering with

Russia at the global level for a PAROS regime through the PPWT. However, the destructive 2007 Anti-Satellite (ASAT) test by China seems to have been implicitly justified by the chapter by highlighting the US attempts at continuing to weaponize space. The Indian perspective on OST is explained by Kumar Abhijeet in the tenth chapter, where India's compliance with the OST is underscored, despite the absence of domestic space law. In this chapter, the need for domestic legislation is emphasized in context of an ongoing attempt to involve the private sector in a significant way.

The perspectives of Japan and the Koreas on OST are explained by Munish Sharma in the eleventh chapter. The North Korean nuclear and missile programme is lies at the heart of the security dynamics in the region, which is driving the militarization of Japanese and South Korean space programme. Japan lifted its four-decade-old self-imposed restrictions on the military use of satellites through the Basic Space Law which was enforced in 2008, as a consequence of the North Korean and Chinese threat. However, it should be noted that North Korea did not violate the OST when it launched its own rockets to place satellites in space. Nevertheless, sanctions were placed on the programme by the international community citing the launches as part of its ballistic missile programme. The twelfth chapter, interestingly, explores the impact of the OST of the observer organizations of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS), with a focus on the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organisation (APSCO) and Inter Islamic Network on Space Sciences & Technology (ISNET) and the African Association of Remote Sensing of the Environment (AARSE).

The third section explores the prospects for the OST to retain its relevance, and the measures that need to be taken in this regard. Under this section, the thirteenth chapter by Eligar Sadeh emphasises on the need to contain the space debris and proposes “deterrence by entanglement” to avert conflicts in space. The concept of interdependence, thus, is highlighted as the key to develop space governance so as to address security concerns in outer space. Rajeshwari Pillai Rajagopalan evaluates the options to make the OST contemporary in nature in the fourteenth chapter. The chapter observes that disagreements and challenges to consensus building have only increased in time. This is because, firstly, the number of players is more, and secondly, the power is more evenly distributed leading to polarization between the US and the Sino-Russian front. One major recommendation given here is that space technology should be dealt with by restricting the end use (similar to the Chemical Weapons Convention) rather

than controlling the technology (similar to the Non Proliferation Treaty). The fifteenth chapter by Ram S. Jakhu envisions the future of the OST and enlists four scenarios – status-quo, dispute settlement under OST, modification and expansion of treaty provisions, and withdrawal from OST by major powers. Out of the four, the strengthening and expansion of the space regime by incorporating necessary changes is presented as the best course for the global community. In the conclusion it is noted that the treaty has certainly survived and has not been dishonoured till date, despite certain failed attempts. It is essential to transform the treaty into one which has contemporary relevance, strengthen the core principles, bring in more clarity in definitions, as well as ensure and expand domestic legislations in addition to facilitating dialogue and confidence building measures.

Though the book covers various perspectives from diverse angles, there seems to be a consensus on the need to update the OST into one which is capable of addressing the issues raised by space-faring activities in the 21st century. The issue related to space weaponization appears to be the one which is most divisive. In comparison, there is no indication of any attempts to ban militarization and commercialization of space, since the space powers benefit from them. On the other hand, there is considerable co-operation between countries on the scientific and developmental domains, since they are closest to the spirit of consensus in OST. To build on the base of the OST, it is therefore better target the low hanging fruits, on which there is universal concurrence. These can be further used to widen and strengthen OST and bridge the trust deficits.

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Contextualizing Research Methodology for Indian Think Tanks

Prof Gautam Sen

“Over the last 40 years, the world has gradually entered into a post-Clausewitzian state where the wars are undeclared, the battlefields can be anywhere, the uniforms are optional, and the combatants as well as the targets are often "civilian". Conventional militaries have repeatedly attempted to utilize technology to meet the new challenges posed, but even the most advanced technology has provided little more than meaningless short-term victories rendered futile in months, if not weeks.”

*William S Lind & Greg Thiele,
“The View From Olympus:
The Fourth Generation Handbook”,
Castilla House Press, USA, 2015*

“The society that separates its scholars from its warriors will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done by fools.” Gen Sir W F Butler, 1889, Afghanistan

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PREAMBLE

India is going through a transformation stage in thinking, implementing policies and bridging the gap between the realm of ideas and the domain of public policy making. The hardest act will be to redefine and restructure the way India will be acting in the new world order of the 21st Century. With 202 nation states on the roster of the United Nations, loss of bipolarity due to the demise of the former Soviet Union, proliferation of nuclear technology and weaponisation of nuclear technology the study of security has become far more complex than what we have known or postulated even in the cold war period. The armed forces as an organization will become even more significant for the nation states to be used to contain internal security problems apart from maintaining the integrity of the nation state from external aggression or project power beyond territorial limits. This entails the nation states to rationalize the purpose of their national power of which one component is the organization called the Armed Forces. Hence we observe that since 1630s, the role of national interest and defining of national interest becomes important to conduct the business of the present nation state militarily, socially, politically, economically and diplomatically.

The Indian Think Tanks whose number have grown to 280 and is fourth largest in the world with US(1835), China(435), and UK(288)¹. Irrespective of what has been the agenda of the Think Tanks in India enumerated in their individual constitution, in the coming decade each one of them have to contribute through intellectual inputs to safeguard India's National Integrity, National Interest and National Security. This presentation is distinctly catering towards the role of Think Tanks whose primary concern is to supplement the conceptualization of National Interest, National Security and the making of National Security strategy. Since expertise nurtured in the think tanks are field specific, one must ponder whether think tanks should accept a value system which will determine the boundaries within which they should work.

DEFINITION

There is no available universally accepted definition of Think Tank. However, suffice to say that public policy related research institutes are basically a 20th century phenomenon and are heavily rooted in a very particular way to the United States culture of research and dissemination of information. Historically, such research centers are social science based and supported by foundations, organizations, private individuals and by the government. The think tanks of

today can well be traced to the universities supported at one time by the church. However, chronologically, think tanks first appeared around 1900 A.D. in the modern era and were mainly directed towards an effort to get the scholars, professionals, and corporate managers to bring their expertise to bear on the economic and social problems of the period (Smith 1991). Perhaps, a somewhat quizzical way of defining what think tanks² “ought to do” appeared in a press report suggesting that a think tank could be defined as “an arrangement by which millions of dollars are removed from willing corporation, government and eccentric wealthy, and given to researchers who spend much of their time competing to get their names in print”³ (Kelly, 1988).

In the past decade think tank consortiums have become much more diverse and reflect new entrants in the market place of ideas and the changes in such organization’s atmospherics. There are three main models of think tanks:

1. University without students
2. Contract researchers
3. Advocacy tanks

However, it must be mentioned that all attempts to mix and match the models was found to be difficult and impractical as some of the think tank managers found over the years. Recently, if one reviews the think tank organization, the Washington directory Capital Source lists 69 organizations under the heading “Think Tank” Interestingly, some of the newer think tanks are extremely small having a staff of one to six and reflect some time the personal agenda of individual entrepreneurs.

WHAT SHOULD THINK TANK DO AND DO THEY MATTER

Think tanks and research organizations set out to influence policy ideas and decisions a goal that is key to the very fabric of these organizations. And yet, the ways that they actually achieve impact or measure progress along these lines remains fuzzy and underexplored⁴. It helps those with an interest in think tanks to envision a well-oiled machine, while giving leaders in these organizations tools and tangible metrics to drive and evaluate success.”⁵

CATEGORIZING THINK TANKS WHICH EXISTS GLOBALLY:

It is essential to quote from the Think Tank report the world wide spread of 6,500 Think Tanks ⁶

North America and Europe

- There are 1931 think tanks in North America (Mexico, Canada and US) of which 1835 are in the United States
- There are 1770 think tanks in Europe
- Close to 55 percent of all think tanks are in North America and Europe
- 90.5 percent of think tanks were created since 1951
- The number of think tanks in the US has more than doubled since 1980
- 31 percent of think tanks were created between 1981 to 1990
- The End of Post WWII consensus & Challenge to the Welfare State contributed to the growth of think tanks on the left and the right of the political spectrum
- Most of the think tanks that have come into existence in the United States since the 1970s are specialized for a particular regional or functional area
- About one quarter of U.S. think tanks (approximately 400 institutions) are located in Washington, DC
- More than half the think tanks are university affiliated
- The rate of establishment of think tanks has declined over the last 12 years in the United States and Europe

ASIA, LATIN AMERICA, AFRICA, AND THE MIDDLE EAST

- Asia, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and North Africa continue to see an expansion in the number and type of think tanks established
- Asia has experienced a dramatic growth in think tanks since the mid-2000's
- Many think tanks in these regions continue to be dependent on government funding along with gifts, grants, and contracts from international public and private donors
- University, government affiliated, or funded think tanks remain the dominate model for think tanks in these regions
- There is increasing diversity among think tanks in these regions with independent, political party affiliated, and corporate/business sector think tanks that are being created with greater frequency
- In an effort to diversify their funding base, think tanks have targeted businesses and wealthy individuals to support their core operations and programs.

THINK TANKS IN INDIA

In India, research institutes developed in different hues and shapes. They were dependent on the type of funding and the source of funding that they have attracted. It almost appears that research institutes of autonomous nature, which conducted research, related to public policy to politico-military analysis considered themselves as a think tank. This also included some of the institutes of such type funded directly or sometimes indirectly by the government itself at the Centre or even by the State. It is only in the last decade that the corporate sector and the private sector have taken initiatives to fund research institutes ostensively to study those areas, which have a bearing on their business. e.g. the Reliance Group of Industries initiated the formation of Observer Research Foundation (ORF) primarily to study the energy aspect of development and its policy implication. Similarly, TERI has been funded extensively by the TATAs to study the aspect of environment & energy.

In the absence of a well-articulated notion of “National Interest” and the perennial absence of “Strategic Culture”, India is standing at the cross roads of the winds of change that is sweeping the very psyche of the Indian nation state. Most of the Government supported think tanks are merely the extension of “Government advocacy” and are more or less being used as event management centers rather than contributing to deeper intellectual introspections required to articulate views to enrich to further the cause of national interest. They also have a major problem of being staffed by area specialists, retired Government servants and academic entrepreneurs. Hence they are motivated and pushed to produce outputs, which lacks the application of stringent norms of research methodologies and rely on strong opinions backed by advocacy. Hardly any scholars of repute or even those belonging to the younger generations are willing to join the Government think tanks in particular or those, which are even privately funded⁷. The role of the Indian Think Tanks in the Indian context can be seen in the context that India has had experiences of think tanks working on defence and security issues, but there is no accurate measurement of how much they have influenced policies. While in many parts of the world the fusion of think tanks to policy is refined, in India the why, what and how of a think tank role is still an unsettled debate and tends to get lost in the rigmarole of decision-making⁸.

Intellectual honesty and the concept of peer review that are mentioned are far from present in India. Here in India, every high official openly plagiarizes with total impunity every 5 day. The result is that our think tanks are filled with

‘lumpen’. intellectual community comprising of academic entrepreneurs, area specialists, expatriate diaspora and outsourced international scholars who have decided to use their personal venture capital for matters strategic thinking. I define Lumpen as follows:

“Lumpen proletariat is a term that was originally coined by Karl Marx to describe that layer of the working class that is unlikely to ever achieve class consciousness and is therefore lost to socially useful production. In the Eighteenth Brumaire, Marx rhetorically describes the lumpen proletariat as a “class fraction” that constituted the political power base for Louis Bonaparte of France in 1848. In this sense, Marx argued that Bonaparte was able to place himself above the two main classes, the proletariat and bourgeoisie, by resorting to the “lumpen proletariat” as an apparently independent base of power, while in fact advancing the material interests of the “finance aristocracy”. For rhetorical purposes, Marx identifies Louis Napoleon himself as being like a member of the lumpen proletariat insofar as, being a member of the finance aristocracy, he has no direct interest in productive enterprises This is a rhetorical flourish, however, which equates the lumpen proletariat, the rentier class, and the apex of class society as equivalent members of the class of those with no role in useful production.”

Till the time the "political will" will not be exerted to get rid of the retired government servants who are comfortably housed in so called think tanks and the leadership of think tanks start functioning beyond "EVENT MANAGEMENT". However it will be useful to note what PM Modi said while announcing his decision to replace the Planning Commission with NITIAYOUG⁹. They are:

1. Think Outcomes, not Resources
2. Think Access, not Incomes
3. Think Innovation, not Allocation
4. Think Abundance, not Scarcities
5. Think Scenarios, not Budget Plans
6. Think Governance, not Politics
7. Think Future, not Playing Catch-up

The latest observation is about the number of ideologically based think tanks which has emerged between 2004 and 2014 have slowly and surely been dedicating their work to specific political organizations i.e. the RSS. These eight

think tanks already have political patronage and one of them is even situated within the party headquarters¹⁰. One can't be sure whether the objective behind the spurt in the number of these organizations is to answer the search for rightwing intellectuals, or to shape public opinion towards the right. What is clear is that some of them have definitely begun to shape public policy under the NDA. They are:

1. Vivekananda International Foundation
2. India Foundation
3. Forum for Integrated National Security
4. Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee Research Foundation
5. India Policy Foundation
6. Forum for Strategic and Security Studies
7. Public Policy Research Centre
8. Centre for Policy Studies

WHAT THEN ARE THE CHALLENGES BEFORE THE INDIAN THINK TANKS?

It is interesting to note that both Mohan Guruswami¹¹ and Rajiv Nainan¹² have put their fingers on the basic modalities under which Indian think tanks operate, flourish and exist, yet they have stopped short of identifying what are the critical conceptual areas in which Indian think tanks ought to contribute. Rajiv Nainan writes about the yeomen work done by a particular think tank to further the development of strategic culture and that the peer reviewed article appearing in Journals as assessed by Alexa ranking, outshines many acclaimed think tanks like SIPRI, Chatham House, Carnegie Endowment and IISS. One wonders whether the Social Science Citation Index or Impact Factor evaluation will corroborate Alexa Ranking and if true then how the think tank mentioned is ranked the way it has been done by the "2016 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report". The following are the main challenges before the Indian think tanks:

1. Methodology to Contextualize and Conceptualize, National Interest.
2. Eradicate the Confused conceptualization of National Interest.
3. Defining National Interest
4. Formulate National Interest.
5. Constructing National Security Policy Making Prism

A schematic Flow Chart of Methodology has been added in the end as a recommendation for Indian Think Tanks while conducting research. It will be prudent to explain the complexities of the problems related to National Interest, National Security Policy Making Prism and Crisis of Identity. I am suggesting here not to indulge in a discussion on Nationalism as it is far more complex than what meets the eye.

The presentation here is to facilitate the readers on the track of thinking about the concepts of theory used in conjunction with methods and methodologies in the complex mosaic of the use of force, international relations, diplomacy and internal compulsions of nation states which have to grip with crisis of identity, center-state relationship, religion, political ideologies and diverse range of ethnic as well as multi-racial problems. All the answers to the above dilemma confronting the political elites and the managers of government lie in as to how each nation state rationalizes her "national interest". Secondly, national interest does not and cannot change with every change of Government be it a nation state, which is developed, developing or underdeveloped.

CONTEXTUALIZING NATIONAL INTEREST¹³

History of the Idea of National Interest. The Idea of National Interest (1934), Charles Beard traced the history of the concept of 'national interest' to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries¹⁴, when modern nation-states began to crystallise. Unsurprisingly, the rise of the nation-state and the use of the term occurred at the same time. Beard found that after the development of the nation-state and the appearance of nationalist sentiments, older terms – the 'will of the prince' and 'raison d'état' – lost their ability to mobilise the public will. They were therefore replaced by references to 'national interests' and 'vital interests'. Other terms¹⁵ used for their mobilizing capacity include 'national honor', 'public interest' and 'general will'¹⁶. This followed the development of the idea of 'nation'¹⁷, Armstrong (1982) and Smith (1989)).

The early history of 'national interest'¹⁸, according to Joseph Frankel, cannot be traced back much further than the sixteenth century. Earlier societies that were in contact with one another often developed notions of self-interest based upon language, a common political identity, survival, power and wealth, but conceived these notions 'within specific bargaining terms or conflict situations rather than in general terms'¹⁹ Frankel writes that the concept could not be articulated in ancient Greece because of the blurring of distinctions between political and cultural communities, and the absence of clear-cut political

boundaries. Frankel observes that in the Middle Ages, the nature of relations between individual political units and the Roman Empire and the 'confusion between politics and metaphysics offered no scope for the evolution of the idea of the "national interest"²⁰. In other words, 'empire' superseded 'nation' as a form of political organization.

Before the French Revolution the term 'nation' referred to a racial or linguistic group. Political authority was largely centralized, exclusively so in the domain of external relations; according to E.H. Carr, international relations were primarily relations between royal families. The narrowness of this domestic conception was matched by a mercantilist policy in external affairs. Such a policy was intended to expand the power and wealth of the state, personified by the ruler and controlled by a small circle of governing elites. For these elites, wealth accumulation occurred as a result of the exploitation of peasants and serfs. In the post- Renaissance period, wealth accumulation also occurred as a result of trade and colonial wars. In this period, mercantilism 'identified the interest of the nation with the interest of its rulers'²¹

The doctrine of *raison d'état* is a predecessor to 'national interest'. *Raison d'état* derives from Machiavelli's writings on statecraft and has its roots, according to Meinecke, in 'the personal power-drive of the rulers' and 'the need of the subject people, which allows itself to be governed because it receives compensations' in exchange²². Machiavelli argued that the overriding imperative for the ruler was the survival of the state, threats to which had to be overcome by any means necessary. The prince 'must be prepared not to be virtuous, and ... must not flinch from being blamed for vices which are necessary for safeguarding the state. ... He should not deviate from what is good, if that is possible, but he should know how to do evil, if that is necessary'.²³

Beginning in the 15th century, and with increasing momentum in the 17th and 18th centuries, secularism and political economy began to gain in prominence at the expense of theology. This displacement from a spiritual to a material concern was matched by a corresponding change in the meaning of the word 'interest', which 'shrank to an economic conception in writings and negotiations involving policy, statecraft and social affairs generally'²⁴. Interest referred to 'outward realities such as material, plant and equipment, or aggregations of plants and equipments'. It also referred to 'the owners of such tangibles, as for example, when we speak of utility interests, railroad interests, and aviation interests'. The national interest, accordingly, is often regarded as 'a mere aggregation of particular interests, or ... the most active and dominant

interests, even though they may be in the minority – considered either as the proportion of persons or corporations involved or as the proportion of capital measured by pecuniary standards²⁵. Thus, for Beard, when the national interest is being considered, it is really the interests of the owners of property that are being considered. Furthermore, there is no objective 'thing' called the national interest because interests cannot be divorced from (subjective) human motives and concerns:

As far as policy is concerned, interest inheres in human beings as motive or force of attention, affection and action... Those who merely discuss policy likewise bring their interests to bear, consciously or unconsciously, and their interests, both intellectual and economic (salary, wages or income), are affiliated with some form of ownership or opposition to the present relations or operations of ownership²⁶.

The subjectivism of the term leads to the 'intellectual impossibility of isolating and defining interests in absolute terms'²⁷. Rousseau described the political expression of these common interests as the 'general will'. He suggested that it is only this general will that 'can direct the powers of the State in such a way that the purpose for which it has been instituted, which is the good of all, will be achieved. For if the establishment of societies had been made necessary by the antagonism that exists between particular interests, it has been made possible by the conformity that exists between these same interests'²⁸

For Rousseau, the common interests of societies constitute the basis of decision-making and policy. These interests are cohesive glue that binds a society together and prevents it from fragmenting. The bond of society is what there is in common between these different interests. The bond of society is that identity of interests which all feel who compose it. In the absence of such an identity no society would be possible. Now, it is solely on the basis of this common interest that society must be governed²⁹.

Once the French Revolution had swept aside the doctrine of the 'divine right of kings', the state came to be seen as the instrument of the nation. The sovereign no longer personified the state and its interests. As popular forces gained greater access to civil and political rights, the aim of national policy began to be understood as the pursuit of the interests of all members of the nation. Hence the economic interests, and the government policies that were designed to pursue them, would be asserted against the interests and policies of other governments. While this gave workers 'an intimate practical interest in the policy and power of the nation', it also necessitated 'the loyalty of the

masses to a nation which had become the instrument of their collective interests and ambitions¹³⁰.

Rosenau argued that the public's stake in international relations increased after World War II and the danger of total war³¹. He suggested that 'national interest' could be used in two distinct senses – one for political analysis and another for political action: As an analytic tool, it is employed to describe, explain or evaluate the sources or the adequacy of a nation's foreign policy. As an instrument of political action, it serves as a means of justifying, denouncing or proposing policies. Both usages ... confine the intended meaning to what is best for a national society. Beyond these general considerations, however, the two uses of the concept have little in common³².

In practical terms, these distinctions are not particularly useful because there is no way to tell. At the operational level, 'national interest refers to the sum total of interests and objectives actually pursued³³. By contrast, operational interests are short-term interests that are the primary concerns of the government and/or party in power. They arise from considerations of expediency or necessity and are used in a descriptive rather than normative form. They are 'generally translated into policies which are based upon the assessment of their prospects of success³⁴. At the explanatory-polemical level, the concept of national interest 'is used to explain, evaluate, rationalize or criticize foreign policy. Its main role is to "prove" oneself right and one's opponents wrong and the arguments are used for this purpose rather than for describing or prescribing³⁵

There are several problems with these classifications. For one, there is considerable overlap between the first two categories and the third. For another, the aspirational level can be utopian, often deliberately so, and un-measurable as well. Furthermore, while the operational level describes the interests and policies actually pursued, it is thrown into confusion at the explanatory-polemical level, where a plethora of assertions and counterassertions are to be found. So imprecise is the term that Aaron³⁶ abandoned the attempt to define it, regarding it as a meaningless, vague formula or a pseudo-theory. He concluded that the national interests pursued by individual states are diverse and not at all permanent. They vary according to context and there is no general agreement even within the state about their nature.

CONCEPTUALIZING NATIONAL INTEREST

In modern political life, "national interest" has become a common term among politicians and political scientists. In nearly every discussion about

changing foreign policy, national interests are treated as accepted facts to support scholars or politicians when they present opinions. But there is no accepted common standard or definition of the concept of national interest, so the understanding of the role or meaning of national interest is totally different from one user of the term to another. This makes it nearly impossible to reach a consensus when debating foreign policy. In practice, such superficial discussion is meaningless for policy making. A debate without a common definition of national interest can never achieve a meaningful outcome. This type of debate does not help policymakers at all in judging which recommended policy serves national interests better. In theory, such discussion is not scientific because it is not based on a common definition of the term or a common understanding of the concept. It is like a blind person touching part of an elephant and describing the animal based on the sense of touch only, but without any concept of what a whole elephant looks like.

CONFUSED CONCEPTS OF NATIONAL INTEREST

Let me illustrate with China as an example. National interest does not have a class nature. In the Chinese language the concept of “national interest” has two meanings. One is national interest in the context of international politics, meaning the interests of a nation state in a global arena. This concept must be contrasted with group interests, international interests or global interests. The other is state interest or interests of state as the highest level in domestic politics, meaning governmental interest or a government that represents the peoples’ interest. In 1954, Chairman Mao, at an extended meeting of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo, said “our policy toward farmers is not like the Soviet’s, but it is one that takes care of both the interest of farmers and the interests of the state.”³⁷ The national interest that Mao Zedong was talking about is in the category of domestic politics. In 1989, when Deng Xiaoping met with the Thai prime minister, he said, “China wants to maintain its own national interest, sovereignty and territorial integrity. China also believes that a socialist country cannot violate other countries’ interests, sovereignty or territory.”³⁸ The national interest that Deng Xiaoping was talking about here meant national interest in the context of international politics. Premier Zhou Enlai said in 1949: “When no war or violation takes place, national interests need to be protected domestically and internationally. In the international arena, diplomacy has become front line work.”³⁹ Because of the dual meaning of “national interest” in the Chinese language, some scholars have confused national interest with

interest of state. They have therefore misunderstood the meaning of the concept of national interest in the context of international politics. Lenin said the state is an instrument of the ruling class in domestic politics. State 10 organizations are that instrument. Because the ruling class controls the state, its interest and that of the ruling class coincide. A state's interest is often contrary to groups other than the ruling class; therefore national interests in terms of domestic politics do have a class nature.

However, a state in international politics represents a political entity that consists of four major elements such as population, territory, government and international recognition. This state is sometimes called a country. After the modern nation state was formed, a country has also been called a nation. This is why the UN is called the United Nations. The term "nation" is a political concept for all people of a country. Its focus is national but certainly not class-based. The national interest in international politics includes the interests of the whole nation state. And both the ruler and the ruled share those interests.

In a country that integrates religion and politics, as in some Islamic countries in the Middle East, national interests often overlap religious interests. In modern democratic countries like America and the Western European countries, it is the political party, not the religious organization, which is at the helm of the state. In some countries where there is no party in control, national interests often overlap with the key political leader's individual interest.

Definition of National Interest. What exactly is national interest? Napoleon had said that he was acting in the interest of France when he initiated his campaign against Russia, and later when he launched his desperate battle at Waterloo. Adolf Hitler justified his expansionist policies, including annexation of Austria and breakup of Czechoslovakia, in the name of Germany's national interest. "Friendly socialist" governments were installed in Poland and other East European countries by Stalin in the name of Soviet Union's national interest. President Bush was acting in America's national interest when he led the war against Iraq on the question of Kuwait's annexation by Iraq. Benazir Bhutto thought that it was in Pakistan's national interest to destabilize the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir.

Thus, all actions, howsoever, wrong are taken in the name of national interest. We must now try to find an acceptable definition of national interest. The idea of national interest is singularly vague. It assumes variety of meanings in different contexts. The concept of national interest has not been objectively or scientifically defined. However, Padleford and Lincoln observe : "Concepts

of national interests are centred on the core values of the society, which include the welfare of the nation, the security of its political beliefs, national way of life, territorial integrity and its self-preservation." According to Robert Osgood, national interest is "state of affairs valued solely for its benefit to the nations." Morgenthau maintains that the main requirements of a nation-state are to protect its physical, political and cultural identity against threat from other states. But, Joseph Frankel writes about aspirational and operation & aspects of national interest. Aspirational (what one expects) aspects include the state's vision of good life and an ideal set of goals to be realized. Put into operation, national interest refers to sum total of its interests and policies actually pursued.

Because the label, "*National Interest*" is so broad that it is like pin pricks in a black paper with a bright light behind it, shining on a wall. If you had 1000 pinpricks, then you would have constellations of interests out there.

Therefore, the government tries to narrow the definition of "National Interest" to:

1. Defense
2. National Security
3. Economy
4. Interstate and Foreign Commerce
5. Foreign relations
6. And the state of general national affairs.

One of the good examples that can be set in concrete with national interest is for instance a federal energy policy. Since "energy" is at the root of just about every issue from transportation, national defense, commerce and foreign relations, not to mention national security etc. that it's strategic in nature; energy is a "national interest".

The reason why its so hard to nail down is that the national interest is so varied and extends into so many corners of our daily lives, its sometimes hard to define only one area unless its a glaring area. Another area would be defense. The defense of this nation requires a standing military made up of several branches. Therefore, it is in our national interest to have a strong and capable military.

Formulating National Interest. This brings us to the question as to how National Interest is formulated. Communists in Vietnam, having impoverished their country, now seek to enter the capitalistic world market economy. Funny how things work out. The utility of national interest is not in any formula that

can untangle complex issues. National interest is useful in training the decision maker to ask a series of questions, such as: How are current developments affecting my nation's power? Are hostile forces able to harm my vital interests? Do I have enough power to protect my vital interests? Which of my interests are secondary? How much of my power am I willing to use to defend them? What kind of deals can I get in compromises over secondary interests? The net impact of these questions is to restrain impetuous types from embarking on crusades.

Morgenthau's argument is that the world would be a much better place if all statesmen would consistently ask such questions, for that would induce a sense of limits and caution into their strategies that might otherwise be lacking. For those who simply will not keep their national interests defined tightly and close to home but instead are intent on expanding their power (imperialism), Morgenthau's approach is also useful. The statesman is constantly scanning the horizon to detect the growth of hostile power centers, and if they seem likely to impinge on his national interests he formulates strategies to safeguard them, each step grounded on adequate power. The national interest approach is terribly old-fashioned and some thinkers argue it has been or must be superseded by "world interest" or "world order" approaches, which go beyond the inherent selfishness of national interest. Empirically, however, one would still find national interest a better predictor of state strategy than world order. In a crisis, when it comes to putting their troops in harm's way, statesmen still ask themselves, "What is my nation's interest in all this?" It is still not a bad question.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY MAKING PRISM:

THE INDIAN CONTEXT

Any discussion on National security Policy Making Prism has to take into consideration the following:

1. The Historical Reality
2. The Indian Dilemma

Historical Reality: India on gaining independence in 1947, inherited many disadvantages. Despite carrying the baggage of many accumulated burden of misuse over the centuries she did have one natural advantage of gaining a resurgent nationalism on gaining independence in 1947. One should not fail to note that India has been a subject nation for centuries without experiencing

the status of a nation state or the culture of experiencing nation hood. India's diversity, her multi-cultural, multi-racial, multi religious and multi ethnic characteristics were greatly deride as well as destroyed and literally shut down. India also carried the consequences of servitude and the humiliation of military defeats in the hands of the invaders from outside over centuries. Interestingly, India became subservient to its inherited partitioned geography, which created Pakistan. This aspect has led to the unending interpretation of its territorial integrity by outside power to the extent of being internationalized by the members of the international organization.

Conceptually, Indian political class as leaders of the largest democracy even at the time of independence committed an unpardonable error which searched for the sustaining roots of Indian nationhood in alien idioms, values and norms. The acceptance of geographical division of the undivided India agreed to by the political blunder committed by Indian political leadership and such decision making influenced by the outgoing British Raj has created today the crisis of identity of the nation states' nomenclature which has remained undefined: Bharat, Hindustan or India. While the moral and psychological momentum of the freedom movement carried on till the disastrous military set back in 1962. Thanks to the idealism of Nehru and illiteracy of Krishna Menon on matters military, India dissipated the high moral and practical aspects of nationalism to guide the destiny of independent India. This coupled with the confusion created by Gandhian pacifism compounded by initiating non-alignment as a foreign policy tool to address hard realities of real politic played by the super powers during the cold war period and the absurdity of rewriting non-alignment as non-alignment 2.0 as late as in 2013 by group of public intellectuals in collusion with some of the top bureaucrats responsible to craft India's Strategic policies reduced India's strategic thinking to irrelevancy by the end of the term of the last Government in office in 2014⁴⁰. That India till 1995, did not have a declared Defence policy but only guide lines is evident from the statements of the Defence Secretary of India in 1990 followed by the Prime Minister in 1995, as appended below

Defence Secretary in 1990 had stated:

"I would submit that perhaps we have not been able to convince the honourable committee through our various notes that there is a policy. It is perhaps not defined in the manner that the committee was looking for. He further added that "there is a document called the Operational Directives. It is a fairly comprehensive paper, which is issued from the Defence Secretary to the three Chiefs of Staff. It

seeks to bring about as clearly as possible, under given circumstances, the threat situation which has been visualized in consultation not only with the three Services but the various agencies, the Ministry of External Affairs, as necessary with the Home Ministry in consultation with the Prime Minister's Office and finally it is approved by the Defence Minister. We have such a document, which has been in existence for a considerable period."

Further on On 16 May 1995, the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Shri P. V. Narasimha Rao, stated:

Mr. Speaker, Sir, I would only confine myself to a few matters, a very few matters impinging on the defence policy of the Government and I would like to take the House into confidence and explain these things to the best possible extent, to the extent I can.

Sir, the first criticism has been rather an extraordinary kind of criticism to say that we have no National Defence Policy. I would like to submit very respectfully that this is not true.

We do not have a document called India's National Defence Policy but we have got several guidelines, which are followed, strictly followed and observed, and those can be summed up as follows:

1. To defend our National Territory over land, sea and air, encompassing among others the inviolability of our land borders, island territories, offshore assets and our maritime trade routes.
2. To secure an internal environment whereby our Nation State is insured against any threats to its unity or progress on the basis of religion, language, ethnicity or socioeconomic dissonance.
3. To be able to exercise a degree of influence over the nations in our immediate neighbourhood to promote harmonious relationships in tune with our national interests.
4. To be able to effectively contribute towards regional and international stability and to possess an effective out-of-the-country contingency capability to prevent destabilisation of the small nations in our immediate neighbourhood that could have adverse security implications for us.

From the above exposition it can be clearly inferred that for the first fifty years after India's independence, the political leadership have made the utterances on defence policy not through a policy document but as guidelines produced by the bureaucracy without any inputs from the Indian intellectual community at large or various stake holders in a transparent way. Even today, there is no official enunciation of a Defence Policy of India by the Government, no official

document enumerating National Security Strategy and no White Paper on Defence Strategy like those published by the US, UK, China, Australia or a hoard of other countries.

Indian Dilemma: India since the beginning of the cold war suffered from three shortcomings. First Nehru's relegating economics of market to a minor position in diplomacy, second, his inability of understanding of the inevitable onslaught of the potential power of an information age in the making and third, the long period of Nehru's leadership as prime minister. Devoid of the realist approach to world order the Nehruvian vision resulted in the incorporation of the worldview that were based on the premise that there were only moral solutions to political problems. Translated into actual implementation, India incorporated central planning and state ownerships in all strategic sectors of defense production and social welfare including education under the garb of mixed capitalistic economy. Private sector thus remained confined to consumer oriented consumable products production, which accounted to less than thirty percent of total outlay for national development.

Proper incorporation of security studies in institutes of higher education on one side and allowing the corporate and private sector to have a stake in matters security would have led to the evolution of strategic thinking to protect the core values and national interests of the nation. In the absence of such a paradigm, the bottom line of the entire development of the rationality of strategic thinking and projection of security perspectives was entrusted to government organization centric empowered regime, which was constituted to ensure that strategically the country was administered to govern and not govern to administer.


National interest and the nation state are not twins. Did national interests emerge along with the interests of human beings? The answer is no. The reason is simple. If there is no state, then there is no national interest. Interest is a social concept. Its subject is, of course, human being with a social nature. For various reasons human beings are classified into various types and groups. Thus interests also vary; individual interests, family interests, children's interests, women's interests, class interests, party interests, social interests, government interests, etc.

The Change: Much has changed today and there is hope and optimism in the air as participation of agencies other than the state on security and discourse on strategy has increased. Decentralization of empowerment to 'think' has occurred. Media has taken centre stage to act as vigilante and information is available to people. Publication and writings on matters security has nearly exploded. Various Commissions have taken the centre stage. There is a definite


impact of neo-realism on India's approach to galvanize National Security policy making strategy supported by strategic thinking where in the culture of strategic thinking has perceptively changed to become more realistic.

Strengthening the National Security architecture will be possible if the TRIAD of Defence and Strategic Studies, Defence Studies and Analysis and National Security Policy Making become interdependent organically, intellectually, professionally and systemically⁴¹. It also needs to be emphasized that "doctrine" as a term is loosely used. Doctrine is the crystallization of concepts that in due course has the potential to yield policies. Also there is an urgent need to compile suitable lexicons of terms to be used in the domain of Security and Strategic Studies. If India has to play its rightful role in global politics as a major power, then it is essential for her to develop world class human resources specialized in National Security Affairs. The schematic flow chart is given on next page.

THE INDIAN CONTEXT: CONSTITUTING THE TRIAD







END NOTES

- 1 McGann, James G., "2016 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report" (2017). TTCSP Global Go To Think Tank Index Reports. 12., p.26 http://repository.upenn.edu/think_tanks/12, accessed 16 March 2017.
- 2 R Gopaldaswami On Think Tanks in India, writes that "The concept and practice of Think Tank is not what it is popularly perceived or described in the literature , as "out-of-the-box" thinking by a set of people within and outside organizational boundaries, whose papers are read by strategists and strategic administrators/ managers at Apex Levels of institutions. Actually, "Think" is not a big or complex issue, for it is already happening in India....."Tank" is the real issue, which really matters when implementing change in an organization (that is the very purpose of thinking!!). It is very easy to gather ideas (the "Think" part of strategic change management) to formulate strategy through the various means your mails have brought out. It is an altogether a different thing for the organization to "Tank" the thinking process i.e implement the strategies thus formulated from ideas gathered by the organizational "think" process. This is happening very rarely in India. Real, sustainable change (and I speak from actual experience at strategic levels in

Government and Government-owned high-tech industry) occurs when the Think process and Tank process become two sides of the same coin as a single unified process guided at apex levels of the organization. Then really effective strategic change management takes place and goals and objectives of the whole Think Tank process are attained in a seamless manner (almost!! and there are ways to cater with unexpected disruptions in the change processes) ,

- 3 Kelley, 1988.
- 4 See *What Should Think Tanks Do?: A Strategic Guide to Policy Impact* Paperback – July 31, 2013 by Andrew Dan Selee (Author) writes
- 5 *Do Think Tanks Matter?*, Second Edition: Assessing the Impact of Public Policy Institutes Paperback – September 1, 2009 by Donald E. Abelson
- 6 McGann, James G., "2016 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report" (2017). TTCSP Global Go To Think Tank Index Reports. 12., p. 8. http://repository.upenn.edu/think_tanks/12, accessed 16 March 2017.
- 7 See Guruswami on Think Tanks in India
- 8 RAJIV NAINAN Sunday, 17 August 2014 | Uttam Kumar Sinha / Rajiv Nayan | in Agenda
- 9 MODIONNITIAYOG S.Raghotham | August 24, 2014, 06.08 am IST <http://www.deccanchronicle.com/140824/commentary-op-ed/article/planning-commission-replacement-%E2%80%98new-body-new-soul-new-thinking%E2%80%99>
- 10 RSS THINK TANKS <http://www.catchnews.com/india-news/eight-rss-think-tanks-that-are-competing-for-the-intellectual-space-1440703010.html>
- 11 Guruswami on Think Tanks in India
- 12 See Sunday, 17 August 2014 | Uttam Kumar Sinha / Rajiv Nayan | in Agenda
- 13 The two succeeding parts on National Interest and National Security Policy Making has been grafted from my latest book “National Interest and National Security Policy Making Prism for India” being released by CLAWS in April 2017.
- 14 I have abridged this section from my reading on National Interest available at http://hass.unsw.adfa.edu.au/timor_companion/fracturing_the_bipartisan_consensus/national_interest.php
- 15 J Armstrong, *Nation Before Nationalism*, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1982.
- 16 A Smith, *The Origin of Nations*, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 12., No. 3 1989.
- 17 B Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, Verso, London, 1991, pp.36-46.
- 18 J Frankel, *National Interest*, Pall Mall, London, 1970.
- 19 Ibid.
- 20 Ibid., P.21.

- 21 E F Carr, *Nationalism and After*, MacMillan London, 1945., pp. 2-6.
- 22 F. Meinecke, *Machiavellianism: The Doctrine of Raison d'état: Its Place in Modern History*, New Brunswick and London, 1998. P., 10
- 23 Machiavelli 1961; 1999:50, 57).
- 24 C. Beard, *The Idea of National Interest: An Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy*, Macmillan, New York, 1934. P. 155.
- 25 *Ibid.*, p.156.
- 26 *Ibid.*
- 27 *Ibid.*, 157.
- 28 Rousseau 1960: p. 190.
- 29 *Ibid.*
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- 31 J. Rosenau, 'National Interest', in Sills D (ed), *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Crowell Collier and Macmillan, New York, 1968.
- 32 *Ibid.*
- 33 Frankel, *op.cit.*, pp. 31-32
- 34 *Ibid.*, P., 33.
- 35 *Ibid.*, p. 35.
- 36 R. Aron, *Peace and War*, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1966.
- 37 *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 5 Peoples Press. 1977, p. 274.
- 38 *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, Vol. 3., People's Press. 1993., pp. 328-29
- 39 Zhou Enlai, *Selection on Foreign Affairs*, Central Document Press, 1990, p.2
- 40 The notion of Nonalignment or whatever was left saw its demise when a group of public intellectuals tried to resurrect it in 2012. See Sunil Khilani, Rajiv Kumar at.el, (Edited), *NONALIGNMENT 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy For India in the Twenty First Century*, Printed and published in India 2012. The publication does not indicate the name or the place of the printers nor was it placed on sale. However, it records that "The views, findings and recommendations of this document are the product of collective deliberation by an independent group of analysts and policy makers: Sunil Khilnani, Rajiv Kumar, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Prakash Menon, Nandan Nilekani, Srinath Raghavan, Shyam Saran, Siddharth Varadarajan. The group's activities were administratively supported by the National Defence College and Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi. This document does not represent the views of either of these institutions, their faculty or their administration. Nor does it represent the views of any of the institutions with which the authors of document are affiliated. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in this document are the sole responsibility of the authors."

The publication was timed and released just before the Indian Prime Minister was to attend the Soul Nuclear Summit. The release of this document in Ashoka Hotel, New Delhi was attended by Shri Brijesh Mishra, Shri M K Narain both former NSAs and Shri Shiv Shankar Menon, the then National Security Advisor.

41 Gautam Sen, op., cit.

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